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ABSTRACT 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
Headquarters and its predecessor the NATO SOF Coordination Center (NSCC) have 
made significant progress in special operations interoperability during its brief history. 
Despite the rapid progress, large gaps in communications, doctrine, intelligence sharing, 
equipment, and structure within NATO SOF units remain. The lessons learned from the 
past decade of persistent conflict and emergence of advanced communication capabilities 
offer an unprecedented window to analyze and enhance special operations 
interoperability within NATO and abroad.  
This research analyzes what systems and procedures increase special operations 
interoperability among coalition special operations forces, interagency, and diplomatic 
partners to enhance combined operations. The overarching hypothesis proposes that 
special operations coalitions with high levels of camaraderie, social and technical 
networking, and the presence of common threats enable enhanced special operations 
interoperability and effectiveness in combined operations. These dynamics coalesce to 
produce the accelerants of trust, responsibility, and access that contribute to elevate 
coalitions from marginal levels of integration to become trusted special operations 
networks. Enhanced special operations interoperability serves as a catalyst to facilitate 
communication and effectiveness among military, law enforcement, diplomatic, and 
interagency partners collaborating against common asymmetric threats. 
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During the opening decade of the 21st century, non-state actors, waging 
asymmetric conflict, emerged as common security threats to industrialized nations in an 
increasingly interconnected global economy. The non-state actors challenging NATO at 
home and abroad are not influenced easily by traditional deterrence measures or 
alliances. Security partnerships and military alliances must adapt to challenge asymmetric 
threats with common resolve and unity of effort to remain relevant. Many conventional 
military units lack capacity, training, and tactical flexibility to combat the greatest threats 
to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. Across the NATO Alliance, 
political and military leaders recognize the utility and economy of force potential for 
special operation forces (SOF). NATO and its partners should recognize the utility of 
establishing collaborative SOF networks capable of facilitating rapid offensive and 
defense measures against emerging threats. NATO’s failure to collaborate and adapt will 
undermine the relevancy of the alliance and threaten its population and infrastructure. 
The newly formed NATO SOF Headquarters (NSHQ) in Mons, Belgium provides 
the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe (SACEUR) a “primary point of development, 
direction and coordination for all NATO Special Operations-related activities.”1 Despite 
the dysfunction and bureaucracy of the larger NATO alliance, the NSHQ serves as a 
relevant and vibrant component meeting vital security gaps across Europe, North 
American, and beyond. This organization serves as a prototype and hub for establishing 
similar regional SOF organizations around the globe to establish a worldwide SOF 
network combating terror and asymmetric threats. This report highlights current unique 
opportunities for success where previous integration efforts have failed. The unique 
convergence of favorable conditions creates the greatest potential for long-term 
interoperability and cohesion since the end of World War II. Some of these opportunities 
include common experience during Afghanistan operations, emerging networking 
                                                 
1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters, “NSHQ Mission,” 2011, 
http://www.nshq.nato.int/NSHQ/page/mission/. 
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capabilities, and NSHQ backed initiatives to increase special operations integration and 
common trust. NATO SOF capacity building initiatives serve as the best defense to 
prevent significant degradation of current capabilities, camaraderie, and cooperation 
gained through combined operations over the past decade. Harnessing this unprecedented 
momentum will enhance NATO SOF interoperability and performance in combined 
operations.  
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
This research explored methods that contribute to effective combined special 
operations integration, cohesion, and increased tactical performance. The author 
highlights combined SOF operations from the past decade to identify best practices in unit 
integration seeking to achieve optimal coalition special operations interoperability in 
future conflicts and domestic security operations. This analysis holistically examined 
various mechanisms and methods that foster effective multinational SOF integration to 
meet the threats of the 21st century. 
The scope of this research defined how strengthening communication and 
interoperability between coalition special operations forces can additionally facilitate 
integration with international diplomatic, inter-agency, and national level law 
enforcement partners. Diplomatic channels traditionally served as the primary method of 
international cooperation, yet extensive professional networks created by special 
operations forces offer other valuable avenues for coordination and communication. 
Although the need for special operations integration is global, the large number of units 
and wide range of tactical and technical capabilities make a detailed global study 
impractical. Although conventional forces face similar challenges to coalition warfare, 
SOF coalitions’ smaller sizes, common language capacity, and intimate tactical 
relationships make integration more feasible, and their study more prudent. The NHSQ 
serves as an excellent testing ground to analyze SOF interoperability issues. The NSHQ 




2007. The NSHQ has close working relationships with non NATO special operations 
partners, and other key allies in Asia. These relationships create potential to export key 
policy recommendations beyond the NATO Alliance.  
C. BACKGROUND  
Twenty-first century threats, such as terrorism, piracy, cyber-warfare, and 
weapons of mass destruction, pose common challenges to the industrialized nations of the 
world. The complexity of modern international threats requires specialized skills, 
integrated intelligence, and military cooperation. To meet these challenges, combined 
special operations units must achieve seamless strategic integration with global allies and 
inter-agency partners to achieve success in future combined operations. Despite advances 
made during the conflicts of the past two decades, tactical level special operations 
integration is still problematic. During the past decade, special operations units have 
relied on personal relationships and liaison officers to overcome interoperability issues 
and bridge communication gaps with inter-agency partners. Identifying formalized 
mechanisms to improve communication among special operations units and their partners 
will be essential to improve long-term interoperability and enhanced performance. 
Achieving global integration will require seamless communication and 
interoperability between coalition special operations units, conventional military allies, 
interagency partners, and international organizations. The Madrid and London bombings, 
and the extensive financing and recruiting terrorist networks in Europe, establish a clear 
focus for NSHQ beyond out of area commitments. The 2010 United States National 
Security Strategy emphasizes a commitment to coalition building, “our relationship with 
our European allies remains the cornerstone for United States engagement with the 
world, and a catalyst for international action.”2 Despite military spending cuts in recent 
years, most European nations protected their special operations units’ budgets, in 
recognition of the wide range of domestic and international special operations 
                                                 
2 United States Government Executive Branch, “2010 United States National Security Strategy,” 2010, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 
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capabilities.3 The focus outlined in the 2010 National Security Strategy and the 
increasing capabilities of European SOF indicate that greater coalition SOF integration 
will play a strategic role in United States-European relations.  
The NATO SOF Headquarters, and its predecessor NATO SOF Coordination 
Center, have made significant progress in SOF interoperability during its brief four-year 
history. Despite the rapid progress, large gaps in communications, doctrine, intelligence 
sharing, equipment, and structure within NATO SOF contributing nations remain. The 
lessons learned from the past decade of persistent conflict and permeation of modern 
communication capabilities offer an unprecedented window to analyze and enhance SOF 
interoperability. Although public support for NATO participation in Afghanistan has 
declined in recent years, the conflict has been a tremendous accelerant to develop NATO 
SOF integration and experience. The NSHQ’s task over the next five years is to build 
upon this momentum and solidify long-term SOF interoperability and capacity within the 
alliance and its partners. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
In this report, the author proposes a framework of systems and procedures that 
increase interoperability and operational performance within coalition special operations 
and interagency partners in combined operations and domestic security initiatives. The 
NATO Special Operations Headquarters serves as a case study to analyze the feasibility 
of establishing other regional special operation organizations to facilitate unity of effort 
and interoperability against common asymmetric threats. 
E. RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Prior to the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the concept of establishing a 
common special operations capability within NATO largely resided in works of fiction. 
Tom Clancy’s 1998 novel Rainbow Six provided a fictional account of a coalition 
counter-terror force composed of SOF personnel from several NATO partners dedicated 
                                                 
3 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, “Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence,” 
June 10, 2010, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2010_06/20100610_PR_CP_2010_078.pdf. 
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to combat non-state actor “free-agents.”4 Several books on early combined SOF 
operations by Task Force K-Bar in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan 
described the importance of fostering SOF interoperability, including Not a Good Day to 
Die by Sean Naylor.5 Nora Bensahel’s RAND report, The Counterterror Coalitions, 
provides an overview of some of the early combined efforts in the early stages of the 
Global War on Terror and advocates a balanced United States approach that combines 
bilateral and multinational SOF efforts.6 Andrew Hoehn and Sarah Harting’s RAND 
report, Risking NATO, provides a detailed analysis of the alliance’s operation in 
Afghanistan, which predicts a dwindling NATO presence in the conflict and increased 
focus of domestic security threats across Europe.7 The limited subsequent literature 
specifically dedicated to coalition special operations interoperability and the 
establishment of NATO SOF resides in military journal articles or NATO publications. 
The first journal article prescribing a detailed model for the establishment of a NATO 
SOF command was Gompert and Smith’s, Creating a NATO Special Operations Force.8 
This groundbreaking work described a potential framework for a counter-terror element 
within the NATO command consisting of rotating “inner ring” units prepared to deploy 
within 24 hours and other “outer ring” partner units that would share common 
interoperability and training goals.9 Some of the concepts prescribed by Gompert and 
Smith gained further traction with the publication of General James Jones’s article, A 
Blueprint for Change, which highlights the initiatives of the newly formed NATO SOF 
Coordination Center.10  
                                                 
4 Tom Clancy, Rainbow Six, 1st ed. (New York: Berkley, 1999). 
5 Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: Berkley 
Books, 2005). 
6 Nora Bensahel, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and The European 
Union (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, Project Air Force, 2003), 
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1746/. 
7 Andrew Hoehn and Project Air Force (U.S.), Risking NATO: Testing the Limits of the Alliance in 
Afghanistan (Santa Monica CA: RAND, 2010). 
8 David Gompert and Raymond Smith, “Creating a NATO Special Operations Force,” Defense 
Horizons, no. 52 (March 1, 2006).  
9 Ibid. 
10 James Jones, “A Blueprint for Change: Transforming NATO Special Operations,” Issue 45 (2nd 
Quarter, 2007). 
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Beyond the limited number of journal articles dedicated specifically to NATO 
SOF integration, the NSHQ has published many of the other relevant documents 
pertaining to NATO SOF. The NATO SOF Study published in 2008 sought input from 
NATO SOF personnel concerning progress made through the NSCC’s transformation 
efforts.11 Additional documents produced by the NSHQ include the Special Operations 
Task Group (SOTG) Manual and the Combined/Joint Forces Special Operations 
Component Commander (CJFSOCC) Manual.12 These documents give a theoretical 
overview to structure forces for enhanced integration while emphasizing that national 
SOF forces should primarily structure their forces to meet national military objectives. 
The NATO Military Committee Special Operations Policy and subsequent Allied Joint 
Doctrine for Special Operations provide more of an operational level overview of SOF 
operations that describes the establishment of forward temporary headquarters and 
command relationships during contingency operations.13 Although these manuals 
highlight some of the important interoperability issues in a conflict, they do not fully 
describe how to best integrate forces prior to deployment.  
U.S. doctrine offers limited insight into best practices in special operations 
integration. U.S. Joint Publication 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force 
Operations describes planning factors to consider in multinational operations, such as 
varying force capabilities, rules of engagement, intelligence sharing limitations, and 
language barriers.14 Field Manual 100-8: The Army in Multinational Operations states 
that U.S. Special Forces are well suited to fill the role of coalition support teams due to 
“their regional orientation, language capability, and requirement to train foreign 
                                                 
11 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Coordination Center, “North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization Special Operations Forces Study,” December 2008.  
12 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Coordination Center, NATO Special 
Operations Coordination Center SOTG Manual, Version 1.0 (2009); and NATO SOF Coordination Center, 
“NATO Special Operations Coordination Center CJFSOCC Manual” (December 11, 2009).  
13 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Allied Joint Publications 3.5: Allied Joint Doctrine for Special 
Operations,” January 27, 2009; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Military Committee Decision 437/1, 
Special Operations Policy,” June 11, 2006. 
14 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force,” 2007, 
IV–5. 
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forces.”15 The manual further cites the key role these elements have in building cohesion 
and synchronizing operations during coalition operations.16 These manuals outline some 
of the challenges and opportunities in multinational special operations, but they not offer 
advanced solutions for achieving full integration of special operations capabilities and 
resources.  
Although limited literature exists specifically relating to the dynamics of NATO 
special operations, many scholars have addressed NATO’s evolving mission against 
emerging threats. Much of this literature outlines the common threats facing NATO 
members, such as rogue states, piracy, weapons of mass destruction, criminal activity, 
and terrorism.17 Further analysis focuses on the political debate and tension between the 
United States, France, and Germany prior to the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom.18 
Many contemporary reviews of NATO, such as James Goldgeier’s holistic overview of 
the alliance The Future of NATO, focus on the ability of the alliance to respond quickly to 
emerging threats and remain flexible to adapt to irregular threats.19 Although these 
references provide valuable insight into what must be done to make the NATO alliance 
relevant in the 21st century, significant voids remain in the available literature describing 
how to accomplish these tasks.  
Despite renewed interest in the Afghanistan conflict, limited coverage has 
examined ISAF special operations integration in Afghanistan or ongoing NATO SOF 
interoperability initiatives. This critical void in literature leaves most military scholars 
unaware of NATO special operations units’ recent progress. The NSHQ produced its 
Biennial Review in 2010, a valuable resource serving as a roadmap for future initiatives, 
                                                 
15 Headquarters, Department of the Army, “FM 100-8: The Army in Multinational Operations,” 1997, 
2–20. 
16 Ibid. 
17 For overview on NATO’s evolving mission following the invasion of Afghanistan see: Philip H. 
Gordon, “NATO after11 September,” and David Yost “NATO and International Organizations.”  
18 For a brief highlight of the many contemporary articles documenting the diplomatic row between 
the United States, France and Germany prior to initiation of combat operations in Iraq, see: BBC News 
World Edition, “Outrage at ‘Old Europe’ Remarks,” January 23, 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2687403.stm; and Josef Joffe, “The World—The Alliance is Dead. Long 
Live the New Alliance,” September 29, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/29/weekinreview/the-
world-the-alliance-is-dead-long-live-the-new-alliance.html. 
19 James Goldgeier, The Future of NATO (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2010). 
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as well as an assessment for previous efforts and description of current operations.20 
Within the United States Special Operations Command, exposure to NATO SOF 
initiatives is generally limited to members of the 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group 
forward deployed in Germany. This unit has cooperated with European special operations 
units for more than 50 years and has been an ISAF SOF contributor since 2007, while 
other American special operations units in Afghanistan operate under Operation Enduring 
Freedom auspices. The sparse literature and minimal operational exposure limits most 
U.S. special operations units’ appreciation for the impressive resources and training 
available to NATO SOF members and partners.  
In the past four years, several field grade officers have captured their experience 
in combined NATO SOF operations while attending the United States Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) and Command and General Staff College (CGSC). These 
student theses represent some of the best sources of information regarding specific 
NATO SOF growth outside of NSHQ publications. U.S. Army Major Sean Berg 
discussed the initial stages of the NATO SOF Transformation Initiative (NSTI) and the 
structure and function of an emerging NATO SOF network in 2007.21 In 2009, U.S. 
Army Major Steve Taylor analyzed the goals and initial progress of the NSTI and 
recommended further support for future growth.22 In 2010, Norwegian Navy Commando 
Lieutenant Commander Kjetil Mellingen compared the growth of the Norwegian, Polish 
and Canadian Special Operations Command to recommend similar transformation within 
Norwegian special operations.23 These three theses are only a sample of the previous and 
ongoing academic research conducted by NATO SOF officers in academic institutions 
across NATO contributing nations. Ongoing NATO SOF related research by 
                                                 
20 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters, “Biennial Review,” 2010. 
21 Robert Berg, “Reform of Command and Control Structures in North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Special Operations Forces” (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 2007), 
http://www.stormingmedia.us/32/3221/A322174.html. 
22 Steven Taylor, “The NATO Special Operations Forces Transformation Initiative: Opportunities and 
Challenges” (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School Defense Analysis Department, March 2009), 
http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2009/Mar/09Mar_Taylor_S.pdf. 
23 Kjetil Mellingen, “Strategic Utilization of Norwegian Special Operations Forces” (Master's thesis, 
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Defense Analysis Department, June 2010), 
http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2010/Jun/10Jun_Mellingen.pdf. 
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multinational Naval Postgraduate School students include in-depth analysis of 
intelligence sharing and the BICES Network, integration of Dutch maritime forces, 
radicalization in Europe, and business development models for the NSHQ. These 
ongoing research projects by NATO SOF veterans attempt to capture their valuable 
combat experiences to assist NATO SOF development and success. 
While limited resources focus specifically on NATO SOF, a number of resources 
document the changing security priorities for NATO allies. The threat of domestic 
terrorism across Europe has been the focus of a number of recent books including 
Melanie Phillips’s Londonistan, Alison Pargeter’s The New Frontiers of Jihad, and 
Zachary Shore’s Breeding Bin Ladens.24 In Europe and Counterterrorism Kristin 
Archick and Paul Gallis discuss European nations’ post–2001 counterterrorism (CT) 
initiatives and efforts to balance domestic political sensitivities with U.S. global CT 
strategy.25 Although these resources frame the evolution of contemporary threats, they do 
not provide sufficient coverage of the challenges presented by the global economic crisis, 
the difficulties of deterring non-state actors, and demographic change across Europe from 
a NATO security perspective.  
F. CONCEPTUAL LITERATURE 
Conceptual literature analyzing social bonding, trust development, network 
centric warfare, and global interdependence offer individual insights to create innovative 
solutions for SOF integration. A topic of debate within the international relations 
academic community focuses on the impact of globalization on global economic 
interdependency, political structures, and defense. Political economist Francis Fukuyama 
suggests contemporary thought on cultural conflict is too narrow. He proposes that 
exposure to cultural differences frequently encourage innovation and increased 
                                                 
24 Alison Pargeter, The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Steve Hewitt, The British War on Terror: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism on 
the Home Front Since 9-11 (London: Continuum, 2008); and Melanie Phillips, Londonistan, 1st ed. (New 
York: Encounter Books, 2006).  
25 Kristin Archick, Europe and Counterterrorism (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003). 
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understanding.26 Founders of the neoliberalism school, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye 
describe the multiple connections that collectively bind nations together in their theory of 
“complex interdependence.”27 The highly interconnected European economy and 
prevalence of common threats to European nations typify many of these concepts, and 
offer a renewed mandate for NATO. Ongoing NSHQ initiatives build from these 
concepts and foster simultaneous advancement in cultural understanding while 
encouraging coalition SOF cohesion. 
The subject of trust elicits much academic discussion, research, and debate 
relevant to forging camaraderie in combined SOF units. Much of this research has the 
potential to assist the NSHQ with its ongoing efforts to harness and enhance existing trust 
and camaraderie. Tom Tyler defines trust as “an attribution that people make about the 
motives of a group authority.”28 Francis Fukuyama argues that trusted relationships 
develop along cultural lines and emphasizes the role of social capital, or the connections 
among and between social networks.29 Jean Ensminger’s research argues that 
demographic factors within cultures further influence rational decision making.30 These 
conclusions are especially relevant as the remnants of Cold War era divisions persist in 
some developing regions of Eastern Europe. Cook, Hardin, and Levi describe that a 
trusted relationship, “emerges out of mutual interdependence and the knowledge 
developed over time of reciprocal trustworthiness.” 31 In this relationship, trust acts as a 
catalyst to generate even greater levels of future trust as seen with increased intelligence 
sharing in combat operations.  
                                                 
26 Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and The Creation of Prosperity (Free Press 
Paperbacks, 1996). 
27 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Power and Interdependence Revisited,” International 
Organization 41, no. 4 (May 2009), 725. 
28 Tom Tyler, “Why Do People Rely on Others? Social Identity and Social Aspects of Trust,” in Trust 
in Society (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), 286. 
29 Francis Fukuyama, “Social Capital and the Global Economy,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 5 (1995), 90. 
30 Jean Ensminger, “Reputations, Trust, and the Principal Agent Problem,” in Trust in Society (New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), 186. 
31 Karen Cook, Russell Hardin, and Margaret Levi, Cooperation Without Trust? (New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation, 2005). 
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Political economist Elinor Ostrum emphasizes the impact of trust, reciprocity, and 
reputation in cooperation and group performance.32 As NATO SOF attempts to establish 
unit camaraderie, the command must overcome long-standing unit reputations and 
loyalties to establish a greater common purpose than pure national interest. Philip Gordon 
describes the importance on trusted relationships in current military campaigns, “since 
(9–11), the benefits of having close allies with similar interests and values—and the tools 
to defend them—are all too clear.”33 While trust is essential in counter-terror operations, 
mistrust can quickly erode coalition. Former Indian Army General Saighal keenly noted 
the necessity of maintaining trusted relationships among modern coalitions, “when 
mistrust increases, the global fight against terrorism will start petering out.”34  
The study of social bonds and cohesion provides significant insight to determine 
how small units can increase collective performance and relate to other organizations. 
The work of sociologist Mark Granovetter in strong and weak bonds has helped to 
illustrate how relationships between individuals can expand to link extended communities 
of associates.35 SOF units’ ability to link inter-agency partners serves as an example of 
this dynamic. Research policy scientist Bruce Newsome has compared scientific research 
from around the world regarding whether soldiers in combat draw from pre-existing 
personal motivation or group enhanced motivation.36 He concludes that the American 
military’s emphasis harnessing recruits intrinsic motivation held prior to their military 
service differs from most other militaries that prefer to focus on extrinsic motivation 
developed through teamwork and unit cohesion.37 Additional research by Newsome 
analyzes the key factors that contribute to enhanced soldier performance with a detailed 
                                                 
32 Elinor Ostrom, Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental Research (New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2003). 
33 Philip H. Gordon, “NATO after 11 September,” Survival 43, no. 4 (2001), 90. 
34 Vinod Saighal, Dealing with Global Terrorism: The Way Forward (New Dawn, 2004), 353. 
35 Mark Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited,” Sociological Theory 
1 (1983): 233. 




study comparing United States, United Kingdom, and German special operations.38 
Newsome refutes that SOF units’ effectiveness relies on physical or psychological 
prowess, and argues that unique personnel management establishes unit cohesion and 
identity leading to increased performance. 
The implications of this research indicate that selection and training of talented 
SOF personnel is merely the first step in achieving optimal performance gained through 
strong bonds within units. Military research psychologists, James Griffith and Mark 
Vaitkus, highlight the importance of group structure, stressful training, and social support 
to enhance small unit cohesion.39 Military veterans have witnessed the importance of this 
dynamic. U.S. SOF participation in Joint Combined Executed Training (JCET) events 
with foreign militaries frequently focused on a combination of rigorous combined 
training by day and social outings by night. Ongoing efforts by the NSHQ attempt to 
capture momentum in small unit cohesion and established trust from combined 
operations over the past decade in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan to achieve 
increased global SOF integration and performance. The primary void noted in the 
surveyed literature was a detailed focus on the bonds that overcome cultural and language 
barriers to foster group dynamics inherent to SOF.40 
Considerable literature exists describing the impacts of emerging technology and 
network structures on modern conflict. Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, a pioneer in the 
concept of network centric warfare, outlined how network centric warfare related to a 
“co-evolution of economics, information technology, and business processes.”41 In 1998, 
David Alberts, John Garstka, and Frederick Stein expanded on Cebrowski’s principles 
with Network Centric Warfare, while conceding that “at the current time NCW (network 
                                                 
38 Bruce Newsome, Made, Not Born: Why Some Soldiers Are Better Than Others (Praeger Security 
International, 2007), 143. 
39 James Griffith and Mark Vaitkus, “Relating Cohesion to Stress, Strain, Disintegration, and 
Performance: An Organizing Framework—Military Psychology” 11, no. 1 (March 1, 1999): 27–55. 
40 For an overview of United States Special Operations in the Post-9-11 world see: David Tucker and 
Christopher Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces, Columbia University Press, 2007. 
41 Arthur K Cebrowski and Jhon J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,” in U.S. 
Naval Institute Proceedings, 124 (1998): 28–35. 
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centric warfare) is far more a state of mind than a concrete reality.”42 Defense analysts 
John Arquilla and David Rondfelt’s Swarming & the Future of Conflict outlined how 
small autonomous teams using modern communication to interconnect would be the best 
defense against emerging asymmetric threats.43 Understanding the internal mechanisms 
within network structures and small units is essential to identify how to develop military 
responses to network centric threats. Social Scientists Nicholas Christakis and James 
Fowler have conducted extensive research on how network participation shapes the 
actions and perceptions of individuals and organizations and how information and 
influence travels through networks.44  
Subsequent work by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt established the 
foundations for the principles of “Netwar,” which describes how asymmetric threats have 
organized themselves in worldwide networks, and requires a focus on network centric 
warfare to counter these threats.45 In Networks and Netwars, Arquilla, and Ronfeldt 
describe the traits inherent to a well functioning network: 
The strongest networks will be those in which the organizational design is 
sustained by a winning story and a well-defined doctrine, and in which all 
this is layered atop advanced communications systems and rests on strong 
personal and social ties at the base.46 
NSHQ initiatives collectively described as the Allied and Partner Collaborative Network 
build upon this framework.47 This report uses the framework established by Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt and the principles of the NSHQ’s collaborative network as basis for research 
and expansion of thought on network centric warfare and trust building on coalition SOF.  
                                                 
42 David Alberts, Jhon J Garstka, and Frederick Stein, Network Centric Warfare: Developing and 
Leveraging Information Superiority (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999). 
43 John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: 
Rand, 2000), http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB311/. 
44 Nicholas Christakis and James Fowler, Connected: The Surprising Power of Our Social Networks 
and How They Shape Our Lives (New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company, 2009). 
45 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and 
Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Cooperation, 2001), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382/index.html. 
46 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, 324. 
47 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters, “Allied and Partner 
Collaborative Network (APCN),” 2011, http://www.nscc.bices.org/page/APCN/. 
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The literature on network centric warfare identifies the urgent need to connect all 
available resources to confront modern adversaries. Much of this literature proposes that 
modern military conventional structures remain unprepared to combat asymmetric threat, 
despite years of persistent conflict. In Worst Enemy, Arquilla outlines the American 
military’s hesitancy to fully grasp his “netwar” doctrine and adapt to network centric 
threats, despite a long history of encountering similar structures in previous conflicts.48 
Foreign policy analyst Stephen Biddle contends that most early operations in Afghanistan 
were fought as “mid-intensity conflict” in a conventional manner using air power, rather 
than revolutionary warfare concepts.49 Similarly, defense analysts Hy Rothstein proposes 
in Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare that following the 
success of initial operations against Taliban forces, U.S. military operations have become 
increasing conventional while its enemy has embraced unconventional tactics.50 Despite 
the limited but well-publicized instances of some special operations forces using 
unconventional and network centric tactics, most NATO SOF operations in Afghanistan 
since 2002 used conventional tactics. Nine years later the American military and many of 
its NATO allies have large numbers of experienced veterans combating networked 
insurgent and terror groups, and possess a greater appreciation for emerging 
counterinsurgency and unconventional tactics. This young corps of veterans has the 
technical capacity and experience to implement the advocated network centric form of 
warfare. The void in this literature remains the practical implementation of SOF to 
achieve full global integration and identify how to build a strong binding narrative 
advocated by Arquilla and Rondfelt within a SOF coalition.51 As NATO nations begin to 
withdrawal troops from the Afghanistan conflict, the NSHQ must ensure it has 
established a strong narrative uniting NATO SOF units interconnected by social and 
technological ties.  
                                                 
48 John Arquilla, Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military (Chicago: 
Ivan R. Dee, 2008). 
49 Stephen Biddle, “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare,” Foreign Affairs (2003), 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58811/stephen-biddle/afghanistan-and-the-future-of-warfare. 
50 Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Annapolis, MD: 
U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2006). 
51 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy. 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. OVERVIEW  
The asymmetric threats of the 21st century pose common security challenges to 
nations around the globe. The NATO SOF Headquarters describes a vision to challenge 
these threats with the Allied and Partner Collaborative Network linking special 
operations units, inter-agency, political, and law enforcement organizations to combat 
emerging terrorist acts, asymmetric threats, and criminal activity.52 The concept of this 
collaborative network includes all of the multi-faceted initiatives to establish trust, 
camaraderie, cooperation, and communication between partner nations. The goal of this 
initiative is ensuring success in global military and security operations. The NATO SOF 
Headquarters cites the influence of John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt’s Networks and 
Netwars in structuring their network approach, which emphasizes the key roles of a 
strong narrative and organizational, doctrinal, technological, and social components.53 
This theoretical framework draws elements from all of the previously mentioned relevant 
literature to best describe mechanisms and processes that contribute to special operations 
organizational success. Although the theories proposed may have some relevance to other 
military organizations, the framework highlights specific group dynamics prevalent in 
special operations coalitions or other small unit collaborations.  
This report builds upon Arquilla and Rondfelt’s framework and other relevant 
literature through emphasis on combined special operations from input from 
multinational special operations veterans and the author’s personal experience.54 The 
theoretical framework described first states the case for multinational special operations 
interoperability efforts, and describes why coalition SOF is a better economic and 
political investment than conventional forces. This argument frames the case for the 
                                                 
52 NSHQ Allied Partner Collaborative Network,” NATO SOF Headquarters website, 
http://www.nshq.nato.int/page/APCN/.  
53 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy. 
54 Author has combined operational experience in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan with 18 NATO allies 
and partners from 2001 to 2009, and five years of service in U.S. Army units forward stationed in 
Germany. 
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framework’s central focus of ensuring SOF coalitions achieve maximum performance 
once they are dedicated to a contingency operation through cooperation, communication, 
and training before conflicts arise. 
While the NSHQ is the framework for this research, the basic concepts proposed 
may be applied to other regional networks promoting special operations interoperability. 
An alliance of regional special operations networks would effectively balance local 
security cooperation with building blocks essential for effective global special operations 
networks targeting non-state actors. This form of international SOF security cooperation 
would be a step toward achieving an effective global network structure advocated by 
Arquilla and Rondfelt to combat competing asymmetric networks.55 A graphical 
depiction of how regional SOF networks could contribute to a global counter-terror 












Figure 1.   Regional SOF Networks and Proposed Global Cooperation 
                                                 
55 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy. 
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B. THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF COALITION SOF  
For the past decade, many NATO nations have deployed conventional troops to 
conflict areas around the world with enduring commitments. In nations that once eagerly 
welcomed western forces, their presence has become a divisive factor in political, social, 
and religious circles. To prevent this dynamic from further eroding public support and 
trust in western military forces across the developing world, special operations must take 
a central role in conflicts to reduce military footprints and facilitate host nation 
operations. While the limited footprint of any special operations element is preferable to 
conventional intervention, effective multinational special operations coalitions diffuse 
potential fears of western imperialism or domination.  
The economic principle of supply and demand offers a simple metaphor for 
understanding the importance of coalition special operations forces in overseas 
contingency operations compared to large-scale conventional forces. During the early 
stages of Operation Enduring Freedom, coalition special operations units mitigated fears 
of American conquest, portrayed common resolve, and contributed valuable experience 
and capabilities to U.S. SOF efforts. During this timeframe, western forces were seen as a 
valuable commodity with increased demand balanced with a limited and prudent supply 
to prevent comparisons of previous Afghan military interventions. As the supply of 
western forces in conflict areas has increased since 2001, the perceived value of these 
forces by many local inhabitants, or consumer demand, has decreased. Large troop 
concentrations and sprawling military installations have contributed to market saturation 
in regions weary of western intentions and contributed to extremist recruiting efforts.  
Coalition SOF intervention limits the western footprint in contingency operations 
while providing access to crucial combat multipliers, such as close air support, advanced 
imagery, and military assistance or training. In many forms of contingency operations, 
special operations forces act as significant force multipliers with each operator frequently 
providing a return on investment equal to several conventional troops. Coalition SOF 
offers a more economical and militarily viable option to achieve common security goals, 
while preserving favorable public opinion or demand within host nation partners for 



































Figure 2.   SOF Economy of Force in Relation to Supply and Demand 
C. ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE COALITION SOF PERFORMANCE 
Establishing a practical theoretical framework for achieving the stated goals is 
essential for long-term special operations interoperability and increased performance. The 
absence of an existing framework specifically designed to explain the complex group 
dynamics inherent in coalition special operations development requires the adaptation 
and evolution of several related theoretical traditions and frameworks. This report 
attempts to propose a simple roadmap for developing coalition special operations 
capacity through the influences of existing areas of research and study.  
The overarching hypothesis of this thesis proposes that special operations 
coalitions with high levels of camaraderie, social and technical networking, and common 
threats and goals, contribute to enhance effectiveness in combined operations. These 
dynamics coalesce to produce the accelerants of trust, responsibility, and access that 
elevate special operations coalitions from marginal performance to become effective 
special operations networks built upon trust and reciprocity. Improved coalition special 
operations interoperability has the potential to serve as a catalyst to facilitate enhanced 
lateral communication between military, law enforcement, diplomatic, and interagency 
Prepared by M. Gates 2011 
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partners. If a special operations coalition lacks any of the dynamics of trust, common 
threats and goals, or technical and social networking, it will not achieve optimal 
performance. 
1. Camaraderie 
The first dynamic of effective special operations coalitions is camaraderie. 
Camaraderie is the mutual trust and friendship within a small group built upon previous 
shared experiences, common lineages, and overlapping professional and personal 
relationships. Within a special operations coalition, camaraderie develops through a 
persistent presence characterized by the ability to maintain unit engagement and 
interaction for extended periods. Persistent presence creates the opportunity for units to 
interact socially and professionally in environments that build small unit cohesion. 
Special operations interoperability is most effective when units train and live within 
proximity. The frequency and variety of interactions between units increase the potential 
for SOF interoperability, where strong relationships have the potential to expand beyond 
casual meetings to take root as lasting relationships. Forward presence enables special 
operations units to gain regional expertise to bridge cultural divides, facilitate cohesion, 
and keep professional and personal relationship networks active through regular face-to-
face meetings and socializing. When family members routinely socialize camaraderie 
increases, emphasizing the benefits of geographic proximity. Additionally, fluency in a 
common language is a key element to establishing deep personal relationships and 
developing the trust required for increased intelligence sharing. Special operations 
require clear communication and common definitions to facilitate the rapid pace of 
tactical operations.  
2. Interdependence 
The second dynamic of successful coalition special operations integration is 
security interdependence. Interdependence is an agreement of common goals dedicated to 
counter common threats. Common threats provide purpose to coalition special operations 
and the impetus to overcome national political objectives, ensure collective security, and 
instill collective responsibility. When these elements coalesce, units will equally 
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contribute to a cohesive team to protect their won national interests and gain trust within 
the coalition. The scope of modern security threats requires vital participation of all 
parties to ensure collective security. In this aspect, the domestic security of all NATO 
nations is only as strong as the combined efforts of the weakest national combined SOF, 
law enforcement, and interagency intelligence apparatus. The worldwide financial crisis 
and increasing government debt across North America and Europe is an emerging 
common threat to NATO nations. This renewed threat has created a requirement for 
increased cooperation to reduce expenses in countering transnational common threats. 
SOF coalitions must rely on all partners to prepare for domestic emergencies while 
maintaining skill sets needed by coalition special operations in out of area operations.  
The complex nature of special operations demands that all elements develop 
advanced niche capabilities to complement coalition requirements while meeting 
common proficiency standards and basic soldier skills common to all partners. Any 
element with degraded capabilities reduces the effectiveness of the entire unit and puts 
other coalition members at risk. SOF units authorized to conduct operations against 
international threats in addition to domestic counter-terror roles are more likely to 
achieve greater interoperability at the tactical level through common equipment and 
combined premission training. Additionally, SOF units contributing to a coalition are 
more likely to share common mission essential task lists (METL) than conventional units 
and have more freedom to acquire specialized equipment outside of national logistics 
channels. With this flexibility, units are more likely to acquire equipment endorsed by 
other partner SOF units, and thus facilitate future interoperability.  
3. Interoperability 
The third dynamic of SOF interoperability is networking, which describes 
methods employed to foster personal and professional collaborative relationships or 
communicate through technical means. Factors that contribute to the ability of SOF 
partners to network include limited barriers to communication and access to both 
common and advanced communication capabilities. Barriers to open communication 
form hierarchies within a coalition, limit full participation by all participants, and create 
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mistrust across the network. An effective special operations coalition must allow all 
parties to contribute to intelligence production and communicate over classified 
networks. Contributing units must find an appropriate balance between protecting 
national secrets and providing coalition partners with need to know information 
concerning emerging threats. Special operations units must also have compatible 
communication portals to facilitate collaboration between units. Personal bonds formed 
in combat establish informal communication networks on which professional networks 
grow if technical structures are available to facilitate communication.  
Digital age technology has created new opportunities for allies to maintain 
relationships following successful engagement including e-mail, social networking, cell 
phones, and face-to-face meetings. Maintaining an open flow of communication is 
essential to enable these relationships to flourish and encourage further collaboration over 
common classified networks as appropriate. Accordingly, fully functioning special 
operations networks harness face-to-face meetings in training, schools, or deployments 
through unclassified communications that create camaraderie and common bonds that 













































Figure 3.   Building Blocks of SOF Networks 
Beneficial special operations integration built upon camaraderie, network 
connectivity, and bonds between special operations coalitions extend beyond military 
relationships. SOF contingency operations require complex coordination with national 
level law enforcement, interagency partners, political leadership, and conventional 
military forces providing essential logistics and resources. This coordination provides 
special operations elements a high degree of network centrality. When special operations 
elements cooperate during combined missions, they provide a bridging capacity to open 
dialogue and cooperation between international partners that may not otherwise have 
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Figure 4.   Special Operations as a Nexus of Security Cooperation  
Strong bonds and network connectivity between special operations units facilitate 
the flow of information between national partners and their international colleagues 
during combined operations, law enforcement, and diplomacy. Therefore, the 
development of trusted networks forged by common goals are not only essential to 
facilitate coalitions’ success, but this integration also enables further partnership among 
many additional international partners supporting common operations. This relationship 
may be more critical in remote regions or emerging operations with limited 
communication infrastructure outside of special operations capabilities. The following 
diagram portrays the relationship of the three described dynamics of special operations 
coalitions. 
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Figure 5.   Dynamics of Coalition Special Operations Integration 
The dynamics of coalition special operations integration enhance interoperability 
and operational performance proportional to the number of complimentary variables 
shared among partner units. When a strong correlation of all three dynamics is present 
among units forming special operations coalitions, the accelerants of trust, responsibility, 
and access enable the relationship to blossom into effective special operations coalitions. 
Special operations partners cannot ignore trust development until after crisis emerges; 
units must nurture relationships to ensure ad hoc coalitions develop upon a foundations of 
mutual respect, confidence, and assurance. The accelerant of responsibility describes the 
understanding that all members freely honor their commitments to ensure collective 
success. To achieve this goal, all parties must have an equal stake in the success of the 
organization. Finally, the accelerant of access allows special operations units to anticipate 
future threats and construct collaborative doctrine and tactical forums to identify how to 
best respond and alert partners of potential threats.  
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D. METHODOLOGY  
This research analyzed NATO special operations forces using three methods to 
identify key limitations in coalition special operations integration. These methods 
included longitudinal and cross sectional case studies, survey research, and process 
tracing. Longitudinal case study analysis evaluated the rise of special operations units in 
NATO over the past 60 years, as well as the development of the NATO Special 
Operations Headquarters. Most NATO special operations units have conducted 
operations in Afghanistan, which presents a common operational venue for further cross 
sectional and longitudinal case study analysis over the nine-year’s conflict. This analysis 
used academic material sited in the relevant literature of this report, personal interviews 
with unit members conducted by the author, and open source technical data concerning 
technical and military development across NATO.  
The author drew from observations made during multiple trips to Kosovo, Iraq, 
and Afghanistan between 2001 and 2008. This experience included participation in 
combined tactical operations with 18 allied nations during NATO led operations. In 
addition to deployments, the author lived in Germany for five years between 2001 and 
2008 while stationed with United States Army Europe units, with frequent combined 
training opportunities and interaction with other NATO forces. Whenever possible, the 
author compared observations with U.S. and international colleagues participating in the 
same tactical operations and coalition special operations colleagues. Cross sectional data 
analysis compared trends, such as unit size, composition, national defense spending, and 
deployment information using data from The Military Balance.56 World Bank economic 
data concerning technology infrastructure development in North American and Europe 
over the past two decades provided a common framework to analyze the potential success 
of NSHQ network initiatives.  
This study used large-N cross sectional comparison by conducting survey 
research and interviews to gain additional insight not readily available in published data. 
The author traveled to the NATO SOF Headquarters in Mons, Belgium and the NATO 
                                                 
56 International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Military Balance 2011,” 2011, 
http://www.iiss.org/publications/military-balance/the-military-balance-2011/. 
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SOF Training and Education Program (NSTEP) campus in Chièvres, Belgium in 
February 2011 to observe training, conduct interviews, and administer surveys to students 
and cadre. A subsequent visit to Germany conducted over five days in February 2011 
surveyed and interviewed American special operations soldiers within a week of their 
return from participation in the ISAF SOF mission in Afghanistan. This report analyzed 
225 surveys collected between January and May 2011. Throughout the research for this 
project, the author conducted more than 60 interviews at Chièvres Air Base, Belgium and 
various U.S. special operations elements stationed in Europe in February 2011, and at the 
Naval Postgraduate School from January 2011 to May 2011. The author conducted all 
interviews in person, including leadership, staff, support, and tactical soldiers from 18 
NATO SOF nations.  
Surveys and interviews provided additional insight into the best practices during 
the past two decades of conflict to achieve SOF integration within national and cultural 
context. In 2008, the author attended reunions of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 
in Washington, D.C. and the First Special Service Force (FSSF) in St. Paul, Minnesota. 
The valuable input of these early special operations veterans of WWII from the United 
States, Canada, United Kingdom, and France assisted in giving the author a realistic 
insight into various methods used by the forefathers of NATO SOF to establish small unit 
cohesion and unit effectiveness. In addition to interviews with NATO special operations 
soldiers and leaders, the author contacted many of the prominent scholars highlighted in 
the literature review to describe how their research may benefit special operations 
integration initiatives. The valuable feedback provided by these scholars in personal 
interviews, electronic mail, and phone conversations contributed to Chapter VII: Analysis 
and Recommendations. Survey research in this project is ongoing beyond the initial 
analysis presented in this report. A Naval Postgraduate multinational research team 
specifically analyzing intelligence sharing within special operations coalitions will 
publish further analysis in December 2011.  
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The concept of process tracing described the “chain of events” that contributes to 
effective coalition special operations described in relevant literature.57 This method 
analyzed effective methods of special operations integration employed in combat zones 
to determine how these effective measures developed in training, doctrine, and common 
education prior to deployment. This method traced elements of friction within coalitions 
to identify where integration efforts have fallen short in pre-mission training and how 
these shortfalls have affected combat effectiveness. Establishing coalition special 
operations interoperability is both a science and an art form. The various methods 
employed during this research attempted to bridge both realms.  
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III. THE GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY OF SOF INTEGRATION 
A OVERVIEW 
Nearly nine years of persistent conflict since September 2001 has created a battle 
hardened and competent corps of coalition special operations veterans. Many current 
NATO SOF units trace their military lineage to multinational SOF units established 
during their grandparents’ generation of WWII veterans. Like their WWII forefathers, the 
current corps of NATO SOF operators has gained extensive combat experience in 
combined operations over the past decade. Unlike their grandparents, most current 
soldiers will continue serving in their militaries for many years following their recent 
combat service as European militaries transition to all volunteer military forces. While 
the percentage of total national populations is a small fraction of the WWII generation, 
the total months deployed in combat zones per soldier in many cases has surpassed 
previous eras. Combined special operations units in earlier conflicts achieved tremendous 
success by learning to develop unit camaraderie and overcome bureaucratic limitations to 
achieve battlefield success. The rapid military drawdowns following World War II 
allowed much of this acquired knowledge and momentum to be lost. The wealth of 
experience and progress made over the past several years toward special operations 
interoperability may similarly be lost if proactive measures are not taken immediately. 
These efforts should capture best practices and formalize the personal relationships 
formed through combat in Afghanistan and beyond, to meet the irregular threats of the 
21st century.  
B. THE NATO SOF LINEAGE IN WORLD WAR I 
The NSHQ follows the lineage of multinational special operations forces formed 
to meet common threats. Frequently, these units faced similar issues with intelligence 
sharing, unit cohesion, and interoperability plaguing modern special operations 
coalitions. Analysis of these units provides insight into the challenges facing 
contemporary integration efforts following the end of combat operations. These units 
included a number of multinational units and temporary commands established during 
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WWI, WWII, the Balkans, and Afghanistan. While technology and the structure of 
enemy forces have evolved, many special operations cohesion principles are timeless. T. 
E. Lawrence’s employment of harassment attacks against Turkish supply routes using 
indigenous Arab forces demonstrated the capabilities of a small raiding force, as well as 
the importance of cultural understanding within combined units.58  
Beyond Lawrence’s endeavors in the Middle East, other allied attempts to form 
covert small units in WWI included the deployment of Dunsterforce in the Caucasus, led 
by British Major General L. C. Dunsterville. The unit selected volunteers from Britain, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.59 The element’s mission was to re-
organize faltering Russian, Georgian, and Armenian forces against invading Turkish 
armies in the narrow region between the Black and Caspian Seas.60 Beyond 
Dunsterville’s fluency in Russian, his subordinate officers lacked linguistic capabilities to 
communicate and bond with their Caucasus comrades.61 Despite a spirited defense of 
Baku during which the element suffered 20% casualties, the unit’s cultural limitations 
failed to galvanize its Georgian and Armenian coalition partners that resulted in Turkish 
forces capturing the city.  
Combined SOF units were not limited to Allied forces in WWI. German Colonel 
Paul von Lettow Vorbeck led a small force in East Africa that raided British supply lines 
and harassed larger forces between 1915 and 1918.62 During the interwar period, military 
planners across Europe studied these campaigns to propose new units capable of 
employing emerging technology, such as the parachute, glider, vehicle mobility, 
submarines, and early breathing apparatuses. T. E. Lawrence routinely visited Winston 
Churchill at his residence to describe how potential opponents in Europe might prepare 
small and flexible military units and advocate similar British units for the likelihood of 
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coming conflict.63 The combined experiences of small unit employment in WWI led to 
the establishment of special operations units that achieved strategic influence in WWII.  
C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE OSS 
Military planners in WWII produced an extraordinary number of innovative and 
effective special operations forces that crossed national and cultural lines. The British 
SOE and American OSS specialized in subversion and espionage behind enemy lines 
with a goal to “set Europe ablaze.”64 The SOE limited initial intelligence sharing between 
the two services until the OSS enhanced American security procedures to meet higher 
British standards.65 The result of this program was the X2 directorate established in 1942 
that allowed top-secret intelligence sharing between the two agencies, such as 
information concerning Britain’s ULTRA program.66 The OSS and SOE planned and 
conducted tactical operations through the combined Special Force Headquarters (SFHQ) 
in London. Despite the complimentary systems elements of suspicion, doubts over 
capabilities, and social differences strained unit integration.67  
In addition to covert intelligence operations, the OSS and SOE jointly created the 
Jedburgh team concept. These small three man teams were capable of serving as liaisons 
with partisans behind enemy lines in occupied Europe. Less than 300 men from seven 
nations comprised the Jedburgh teams; the genesis of what Will Irwin describes as the 
first “diplomat soldiers”68 The OSS and SOE recruited men for the Jedburgh teams from 
exceptional soldiers in U.S. and British Army airborne units and intelligence operatives. 
Additionally, the SOE recruited French, Belgian, and Dutch exiles living abroad. The  
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United States and British conducted separate initial selections, followed by a second 
selection at the SOE’s Student Assessment Board. The board tested psychological traits, 
physical toughness, mental acuity, and elements of teamwork.69  
The OSS leadership recognized the importance of establishing cohesion and trust 
within small teams in combat. The Jedburgh men selected their teammates after several 
weeks of initial training. Selection criteria required that one officer had to be from the 
British Commonwealth or American, the second team member was French, Belgian, or 
Dutch, and the radio operator could be from any country.70 The nationality of the second 
team member determined the destination of the team. Despite this initial concept to 
integrate Jedburgh teams fully, nearly 90% of the teams had at least two members with 
the same nationality as most soldiers were reluctant to go to combat without a fellow 
countryman.71 Initial cohesion was lacking in teams as veterans British soldiers viewed 
their new American comrades as inexperienced and untested.72 Teams conducted all 
subsequent training together to develop unit cohesion. Despite early preconceptions, unit 
camaraderie improved through rigorous training consisting of 25-mile marches in rough 
terrain, cultural assimilation courses, advanced tactics, and marksmanship training.73 
Once Jedburgh teams arrived into occupied France in 1944, they were 
instrumental in organizing and equipping the French Marquis guerilla bands. The 
Jedburgh teams prepared the battle space for Allied invasion forces alongside their 
French, Belgian, and Dutch partisan allies. Despite the tactical cohesion of the teams, 
bureaucratic rules limited intelligence sharing between conventional forces participating 
in the invasion. This situation required tactical commanders to bypass guidelines and 
share pertinent information beyond their imposed national restrictions.74 Following the 
                                                 
69 Irwin, The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France 1944, 58. 
70 Ibid., 65. 
71 Julian Thompson and Imperial War Museum, The Imperial War Museum Book of War Behind 
Enemy Lines, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, Inc., 2001), 306. 
72 Statement derived from author’s conversations with OSS veterans at OSS Society dinner in 
Washington DC, 2 May 2009. 
73 Irwin, The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France 1944, 62. 
74 Foot, SOE: An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive, 1940–46, 224. 
 33
conclusion of European combat operations, some Jedburgh teams would later see combat 
in the Pacific theater. Despite their success, the teams disbanded following the war, 
which dissipated valuable experience and techniques regarding combined special 
operations. Many Jedburgh veterans did not see each other for decades until the first unit 
reunion in 1984.75 
D. THE FIRST SPECIAL SERVICE FORCE 
Another WWII forbearer to NATO SOF was the First Special Service Force 
(FSSF). The FSSF formed at Fort William Henry Harrison Montana in 1942, composed 
from American and Canadian soldiers and some Norwegian trainers. The unit’s founder, 
Colonel Frederick, demanded that the unit have, “unity of purpose, spirit, and action to 
make the outfit work.”76 Despite these early efforts and a common language, the unit had 
early difficulties overcoming inconsistencies between the American and Canadian 
customs, doctrine, preference of uniforms, and weapons. Colonel Frederick mandated 
that the unit fully integrate between the two nationalities and produced distinctive 
uniforms and shoulder patch including the Native American arrowhead.77 Throughout the 
training, the men could identify weak performers in the unit and have them reassigned by 
a majority vote.78 The remaining men in the force knew they could trust the skills and 
capabilities of the men they would trust their lives within combat. Strong unit 
camaraderie developed prior to deployment to Europe through rigorous training, common 
purpose, and forced socialization. 
The First Special Service Force took heavy casualties in the Mediterranean theater 
at Monte Casino and Anzio, yet earned a reputation for taking impenetrable objectives 
with courage under fire. Senior commanders often misused the FSSF as regular infantry 
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soldiers despite their advanced capabilities.79 Following WWII, the FSSF disbanded, and 
thus, years of accumulated combat experience and unit cohesion disappeared. The men 
progressed to other careers, but many attended frequent reunions held at locations near 
the common border. The bonds these men developed in combat continued to develop 
through social functions, letter writing, and the FSSF Veterans Association. John Nadler 
describes the relationship among the FSSF veterans, “this bond had withstood the 
passage of more than sixty years. In some cases, it extended over thousands of miles and 
resisted sickness and the infirmities of old age.”80 
E. OTHER WORLD WAR II SOF PREDECESSORS 
Creative use of well-trained combined special operations forces was not confined 
to the Allied forces in WWII. The German military intently studied the successful use of 
small and flexible raiding parties in the Middle East, Caucuses, and Africa during WWI. 
Admiral Canaris, head of the German counter-intelligence unit the Abwehr, proposed the 
recruitment of men of German heritage returning from interwar time living abroad in 
North America, South America, and Africa. Canaris sought “independently minded, 
tough and resilient men, inured to hardship and with knowledge of foreign language, 
customs, and cultures.”81 In September 1939, the 800th Special Purpose Training 
Battalion Brandenburg formed, commonly described as the “Brandenbergers.”  
The unit recruited these former expatriate Germans to employ their foreign 
language fluency and cultural knowledge to conduct espionage, sabotage, and commando 
operations behind enemy lines across Europe.82 Training consisted of strenuous extended 
nighttime marches, detailed combat simulations, and small unit tactics using live 
ammunition and explosives to prepare the men for complex missions.83 Once employed 
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in combat, the Brandenbergers inflicted heavy losses on Allied supply lines and were 
instrumental in key German successes early in the war. The varied cultural composition 
and diversity within this force proved to be this unit’s greatest asset to form a wide 
clandestine network across Europe. German commando officer Otto Skorzeny would 
later form his Jagdverbande 502nd Hunting Group by using the examples of the British 
Commandos and the Brandenbergers.84 Near the end of the war, Skozeny attempted to 
infiltrate Allied lines with English-speaking German commandos disguised as American 
soldiers.85 Both of these units fully maximized the unique cultural traits and military 
expertise of their soldiers to achieve a much greater impact beyond their assigned 
strength.  
Other influential components to the lineage of modern NATO SOF warriors are 
the numerous partisan forces that formed across Eastern Europe. Lithuanian SOF honors 
their heritage with these fighters by referring to their Special Purpose Service operators 
as the “Forest Brothers” (Žaliūkai) in honor of the fierce World War II guerilla fighters of 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.86 These forces stood united against the German and 
subsequent Soviet occupation for decades. The Home Army of Poland (Armia Krajowa) 
fought fierce urban battles in Warsaw and conducted coordinated insurgent attacks 
against elite German military units.87 Many of the brave partisan fighters in Eastern 
Europe later had the opportunity to serve in the United States Army Special Forces under 
the Lodge-Philbin Act of 1950.88 The 10th Special Forces Group would later assist in the 
training and development of many emerging Eastern Europe special operations units 
following the end of the Cold War. The proud histories of all of these units weave a 
proud lineage and valuable insight for future partnerships.  
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F. APPLYING THE LESSONS OF WORLD WAR II SOF 
The lessons of multinational SOF integration in WWII emphasize the importance 
of camaraderie, common goals, and efficient information flow in contemporary special 
operations. These units faced daunting challenges in overcoming cultural, social, tactical, 
and bureaucratic cleavages. The OSS and SOE had to create the X2 program to overcome 
intelligence sharing limitations, and in the process had to assume potential risk to combat 
a greater common threat. SOF operations over the past decade have demonstrated how 
barriers to open communication create hierarchies within a coalition. A fully effective 
SOF coalition must have an open and collaborative flow of information to facilitate 
integration and maximize unit potential. An effective special operations coalition must 
allow all parties to communicate freely over compatible classified networks and 
participate in the intelligence production process. Beyond trusting comrades with 
intelligence, partners must trust other members’ capabilities. Ongoing research by U.S. 
Army scientist James Griffith has shown some correlations of this dynamic of increased 
unit cohesion stemming from common perceptions of group competence.89 Each of the 
WWII special operations units established criteria for evaluating specific traits for 
ensuring each unit member was tactically proficient.  
Both allied and axis forces’ leadership in WWII gave special operations units 
significant autonomy to structure their own selection process and evaluate peer 
performance prior to combat service. Trust must develop over time and through repeated 
actions within a small group to establish individual credibility. Additionally, these units 
understood the importance of forming SOF camaraderie through rigorous physical and 
mental training. Once these specialized units formed, they tended to stay together through 
training, deployment, and draw down, with less individual replacement than conventional 
units. Research by military sociologist Bruce Newsome identifies correlations between 
special operations selection methods and personnel systems and small unit cohesion and 
performance.90 Further research sponsored by the U.S. Army has shown correlations of 
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realistic and difficult common training, but delivered in a non-hazing environment.91 
Although the WWII era training was demanding, unit members were generally treated in 
a professional manner in recognition of their volunteer status and dedication. These 
methods of selection, training, and employment minimized cultural cleavages and 
brought the units together with a common purpose and vision. Once unity emerged, the 
small elements transformed from multinational allies to true brothers in arms.  
The post-WWII military draw down prevented either units from building upon the 
skills and capabilities developed in combat to reach the next level of coalition SOF 
integration. The FSSF veterans remained connected in the years following the war, which 
allowed the personal bonds forged in combat to continue to flourish.92 Many OSS 
veterans achieved remarkable careers in politics, diplomacy, and enterprise, yet most of 
these veterans maintained little contact until modern technology facilitated easier 
communication.93 Modern technologies enable the newest generation of warriors to 
remain connected and further strengthen the camaraderie and trust developed in conflict. 
These factors offer an unprecedented opportunity to enhance global SOF integration 
through personal and professional networks beyond what was possible following WWII. 
The network structures established by NATO SOF can form the framework for enduring 
special operations partnership and personal relationships. 
G. THE GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY  
Digital age technologies offer modern special operations forces the ability to 
develop further inter-personal bonds formed in combat. Through these communications, 
collaborative professional relationships develop. The bonds created between special 
operations forces can create networks of increased diplomatic ties, connectivity with 
foreign interagency partners, and allied conventional unit integration. Emerging 
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technologies facilitate collaborative doctrine development and intelligence analysis. 
Modern multi-layer network communications allow operators to bridge gaps that 
previous generations could not overcome. More than 65 years after WWII, modern 
multinational SOF warriors possess the advanced technology and background to develop 
combat bonds further. Young special operations warriors have been well equipped to 
exploit this golden opportunity of special operations integration. Contemporary special 
operations commanders grew up in a rapidly changing world. Most of these warriors 
were in middle school as the Cold War ended. Following the collapse of communism, 
young students in Eastern Europe experienced Western languages, media, and expanded 
educational and travel opportunities. This generation later attended college at the dawn of 
the Internet age, which gave them access to news and information from around the world.  
The 9–11 attacks initiated events that have shaped the world outlook and military 
careers of young American soldiers and NATO allies. The subsequent attacks in Madrid 
and London further galvanized young men and women across Europe. This generation of 
tech savvy warriors has gained extensive experience in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. 
Through their combat deployments, they exchanged e-mail addresses and established 
trusted relationships with their coalition partners. They honed their individual skills and 
capabilities to protect their homelands and join their international comrades on the 
frontlines of the Long War. From the most remote regions of the world, these newly 
trained SOF warriors remained digitally connected with friends, family, and their 
coalition partners. In Afghanistan, they learned to overcome structural, doctrinal, and 
bureaucratic challenges to conduct combined tactical operations. They forged strong 
relationships, and mourned collectively when one of their fellow SOF operators fell in the 
line of duty. Through this journey, these young veterans gained camaraderie their WWII 
forefathers never fully achieved. Fully harnessing this wealth of experience, camaraderie, 




IV. COMMON THREATS TO NATO 
A. OVERVIEW 
If global trends of the past decade persist, NATO collective security efforts in the 
remainder of the 21st century will be defined by uncertain threats, persistent conflict, and 
the empowerment of non-state actors. Security reviews among global powers emphasize 
the strength of continued military cooperation to combat evolving defense challenges. 
The British 2010 Strategic Security and Defence Review recommends a national strategy 
that “strengthens mutual dependence with key allies and partners who are willing and 
able to act, not least to make our collective resources go further.”94 The 2008 French 
White Paper on Defence and National Security summarizes the uncertainty of modern 
threats: “new powers have emerged and new vulnerabilities have been exposed. The 
traditional distinction between domestic security and foreign security has blurred.”95 
NATO has gained a new capability to confront common threats and challenges through 
the NATO SOF Headquarters. This analysis evaluates modern threats to key European 
partners, how the NSHQ is adapting to meet these challenges, and what must be done to 
ensure a strong future for the NATO Alliance. 
The NATO SOF Headquarters has made significant advances from its inception 
in 2007 as the NATO SOF Coordination Center. In four years, the NATO SOF 
Headquarters has grown from a small staff section within the Special Operations 
Command-Europe into a three-star headquarters led by U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Frank 
Kisner. The headquarters conducts combined special operations training courses and 
serves as the epicenter for establishing doctrine, developing new tactics, and defining 
procedures for NATO’s special operations capabilities. The NSHQ’s rapid development 
and success prove that a NATO subordinate command can succeed despite the 
dysfunction normally associated with NATO decision making. The organization is likely 
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to take a central role in defending the NATO alliance against evolving threats, such as 
international and domestic terrorism, piracy, cyber warfare, and WMD proliferation. The 
NSHQ has initiated reforms, training, and infrastructure development to meet the 
guidance of the new NATO Strategic Concept and remain “effective in a changing world, 
against new threats, with new capabilities and new partners.”96 As the gravity of irregular 
threats increases across Europe and North America, the role of special operations as a 
cornerstone of international security, diplomacy, and intelligence collaboration is likely 
to increase. 
Common threats provide purpose and an impetus for allies to overcome 
differences in national political objectives, ensure common security, and instill collective 
responsibility. Within many NATO nations, radical Islamic groups have gained 
substantial followings among the growing immigrant populations from Africa, the 
Middle East, and Asia. Increasingly within nations, such as Germany, France, Spain, and 
the United Kingdom, the call of global jihad has infiltrated second and third generation 
immigrant populations. The followers of radical terror groups across Europe hold 
European Union passports, speak with local accents, and grew up in the communities 
they wish to attack. These factors indicate that the NATO alliance may confront 
domestic, as well as international threats in the future. The presence of common threats 
can facilitate the development of collective capabilities and cooperation by alliance 
partners. Allies facing imminent security threats are likely to achieve cooperation without 
political delay, demonstrated by the rapid development of the NATO SOF Headquarters 
and its subordinate units. 
B. EVOLVING NATO SECURITY CONCERNS  
NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen commented in October 2010 
that “NATO's core mission, to protect the 900 million civilians of NATO countries from 
attack, must never change…but it must be modern defense against modern threats.”97 As 
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the focus of European security has shifted from Cold War deterrence to countering 
internal extremism, enemy attacks are much more likely to emanate from Hamburg, 
Milan, or London than from Beijing, Moscow or even Tehran. While Baltic and 
Scandinavian nations’ fears of a re-immerging Russia do have merit, potential aggressive 
influence is more likely to come in asymmetric forms, such as cyber terror to NATO’s 
border nations than any conventional military action. Russia’s calculus to intervene in the 
Caucasus in 2008 likely would have taken a different form had Georgia gained NATO 
membership. Subversive groups within Europe seek to destroy the societies that have 
welcomed and sheltered their families. The recently released 2010 NATO Strategic 
Concept declares that the potential for a conventional attack on the territory of an alliance 
member is low, yet reaffirms that terrorism “poses a direct threat to the security of the 
citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly.”98 
Extremist groups have demonstrated agility, flexibility, and the ability to collaborate 
using advanced networks, whereas NATO’s conventional military forces have failed to 
demonstrate the same capabilities. Additionally, the new concept emphasizes that 
instability abroad can affect alliance security “by fostering extremism, terrorism, and 
trans-national illegal activities.”99  
The threats emphasized in the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept echo growing 
awareness in alliance member nations that the scope and purpose of NATO must adjust to 
changing security concerns in a globalized society. An analysis of European defense 
reviews and security white papers shown in Appendix A demonstrate this trend. Of the 
14 national strategies reviewed, all describe a diminished threat of conventional attack 
while stressing the increasing uncertainty and asymmetric threats of terrorism and 
weapons of mass destruction.100 The NSHQ has made significant progress in decreasing 
key capability gaps and stands poised to counter NATO’s asymmetric threats. Despite 
NATO SOF’s success in internal domestic security and operations abroad in Afghanistan, 
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the new strategic concept never mentions special operations. This omission is quite 
notable because most conventional forces cannot effectively challenge many modern 
threats. Contemporary threats require flexible and adaptable units highly trained to detect, 
destroy and deter complex terror networks; within NATO, much of this capability resides 
within NATO SOF units. 
C. DEMOGRAPHICS IN EUROPE IN SECURITY TERMS 
Between 1970 and 2006, the fertility rate of European NATO nations fell from 
2.6 to 1.4 children per mother, which is incapable of maintaining current population 
levels without increased immigration.101 Over the past two decades, 80% of Europe’s 
population growth has come from immigration. Despite low fertility rates, European 
populations have increased slightly over the past four decades with increased longevity, 
immigration, and the maturation of larger post WWII populations.102 Children born in the 
early stages of steady lowered fertility rates across Europe are now reaching childrearing 
age. Many demographers predict that European populations will steadily decrease during 
the next several decades as longevity and immigration will not be able to offset the 
dwindling fertility rates.103 These trends indicate that the Europe of the future will be 
older, more culturally diverse and struggling to maintain the social security programs 
developed since WWII with fewer working age persons contributing tax revenue. Many 
European nations will likely further reduce military budgets in efforts to keep social 
programs solvent for as long as possible. These trends also indicate that European 
militaries will have few military aged males available for service, and those available, 
will come from a diverse ethnic, religious, and cultural background. 
Although the majority of Europe’s 17 million Muslims supports national 
governments and renounces terrorism, a growing wave of religious extremism has 
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manifested into more than 28 jihadist networks across the continent.104 Across Europe, 
many Islamic societies have renounced violence and advocated achieving organizational 
goals through secular political movements. Organizations, such as the British Muslims 
for Secular Democracy, have cooperated with military and law enforcement agencies to 
limit the influence of jihadi organizations.105 The Muslim population of Europe has 
increased more than 58% in the past two decades, while birthrates among native 
European populations continue to decline.106 At this pace, several European nations may 
have majority Muslim populations within the next 50 years.107 Following this trend of 
increased immigration, the name “Mohammed” in its varied spellings has become the 
most popular name for boys born in Britain during the past several years.108 European 
society is becoming increasingly multicultural. The increased diversity of European 
society provides a pool of potential recruits from varied ethnic, religious, and cultural 
backgrounds with advanced language capability. However, mistrust in many immigrant 
communities with national government and law enforcement is likely to deter many 
young people from serving their adopted nations’ militaries. 
Many of the various terror cells identified in recent years across Europe have 
supported both international jihad efforts, as well as internal national level plots. 
According to Peter Nesser of the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, “the 
distinction between ‘homegrown’ and ‘international’ jihadism in the European context is 
vague in terms of organizational affiliation and motivational landscape.”109 This dual-
natured threat demonstrates the overlapping of internal and external security concerns 
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present in Europe in the modern age.110 Radicalism has converts in Europe’s non-
immigrant population as well. In September 2007, German authorities uncovered a plot 
targeting Frankfurt Airport and Ramstein Air Base, led by German-born coverts to 
Islam.111 The men linked to the plot came from stable traditional German Catholic 
families and had advanced university educations. The efforts to disrupt the plot 
demonstrated a great deal of cooperation between American intelligence agencies, 
German security officials, special operations forces, and law enforcement. The 
sophisticated methods used to disrupt this plot demonstrate a significant increase in the 
capabilities available to NATO allies. 
D. THREAT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
In a Kabul interview in November 2001, Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-
Zawahiri claimed that Al Qaeda had obtained weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and 
even possessed a suitcase nuclear weapon purchased after the fall of the Soviet Union.112 
This claim was likely a deception operation, yet the fear this claim triggered is evident in 
defense reviews across NATO. According to the 2010 United States National Security 
Strategy:  
Terrorism is one of many threats that are more consequential in a global 
age. The gravest danger to the American people and global security 
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In 2007, The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that through 
2006, 1,080 incidents of illicit or unauthorized transfer of nuclear or radioactive material 
occurred; however, all of these incidents accounted for only a total of 8 kg of highly 
enriched uranium, which is far below the 25 kg required to construct a conventional 
nuclear explosive device.114 
The difficulty in purchasing, stealing, or developing a nuclear explosive device 
suggests that the probability of a terrorist attack using a radioactive dirty bomb is much 
higher.115 The capabilities and materials required to conduct a dirty bomb attack fall 
within the potential of a number of worldwide terror groups including Al Qaeda. 
Although the number of potential casualties from such an attack would be relatively low 
compared to a nuclear device detonation, the psychological damage imposed on a NATO 
nation would be devastating. Nuclear forensics may offer the most likely safeguard 
against rogue states providing nuclear material or devices to terrorist groups potentially 
threatening NATO allies. The fear of attribution and probable military reprisals against 
rogue nations transferring nuclear components would deter nations from collaborating 
with Al Qaeda and other groups.116  
The potential for a terrorist attack using chemical or biological weapons is much 
higher than the threat of a nuclear detonation by terrorists, as suggested by the actions of 
the apocalyptic religious terror cult Aum Shinrikyo. From the early 1990s, the group 
recruited more than 300 scientists, physicians, and other technical advisers with advanced 
degrees in an attempt to procure nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and instigate 
global conflict.117 Despite huge financial resources and high-level connections, efforts to 
acquire nuclear weapons failed, which led the group to abandon its nuclear efforts and 
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focus on biological and chemical weapons.118 In 1995, the group attacked the Tokyo 
subway system with sarin gas, which resulted in 13 dead, more than 50 seriously injured 
and thousands more affected. 
Aum Shinrikyo’s 1995 Tokyo attack serves as the most striking example of an 
attempt to employ chemical or biological weapons in a cosmopolitan capital. The plotters 
of the Madrid and London train bombings copied elements of the Tokyo attacks, 
including the targeting of confined train cars, methods of pre-attack reconnaissance, and 
target selection to maximize psychological effect. The February 2010 report by the 
United States Commission for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Proliferation and Terrorism highlighted the threat of non-state actors armed with WMD. 
The report predicted that “unless the world community acts decisively and with great 
urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a 
terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.”119 Conventional NATO 
troops do not have the advanced training and equipment required to target these threats. 
Combined special operations task forces must match and surpass terrorist financial, 
logistic, and intelligence structures using similar networked approaches characterized by 
collaborative intelligence sharing and diffused command and control.120 These efforts 
must constitute a coordinated effort among NATO special operations forces, law 
enforcement, and inter-agency partners to identify, monitor, and interdict potential 
threats. 
E. THE INCREASED THREAT OF PIRACY 
The increased prevalence of piracy in the waters off Somalia in the past decade 
has galvanized leading global economic powers towards increased security cooperation to 
secure shared shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean. Piracy off the East Africa coast 
increased an average of 19.40% each year from 1998 to 2008, as well as increasing from 
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19 attacks in 1998 to 134 in 2008.121 Although a number of nations have participated in 
antipiracy patrols off the Horn of Africa, these operations have had a minimal impact in 
countering the growing threat to international maritime cargo. Current NATO efforts in 
the region fall under the Operation Ocean Shield, which consists of five ships from the 
United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Italy.122 A recent 
trend in European Union shipping companies has been reflagging vessels in “open 
registry” countries to circumvent European Union law and allow armed security 
contractors to provide security against potential pirates.123 The current rise in worldwide 
piracy blurs the traditional lines between naval combat and law enforcement. During the 
past two years, several international SOF units have executed rescue operations aboard 
hijacked ships off the Somali coast, such as the United States Navy SEALS rescuing the 
captain of the Maersk Alabama and Russian Spetznaz rescuing the crew of the oil 
freighter Moscow University.124 
F. EXTREMISM WITHIN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The United Kingdom has decades of experience countering domestic terrorism, 
yet rapidly evolving demographics within the nation have created unique challenges and 
a generation of disenfranchised and impressionable young Muslim men. Irish nationalist 
terror dates back to the 1860s and between 1960 and 2000, the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) killed more than 1,800 people, which included more than 650 civilians.125 As the 
threat of IRA violence decreased in the 1990s, the threat of radical Islamic groups grew 
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under the tutelage of fiery clerics, such as London-based Abu Hamza Al-Masri and 
Anwar Al-Awlaki. British authorities imprisoned Al-Masri in 2006 on terrorism-related 
charges, while Al-Awlaki fled to Yemen in the face of increased British pressure.126 
These extremist clerics vied for support from the children of immigrants who flocked to 
Britain from the 1970s to the 1990s to escape conflict areas and benefit from generous 
social security benefits. These extremist groups produced radical followers, such as the 
“shoe bomber” Richard Reid and the two British born suicide bombers who attacked a 
Tel Aviv bar in 2003.127  
Despite their long history in dealing with terrorism, the London Tube attacks on 
July 7, 2005 caught British security officials by surprise. One month prior to the London 
attack, MI5’s Joint Terrorist Analysis Centre published a report stating that no group in 
Britain had the capability or intent to conduct a major terrorist attack.128 During the 
London attack, four suicide bombers killed 56 people. The attack consisted of three 
simultaneous explosions within the London subway system and a subsequent explosion 
on a bus near Bloomsbury Square.129 In addition to those killed, nearly 700 London 
residents suffered serious injuries. Terrorists attempted a nearly identical attack two 
weeks later; fortunately, all four bombs failed to detonate.130 The martyrdom videos of 
the four successful London bombers shocked Britain because all of the attackers, aged 18 
to 30, were British citizens who grew up in suburbs of London, held university diplomas, 
and spoke with Yorkshire accents.131 Three of the bombers were born in Britain, and the 
fourth moved to Britain from Jamaica when he was a child of five.132 The attacks 
introduced the British public and world media to a number of radical Islamic groups 
operating in public view in London and other British cities.  
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The increasing religious fervor among young British men serves as fertile ground 
to implant the seeds of extremism by radical groups. The British Security Service (MI5) 
warns that a “significant” number of British citizens or residents have links to or 
sympathize with Al Qaeda.133 These supporters contribute to fundraising and recruiting 
efforts, facilitate training, and provide false documents to potential terrorists. A 2006 Pew 
Research poll found that 43% of Muslims in Britain stated that they were “very 
concerned with the rise of Islamic extremism” within the United Kingdom compared with 
42% of the general population.134 These results reflect that Britain’s Muslim community 
equally shares the growing concerns regarding the radical clerics spewing violence and 
intolerance from their neighborhood mosques. The United Kingdom’s Strategic Defence 
and Security Review echoes this concern, and warns of “a severe terrorist threat that has 
origins at home and overseas.”135 The review further states that the best method of 
prevention is to “maintain military capabilities that provide maximum mutual benefit, for 
example Special Forces.”136 Britain’s valuable contributions to NATO SOF include the 
Special Air Service (SAS) and the Special Boat Service (SBS), as well as collaboration 
with MI5 and MI6. 
G. ASSIMILATION CHALLENGES IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 
A variety of extremist groups in the past four decades have challenged Europe’s 
leading economies, France and Germany. In the 1970s, attacks by the Baader-Meinhof 
Group and the assassination of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics led to Germany 
founding the GSG-9 counter-terror unit.137 A peak in terrorist events occurred in 1986 in 
both nations with the Berlin discotheque bombing by Libyan-sponsored terrorists and a 
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series of 10 attacks around Paris by pro-Iranian groups. In the 25 years since these 
attacks, both nations have become destinations for increased immigration from 
predominantly Muslim nations. France is now home to the largest Islamic population in 
Europe. The U.S. State Department estimates there are approximately 6.5 million French 
Muslims, which is roughly 10% of the population.138 More than a million immigrants 
from Algeria and other North African nations came to France in the 1960s and 1970s. In 
the summer and fall of 2005, a series of riots demonstrated dissatisfaction among the 
second and third generation of French Muslims centered in the Clichy-sous-Bois suburb 
and other dilapidated neighborhoods of Paris. Within these neighborhoods, severe 
housing restrictions, unemployment approaching 40%, government work restrictions, and 
lack of adequate civilian police created flash points that erupted into violence.139 The 
riots peaked in early November 2005 with hundreds of French Muslims detained and up 
to 1,500 vehicles burned each night during several weeks of intense conflicts between 
rioters and police. Violence erupted again in the fall of 2007 following the deaths of two 
French Muslim teenagers killed in a crash with a French police car.140  
The French government’s October 2010 ban on Muslim women’s burqas and 
other similar Islamic coverings has sparked further social unrest within the French 
Muslim community, and prompted a threat of attacks against France by Osama Bin 
Laden.141 Although Al Qaeda and other groups have spared both France and Germany 
from major attacks during the past decade, the threat of significant attacks looms on the 
near horizon. In September 2010, German and French authorities disclosed they thwarted 
a “Mumbai-like terror attack” in central Europe through a combined operation, which 
references the 2008 series of attacks in India’s largest city that killed 164 people.142 In 
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response to emerging threats, the French government established special operations as a 
national security priority to conduct activities “on a national basis or in a narrow 
multilateral framework in order to free hostages or to pursue terrorists.”143 Significant 
French contributions to NATO SOF include the Brigade des Forces Spéciales Terre 
(BFST) and the Commandos Marine. 
The 2006 German White Paper on Defense notes, “given such threats posed by 
WMD and international terrorism, internal and external security are overlapping more 
and more.”144 The White Paper further elaborates, “the most immediate danger to our 
security currently emanates from international terrorism perpetrated methodically in 
transnational networks.”145 Within Germany, the nation’s large immigrant community 
has not assimilated fully into national society. The growing ethnic tensions in Germany 
have attracted the attention of Germany’s political leaders. German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel declared in 2010 that multiculturalism in Germany had “utterly failed” and top 
Bavarian politician Horst Seehofer called for a cessation of immigration from Turkey and 
Arab countries.146  
German security officials estimate that there are more than 400 violent Islamic 
extremists in Germany and more than 70 German citizens have received training in 
overseas terrorist camps.147 Germany faces a threat emanating from extremist groups in 
several major cities. The largest group resides in the northern city of Hamburg. These 
groups recruit impressionable young Muslim men who have failed to benefit from 
German economic success or have suffered discrimination from the nation’s resurgent 
right wing neo-Nazi hate groups. A Muslim Kosovan immigrant’s murder of two U.S. 
Air Force personnel on a transfer bus at Frankfurt Airport in March 2011 portrays some 
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of the complexities of countering radicalism in Europe.148 Despite the U.S. Air Force’s 
protection of Kosovo Muslims against Christian Serbs in the 1999 air campaign, the 21-
year-old attacker still targeted the unarmed airmen for slaughter. As racial and ethnic 
tensions rise, Germans fear that cultural intolerance may re-emerge in response to Islamic 
extremism, despite laws banning hate crimes and speech. The greatest question for 
German lawmakers is whether the nation will continue to open its doors to Muslim 
immigrants seeking a better life, or impose the more stringent restrictions sponsored by 
some conservative groups out of security and economic concerns. German contributions 
to NATO SOF include the Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK) and training partnerships 
with the GSG-9 counter-terror unit of the German Federal Police. 
H. TURKEY AND SPAIN: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS 
Turkey’s secular government has a long and bloody history of battling Islamic 
extremism, terrorism, and insurgent movements. For more than 40 years, Turkish forces 
have conducted campaigns against groups, such as the ethnic Armenian group ASALA 
and the Kurdish PKK. In the Defense White Paper 2000, Turkey emphasized its efforts to 
keep the nation secular and focused on combating any form of extremism within its 
borders.149 At the time of publication before the terrorist attacks against the United States 
on September 11, 2001, Turkey urged other nations to match its counter-terror efforts and 
stated, “at present, it is not possible to say that the international community shows the 
needed reaction to terrorism.”150 In November 2003, Istanbul suffered two large car 
bombs that killed the British consul general in addition to 60 others and wounded more 
than 750 people. In March 2010, Turkish authorities arrested three retired Turkish general 
officers in connection to this plot, which demonstrates the complex security situation 
within the nation.151  
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To combat radicalism, Turkey has employed efforts to rehabilitate radicalized 
young men under the “Penitence Law,” which is similar to efforts employed in Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia.152 These efforts are especially critical as public support for western nations 
is at an all-time low within the Turkish population. Favorable opinions of the United 
States have decreased from 52% in 2000 to 9% in 2007.153 Despite declining public 
perceptions of western nations within the Muslim world, Turkey’s special operations 
forces remain a critical and trusted ally in the NATO SOF community.154 Due to their 
advanced capabilities and long history of battling asymmetric threats in challenging 
terrain, Turkish Special Forces were among the first allied partners to join U.S. SOF in 
Afghanistan in November 2001.155 
Like many other European nations, Spain has battled both domestic and trans-
national terrorism. In contrast to the Basque separatist Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) 
attacks typically directed against government installations and prefaced by warnings, a 
much more violent form of radicalism has migrated from Morocco to threaten the nation. 
The Madrid train bombings of March 11, 2004 killed 192 people and injured more than 
2,050 with 10 backpack bombs that detonated nearly simultaneously near the Atocha 
station.156 The attack demonstrated modern terror groups’ ability to use terrorism to 
influence political decisions and elections, which has resulted in a change to the national 
political leadership and the withdrawal of troops from Iraq. Poorly educated members of 
the North African guest worker community that had not assimilated into Spanish society  
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executed the attack.157 As Spanish police attempted to arrest the likely plotters of the 
Madrid attacks, the seven suspects detonated suicide vests and destroyed their apartment 
building and killed one police officer.158  
Radical groups in Spain have attempted to export terror beyond the nation’s 
borders. In January 2008, Spanish authorities uncovered a terrorist cell in Barcelona that 
recruited suicide bombers for overseas Jihad.159 The rise of religious extremism over the 
past decade has influenced the Spanish public’s views of the Muslim community. Forty-
one percent of non-Muslim residents responded in polls, “most or many Muslims in their 
country support extremists like Al Qaeda.”160 The growing animosity, fear, and 
intolerance of Europe’s different ethnic groups serve as a major hurdle to the long-term 
peace and stability of the continent. 
I. SOF DEVELOPMENT IN ADVERSE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
The global economic crisis has resulted in strained national defense budgets 
across NATO, which has resulted in reduced military spending among allies. In 2009, the 
United States accounted for approximately 68% of all NATO defense expenditures and 
only Albania, France, Greece, the United Kingdom, and the United States met the NATO 
target of 2% of GDP military spending.161 Despite cuts to military spending over the past 
several years, most European NATO nations have increased their SOF budgets since they 
have recognized the utility of these capabilities for a range of domestic and international  
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purposes.162 Although training and equipping a SOF operator cost slightly more than 
supporting an infantry soldier, the tactical flexibility and advanced capabilities of these 
troops make special operations forces a wise investment.  
As a strategic asset capable of implementing national policy, a moderate sized 
special operations force can provide a much greater economy of force than other assets 
available to NATO military planners. A European nation can fully outfit a 110-man SOF 
land force for approximately 13 million euro; a virtual bargain compared to the steep 77 
million euro cost of a Eurofighter jet.163 With such a high return on minimal investment, 
NATO partners are protecting SOF budgets during seasons of austerity measures while 
they slash conventional military funding. While British defense cumulative growth will 
decrease by 7.5%, the 2010 Spending Review stresses the importance of “enhanced 
Special Forces capabilities to make the Army more flexible and mobile.”164 Although 
SOF are not mentioned specifically in the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, the document 
echoes the spirit of cost efficiency in SOF. The document “commits NATO to continuous 
reform towards a more effective, efficient and flexible Alliance, so that our taxpayers get 
the most security for the money they invest in defense.”165 If the economic situation of 
EU and NATO nations deteriorates, political and military leaders will probably continue 
to see the wisdom of investing in capable special operations forces. 
J. AFGHANISTAN: FOSTERING SOF INTEROPERABILITY 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the U.S. Government rapidly 
developed a special operations focused response for contingency operations in 
Afghanistan targeting Al Qaeda and its Taliban hosts. Within 24 hours of the attacks, the 
North Atlantic Council took the unprecedented step of invoking Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty. Despite the allocation of large-scale military support from NATO forces 
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and the massive conventional capabilities of the U.S. military, the lessons learned from 
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan dictated a smaller special operations response. Then 
Colonel John Mulholland, former 5th Special Forces Group Commander, stated, “by the 
13th a decision had been made that we would stand up what's called a Joint Special 
Operations Task Force headquarters [and that] I'd be responsible for conducting 
unconventional warfare operations in the region.”166 This rapid decision demonstrated 
American planners’ confidence in the capabilities and flexibility of special operations in 
austere environments. 
American special operations planners also recognized the diverse capabilities of 
traditional coalition SOF partners and requested their assistance to augment expeditionary 
combat operations. The tactical flexibility and small logistic footprint of these units made 
special operations forces more appealing than conventional forces dedicated to the 
NATO Reaction Force. Nations contributing some form of special operations capability 
to the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom included Australia, Britain, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, Poland, and Turkey.167 From 2001 to 2007, NATO 
SOF forces continued to support U.S. SOF forces in Afghanistan in a subordinate role. 
Since 2007, the NATO SOF linked command in Afghanistan, ISAF SOF, has served as 
an example of effective, efficient, and rapid multinational command and control during 
conflict. Within this command, U.S. soldiers from the 10th Special Forces Group serve 
under British and Australian SOF commanders during counter-terror operations. The 
momentum gained from this “one team, one fight” ethos now extends from remote 
Afghan villages to cosmopolitan European capitals.  
K. THE WAY FORWARD IN UNCERTAIN TIMES 
Despite the rise of complex and uncertain threats, the NATO Alliance has the 
most professional, capable, and battle hardened collective special operations forces in its 
history. Supplemental defense spending over the past decade in many NATO countries 
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has gone a long way to ensure forces have effective combat equipment, improved 
battlefield medical capabilities, and competitive pay. The challenge to military planners 
is to ensure these valuable resources, skills, and momentum are not lost as the NATO 
Alliance faces further austerity measures in the coming decades. To accomplish this goal, 
NATO SOF is developing centralized training, education, and communication resources 
to provide common opportunities at reduced expenditures. Chapter V Developing Trusted 
SOF Networks covers these programs in detail. While common asymmetric threats pose 
challenges to NATO, this new mission set gives the Alliance a renewed focus and 
mechanism to foster enhanced special operations interoperability and capacity. 
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V. DEVELOPING TRUSTED SOF NETWORKS 
A. OVERVIEW 
Special operations networks and coalitions cannot ignore trust development until 
a crisis emerges. Long-term trust relationships contribute to enhanced performance in 
combined military organizations. Special operations forces (SOF) integration requires 
seamless communication and interoperability between coalition SOF, interagency 
partners, and international organizations built upon layers of trusted networks. The 9–11 
attacks, Madrid and London bombings, and the extensive financing and recruiting 
terrorist networks currently operating in Europe create an environment in which trust-
based relationships are essential for collective security. Members of the NATO Alliance 
must refocus efforts on domestic defense against the asymmetric threats described in 
Chapter IV. Coalition special operations in Afghanistan have increased familiarization 
and camaraderie rapidly among soldiers, which has achieved the highest degree of 
cohesion among allied special operations forces since the OSS and FSSF in WWII. This 
unique occurrence combined with the specter of common asymmetric threats creates an 
excellent opportunity to achieve long-lasting social ties among NATO SOF soldiers.  
The NSHQ fosters the establishment of trust-based relationships among soldiers 
through various initiatives to develop unity of effort and optimal performance. The 
command tailors initiatives to the unique antecedent conditions that shape NATO SOF 
soldiers including historical factors, technology proliferation, and previous interaction in 
training and combat. The NSHQ describes these collective efforts as the Allied and 
Partner Collaborative Network. Elements of this network includes establishment of the 
NATO SOF Training and Educational Program (NSTEP), expansion of the BICES 
Network, development of SOF social networking tools, and English language training.168  
 
 
                                                 
168 This assessment is based on the author’s personal experience with NATO SOF 2007–2011 and 
from research visits and interviews at NSHQ in Mons, Belgium and NSTEP at Chièvres Air Base, Belgium 
in February 2011. 
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The success of NSHQ initiatives will hinge on fostering networked interoperability 
among the various NATO SOF units and its ability to safeguard NATO allies and 
partners from asymmetric threats.  
B. EUROPEAN SOF ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS  
Analyzing the establishment of trust networks in NATO SOF requires a study of 
the antecedent conditions prevalent within European military demographics over the past 
30 years. In many ways, the officers and soldiers aged in their mid-30s and below hold 
different worldviews than previous generations. The remarkable fall of communism in 
the late 1980s created an unprecedented opportunity for young men and women in 
Eastern Europe to gain exposure to Western European culture, languages, and travel to 
foreign nations. Following the end of the Cold War, students in Eastern Europe had the 
opportunity to study English rather than Russian, mandated under communism. This 
trend is apparent in young soldiers in nations, such as the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Romania, and Hungary. Soldiers born after 1975 are more likely to speak English and 
have a more “western” outlook than older citizens of their nations.169 This generation of 
Eastern European young men and women was just old enough to remember the 
repression of communism, yet young enough to consider emerging ideas and appreciate 
the role NATO played in delivering freedom to their nations.170 During their years under 
communism, western nations served as beacons of freedom, and were more trusted than 
their own governments. The domination of communist ideology created what Sztompka 
describes as “bloc culture,” with the inadvertent decay in public trust.171 Despite the 
general lack of trust in many aspects of East European society in post Cold War 
development, trust in national militaries and soldiers remained considerably strong.172 
                                                 
169 Author’s personal observations while living in Europe from 2001 until 2008 and more than 60 
interviews conducted in 2011 with NATO SOF members. 
170 Observation derived from round table discussions by the author in Prague, Czech Republic with 
Czech special operations forces during a combined training event in January–February 2007. 
171 Piotr Sztompka, Trust: A Sociological Theory (Cambridge UK New York NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 152. 
172 Ibid., 44.  
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Contemporary mid-career officers and enlisted soldiers across NATO SOF 
completed high school at the beginning of the modern digital age of the mid-1990s. The 
West Point Class of 1999 was the first class in the military academy’s history to have 
access to the Internet midway through their first year. The class of 2000 had Internet 
access from the start of its academic classes in August 1996.173 These two classes and 
their peers across NATO were military platoon leaders on September 2001, and are mid-
career U.S. Army majors with more than a decade of experience in multinational combat 
operations. The trend of expanding technology rippled across Europe as students learned 
to access information from around the world via communal libraries and Internet cafes 
and communication with cell phones. Although the United States held a considerable 
advantage in the number of Internet users in 1996, by the dawn of the Global War on 
Terror five years later, there were more Internet users in the European Union.174 The 
phased implementation of the Schengen Agreement between 1995 and 2001 offered the 
opportunity to travel across Western Europe without border controls, which increased the 
opportunities for young students and military members to travel and experience other 
European cultures.175 When this generation entered service as lieutenants and soldiers of 
the newly expanded NATO, Balkan peacekeeping missions were the only military 
operations on the foreseeable horizon. The 9-11 terrorist attacks abruptly altered these 
young NATO soldiers’ brief peacetime service.  
The 9–11 attacks shaped American soldiers’ global perspectives and military 
careers, as well as those of their NATO allies.176 The subsequent attacks in Madrid and 
London reinforced common irregular threats facing NATO contributing countries and the 
industrialized societies of the world. For many soldiers, these attacks served as a strong 
motivation to continue their military service careers; for others, they were rallying calls to 
join the military. For the next nine years, these generations of digital age warriors 
                                                 
173 Author’s personal observations while a student at the United States Military Academy. 
174 See Appendix B: Internet; Internet Use Statistics derived from the World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER/countries/1W?page=2&cid=GPD_58&display=default. 
175 European Commission Home Affairs, “Background to Schengen Cooperation,” 2011, 
http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/borders/borders_schengen_en.htm. 
176 Gordon, “NATO after 11 September.” 
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deployed to Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and quickly establishing trusted relationships 
with their coalition partners.177 From remote regions around the world, these newly 
trained SOF warriors remained digitally connected with friends, family, and their 
coalition partners. In Afghanistan, they learned to overcome structural, doctrinal, and 
bureaucratic challenges to conduct daily combined tactical operations. They forged 
strong relationships, established long-term trust, and mourned collectively when one of 
their fellow SOF operators fell in the line of duty.  
C. THE EVOLUTION OF TRUST IN NATO 
Social theorist Jon Elster described that in a well-functioning group, “duty enjoins 
us to do what we can rationally will that everyone should do.”178 In the early stages of 
the NATO Alliance, members obligated themselves to honor their collective defense 
commitments if other members were attacked, and trusted their allies to respond in kind. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the lack of a conventional threat to the 
European homeland. In this changing environment, many European nations took a 
“rational actor” approach to defense budgets, which meant contributing the minimum 
amount required to stay active in the alliance.179 Reduced defense budgets funded 
development projects and assisted Eastern European infrastructure upgrades. Many 
NATO nations’ defense expenditures fell to all-time lows below the 2% required under 
the NATO treaty, and thus, placed trust in the United States to honor security 
guarantees.180  
Post-Cold War military force reductions altered the structure and composition of 
European militaries as many European nations transitioned from conscript armies to 
much smaller professional militaries. Between 1988 and 2003, the combined number of 
active duty military forces among NATO allies in Europe fell by 43%, whereas United 
                                                 
177 For a first person perspective of a British junior officer with service in Bosnia, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan see: Patrick Hennessey, The Junior Officers’ Reading Club: Killing Time and Fighting Wars, 
vol. 1 (New York: Riverhead Books, 2010). 
178 Jon Elster, “Rationality, Morality, and Collective Action,” Ethics 96, no. 1 (October 1985): 136–
155. 
179 Ibid., 142. 
180 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, “Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence.” 
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States troop levels fell by 31%.181 While these numbers appear comparable, significant 
gaps in the individual training levels and force projection capacity between U.S. and 
European military forces emerged.182 During peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and 
Kosovo, NATO authorized members to determine their own force contributions. This 
precedent for participation in “out of area” conflicts further encouraged many nations to 
limit the size and scope of their participation in NATO and contributed to accusations of 
defense free riding by some NATO partners.183 Muller and Opp described the dichotomy 
of the free rider dilemma “thus what is individually rational is collectively irrational.”184 
Beyond differences in military employment and funding, larger social and political 
differences began to erode trans-Atlantic unity and trust.185 Despite these differences, 
NATO continued to expand eastward, and absorbed new alliance partners with diverse 
cultures, languages, history, and military capabilities. The lack of identifiable common 
threats, varying levels of cooperation, and cultural differences created uncertainty over 
the future of the alliance.186 
Following the 9–11 terrorist attacks, the primary security concerns for NATO 
members shifted from conventional threats and conduct of peacekeeping missions to 
fears of asymmetric threats.187 The attacks demonstrated that traditional deterrence 
measures would not likely influence non-state actors. Mohamed Atta’s support network 
revealed European hubs and connections, which prompted many NATO nations to 
examine their own domestic threats.188 For the first time since the end of the Cold War, 
NATO nations appeared unified against common asymmetric threats at home and abroad. 
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In the years since the 9–11 attacks, themes of uncertain security treats including 
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, piracy, and domestic disruptions, appeared in 
national defense reviews and white papers of NATO Alliance nations.189  
D. TRUST DEVELOPMENT IN AFGHANISTAN  
While NATO operations in Afghanistan have been politically controversial in 
many European nations, the combined effort has achieved the significant development of 
some trust-based relationships, while negatively influencing other partnerships. U.S. 
special operations forces, specifically the 10th Special Forces Group (SFG), assisted in 
the establishment, development, and training of many European SOF forces, which 
created close working relationships and personal bonds. While U.S. military planners had 
respect for tactical SOF units across NATO, these planners did not hold equivalent 
confidence and trust in the capabilities of the NATO Alliance to wage an unconventional 
war.190  
Strategists planned initial military operations in Afghanistan upon custom 
designed special operations frameworks intended to maximize trusted partners’ 
capabilities rather than NATO hierarchical structures. In a New York Times editorial in 
late September 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld summarized this belief that 
“the mission will define the coalition - not the other way around.”191 Special operations 
units with trusted reputations and pre-existing working relationships with U.S. forces 
received invitations to participate in the coalition, while American planners politely 
declined unvetted forces’ offers of support. During the initial phases of Operation 
Enduring Freedom, U.S. forces requested support from trusted special operations allies 
including Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey, and the United 
Kingdom. Many early SOF operations in Afghanistan employed principles of network 
centric warfare advocated by defense strategists John Arquilla using small “hunter 
networks” to collect information regarding enemy situation and disposition in real 
                                                 
189 See Appendix A: Views on security noted in national defense reviews and white papers. 
190 Gordon, “NATO after 11 September.” 
191 Donald Rumsfeld, “A New Kind of War,” New York Times, September 27, 2001, http://www.tep-
online.info/laku/usa/news/27rums.html.  
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time.”192 From remote outposts, SOF leaders conducted daily video teleconferences with 
senior leadership halfway around the world that allowed rapid approval and feedback 
during key operations.193 Between 2001 and 2007, combined coalition SOF operations 
expanded to include valuable participation from many NATO SOF nations.  
Many of the ongoing NATO SOF initiatives began in 2007, which initiated an 
ambitious period of special operations capacity and network infrastructure development 
across the alliance. By the spring of 2007, the International Security and Assistance Force 
Special Operations (ISAF SOF) coordination element reached initial operating capacity 
in Afghanistan. By summer 2007, the NATO SOF Coordination Center (NSCC) emerged 
out of the Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) and established offices at 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium. Both 
organizations advocated SOF interoperability, network connectivity, and harnessing the 
significant camaraderie and trust developed during previous Afghanistan combined 
operations. While most U.S. SOF units in Afghanistan remained under the American led 
Operation Enduring Freedom, Operational Detachment Alphas (ODAs) from 1st 
Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (1-10th SFG) based in Germany deployed to 
support ISAF SOF. While serving as the Special Operations Command-Europe 
Commander, Rear Admiral McRaven performed a significant demonstration of trust in 
coalition special operations capabilities by placing his American special forces under 
foreign leadership for the first time in the conflict. Following these commitments, 1-10th 
SFG personnel reported to British and Australian SAS flag officers and served key staff 
positions in the ISAF SOF headquarters.194 A case study in Chapter VI of this report 
outlines 1-10th SFG’s contributions to NATO SOF integration. Many of these early 
initiatives achieved significant progress in standardizing coalition contributions, which 
set the stage for subsequent efforts focused on increasing special operations capacity, 
network infrastructure, and enhanced partnership. 
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E. THE ALLIED AND PARTNER COLLABORATIVE NETWORK 
The NSHQ describes its multifaceted approach to developing SOF 
interoperability and cooperation as the Allied and Partner Collaborative Network with a 
mandate “to create an enduring Allied and Partner SOF community of interest anchored 
by personal relationships which assure loyalty and trust.”195 While many network 
initiatives focus on technological means, the Collaborative Network relies on an 
investment in human capital by leveraging personal relationships established between 
special operations soldiers to solidify unit trust and cooperation.196 Initiatives supporting 
these goals include expanding the Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation 
System (BICES) network, establishing the NATO SOF Training and Education Program 
(NSTEP), investment in English language training, and developing a special operations 
social networking web portal. These initiatives attempt to take a multi-faceted approach 
to build upon combat camaraderie and establish long-term trusted relationships to 
improve special operations performance and enhance security for NATO contributing 
nations. 
F. THE NATO SOF BICES NETWORK:  
The key development facilitating NATO SOF interoperability and intelligence 
sharing was the expansion of the NATO Battlefield Information Collection and 
Exploitation System (BICES). The expansion of the network began in 2007 as the newly 
established NSCC recognized deficiencies in the existing classified communication 
infrastructure linking allied partners. These network structures lacked sufficient resources 
and available connections to tactical level units. Most NATO SOF units relied on 
unclassified e-mail and phone lines for most communication between units.197 NATO 
special operations leaders relied on preexisting personal relationships established during  
 
                                                 
195 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters, “Allied and Partner 
Collaborative Network (APCN).” 
196 Ibid. 
197 Alan Dron, “Special Network—Alliance Aims to Improve Cooperation among Special Operators,” 
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exercises and deployments, or mutual contacts captured in Rolodexes and business card 
books to exchange information. These methods of communication were incapable of 
supporting the rapid flow of information required to support combined operations.  
As NATO special operations visionaries, such as then-Rear Admiral McRaven, 
outlined requirements for enhanced network connectivity, identifying the most efficient 
infrastructure became a top priority within the organization. To address limitations in 
network capability, an implementation team evaluated the feasibility of linking special 
operations units around the world through a comprehensive NATO all channel 
communication network.198 Rather than establish a new network, the implementation 
team recommended expanding the BICES intelligence network.199 The initial version of 
the enhanced network provided secure e-mail, phone, and limited video teleconference 
capability in additional to the preexisting limited intelligence sharing capabilities. 
Subsequent upgrades to the network included full motion video linked to air platforms, 
intelligence tools linking national level and NATO fusion centers, advanced targeting 
functions, access to biometrics, and geo imagery.200  
Once a robust BICES network infrastructure began to emerge, the implementation 
team researched methods to connect the network safely to other alliance systems to 
facilitate information sharing. These efforts resulted in “cross domain solutions” that 
facilitate integration with NATO and U.S. secure networks.201 With these advanced 
capabilities, the NATO SOF BICES network can serve as a mechanism to overlap pre-
existing bonds among users and link expanded networks of national level inter-agency 
partners and partner countries. Stanford sociologist Mark Granovetter’s research focuses 
on this dynamic to show how strong and weak bonds between individuals can expand to 
link extended communities of associates.202 The NSHQ worked to establish NATO SOF  
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BICES as the central hub for communication on emerging domestic and international 
threats and a mechanism to capture relationships and interoperability established in 
Afghanistan.  
The NSHQ will continue to expand BICES Network capabilities with more than 
$7 million dollars dedicated over the next five years to research and development 
initiatives.203 Recent upgrades to the network provide mobile access to the network 
through encrypted satellite links and deployable Mobile Expandable Container 
Configurations that provide communications centers that can rapidly deploy via small 
aircraft to remote regions of the world. Within four years, the NATO SOF Headquarters 
greatly enhanced the ability of its subordinate commands to communicate, collaborate, 
and develop long-term trusted personal and professional networks effectively. While the 
BICES Network greatly enhances special operations intelligence sharing, enhanced 
security protocols are essential to mitigate the mishandling of classified information. Any 
careless mishandling of intelligence or diplomatic correspondence could severely 
compromise ongoing combined special operations, and thus, requires common vigilance 
to approved data safe guarding practices  
The recent security breach of U.S. classified reports and diplomatic cables and 
subsequent posting on the Wikileaks website demonstrated the damage one nefarious 
network user could inflict.204 To mitigate this threat, the NSHQ has established common 
protocols for vetting potential network users and safeguarding the network infrastructure. 
The BICES network’s cross domain solutions eliminate requirements to “air gap” or 
manually copy and move classified data via writable media between networks, which 
eliminates a security weakness exploited by Manning.205 Although no classified system 
can be impervious to potential compromise, prudent implementation of established 
security rules and practices will ensure BICES can continue to serve as the hub of an  
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expanding network of trusted global partners. This initiative and other emerging 
technologies may give NATO SOF greater protection from potential cyber-attacks like 
those conducted against Estonia in 2007.206 
 
 
Figure 6.   NATO SOF BICES Network Capabilities207  
G. MAINTAINING MOMENTUM THROUGH EDUCATION 
The NATO SOF Training and Educational Program (NSTEP) is another 
important component of the Allied and Partner Collaborative Network.208 NSTEP classes 
prepare NATO SOF soldiers and staff for operations in Afghanistan, improve 
performance and capabilities in future “out of area” contingency missions, and field 
emerging technology capable of improving networked interoperability. NSTEP academic 
campus construction began in 2009 at Chievres Air Base, 19 kilometers from the NATO 
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Headquarters in Mons, Belgium.209 The new campus incorporates emerging technology 
and network communications to link students with forces currently conducting operations 
in Afghanistan and global SOF partners. Each of the campus’ 10 classrooms contains 
computer workstations for all students connected to the BICES network and advanced 
military planning software.210 Returning students train their units on these platforms. Of 
the 14 primary courses taught at the NSTEP campus, only one, the ISAF SOF Operations 
Course, specifically focuses on the NATO role in Afghanistan.211 Classroom instruction 
in the other 13 courses attempts to harness students’ experience in ongoing operations in 
Afghanistan and other contingencies. The courses build on previous experience to 
prepare students for future combined special operations to combat emerging threats or 
provide military assistance to developing nations.212  
NATO SOF Training and Education Program curriculum constantly evolves to 
ensure instruction supports ongoing operations. The instructor cadre has considerable 
tactical experience and frequently conducts Afghanistan site visits to ensure instruction 
remains relevant. Many instructors and staff members attended the Defense Analysis 
Program at the Naval Postgraduate School, which gave them a common academic 
foundation and access to a worldwide graduate network sharing recent lessons learned in 
combat.213 Most courses last several weeks and created conditions for students to 
establish relationships rapidly during courses. Roderick Kramer and Tom Tyler describe 
this form of trust development in temporary systems as “swift trust.”214 This rapid 
socialization can serve as building blocks to establishing long-term trust in colleagues as 
they maintain future communication through social networking sites, e-mail, classified 
                                                 
209 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Training and Educational Program 
(NSTEP), “NSHQ 2011 Course Catalog” (NATO SOF Headquarters, Mons, Belgium, 2011). 
210 Author’s personal observations from NSTEP Campus site visit and auditing of four classes, 
February 2011. 
211 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Training and Educational Program 
(NSTEP), “NSHQ 2011 Course Catalog.” 
212 Derived from interviews conducted by author in Chievres, Belgium with NATO SOF Headquarters 
staff; February 2011. 
213 Authors visit to NSTEP Campus on Chievres Air Base, Belgium; February 2011. 
214 Roderick Kramer and Tom Tyler, Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research 
(Thousand Oaks CA: Sage Publications, 1996), 167. 
 71
networks, and cooperation in training and deployments. Each time a student attends a 
course, that student becomes a link in formal and informal networks, further expanding 
cooperation and organizational trust. 
 
 
Figure 7.   NSTEP Course Offerings215 
H. BENEFITS OF COMMON LANGUAGE  
The complexity and intimacy of special operations requires members of combined 
operations to communicate through a common language effectively. To promote common 
language capabilities across NATO special operations, the NSTEP campus conducts all 
training in English. Most courses offered require prospective students to achieve level 
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three-language proficiency and demonstrate technical writing capabilities.216 NSTEP 
language requirements advance a broader NSHQ goal to achieve common language 
proficiency across all NATO SOF units. While the NATO SOF BICES network includes 
translation tools to facilitate multinational communication, the intricate nature of military 
communications and intelligence products dictates that users preferably share common 
language capabilities. The formal establishment of English as the mandated international 
language of aviation in 2008 further emphasized the necessity of precise language skills 
as SOF operators coordinated close air support with English-speaking allied pilots near 
population centers and troop concentrations.217 When soldiers and civilians lives are at 
risk, coalition partners reading or listening to dispatches must trust the accuracy of 
reports. While progress has been made in this initiative through English language training 
funded by the United States at units’ home stations, much work must be done to 
overcome lagging English language skills in emerging NATO partners in Eastern 
Europe.218 Younger European soldiers’ exposure to the Voice of America, United States 
Armed Forces Radio Europe, American movies and television, the Internet, and 
participation in multinational military operations have contributed to enhanced English 
language skills.219  
I.  SPECIAL OPERATIONS SOCIAL NETWORKING 
While the tactical requirements for common language capability in small units are 
essential, language also influences the levels of trust between associates. Colleagues 
sharing face-to-face communication are more likely to make astute trust assessments.220 
Within combined SOF operations, soldiers who can communicate without the assistance 
of an interpreter form personal bonds, share intimate conversations, and maintain future 
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correspondence via e-mail and social networking.221 The senior leadership of the NSHQ 
recognizes the power of social networking to harness and strengthen pre-existing 
relationships, which is directing the establishment of a NATO SOF specific social 
networking web portal. With a working title of SOF Net, the portal has an anticipated 
beta version unveiling in April 2011.222 The portal will include tools to capture the “swift 
trust” networks established during NSTEP courses. As students attend future classes, they 
enroll in collaborative forums with classmates and remain linked following their return to 
their units. Other functions will include online collaborative forums to conduct 
unclassified discussions concerning recent experiences during deployments, doctrine 
development, and resources to facilitate combined training events between coalition SOF 
partners.  
The unclassified NATO special operations SOF Net social networking site under 
development can serve as a gateway to increase online participation on classified 
networks. Conversations and relationships that emerge on the social networking site can 
transition to classified forums to ensure operational security when exchanging recent 
combat experience, sharing emerging intelligence, or planning upcoming training. To 
achieve seamless transition between SOF Net and BICES, the unclassified social 
networking site should mirror BICES network layout and basic functions. As soldiers 
navigate through the unclassified portal, they gain familiarity with the collaborative tools 
available on BICES portals. This gateway structure is similar to the mirrored layout of 
the U.S. Army Knowledge Online (AKO) unclassified and classified versions.223 
Additional functions will include unclassified e-mail, chat, and white page functions. 
These tools will allow users to reconnect with other NATO SOF soldiers they have met 
during courses, deployments, training, or through mutual acquaintances.  
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The NATO special operations SOF Net social networking site would perform 
similar to West-Point.org, a privately funded portal started in 1996 by a graduate linking 
his former classmates and Vietnam War comrades. The site rapidly grew to offer a wealth 
of services connecting nearly 30,000 graduates, parents, and friends of all West Point 
classes.224 The site provides relevant news, an online eulogy forum, e-mail accounts, web 
portals, and a living history project that captures graduates’ combat and life 
experiences.225 The success of this site demonstrates the power of not only linking 
military colleagues but also the extended network of friends and family. The U.S. 
military has stressed the importance of forging social networks among military spouses 
during the past decade of prolonged military deployments. Many tactical military 
battalions now have a full-time paid family readiness coordinator on staff working with 
company and level volunteer spouses to give military commanders a structured method to 
disseminate pertinent information to family members quickly.  
As social networking tools grow, many of these formal and informal spouse 
networks span large geographic distances and military structures. In one example of the 
power of these networks during the Japanese earthquake in March 2011, military spouses 
stationed in coastal communities in California and Hawaii were alerted in the middle of 
the night by text messages from a spouse stationed in Germany watching reports of 
potential Tsunami warnings in the Pacific on television.226 The wives formed strong 
bonds during a previous assignment when their spouses frequently deployed and the 
women volunteered as family readiness coordinators. While constructing social 
networking initiatives, the NSHQ should consider the powerful dynamic of linking 
military spouses, especially during combined deployments. Similar to efforts connecting 
NATO SOF service members, these potential social networking efforts will have to 
explore options to overcome language barriers and military information confidentiality 
protocols. 
                                                 
224 West-Point.org, “West-Point.org, The West Point Connection,” 2011, http://www.west-point.org. 
225 Ibid. 
226 Author’s review of text message communications among military spouses spanning 12 time zones 
concerning potential tsunami danger before local news reported warnings, March 11, 2011. 
 75
An analysis of Internet growth across Europe from 1991 to 2008 indicates that 
sufficient Internet saturation across NATO contributing nations has occurred to facilitate 
widespread participation in online social networking.227 The phased introduction of the 
Internet beginning in Western Europe and spreading eastward indicates that some older 
soldiers from these regions will be less likely to use these tools than their younger 
colleagues or western peers. The rapid advancement of technology across Europe and the 




Figure 8.   NSHQ SOF Net Special Operations Social Networking Portal228 
                                                 
227 See Appendix B: Internet Use in NATO Contributing Nations, compiled by the author from data 
obtained through The World Bank: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER/countries/1W?page=2&cid=GPD_58&display=default. 
228 NATO SOF Headquarters, SOFNet Login Portal, https://aaa.nshq.nato.int/vpn/tmindex.html, 2011. 
Source:NSHQ 2011 
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VI. COMMON THEMES IN NATO SOF DEVELOPMENT 
A. CZECH REPUBLIC: EASTERN EUROPE SOF DEVELOPMENT 
The Czech Republic’s 601st Special Forces typifies the transition of former 
Eastern Bloc airborne units to modern special operations units. These units transitioned 
from centralized command and control structures during the Cold War to structures with 
empowered subordinate leadership in current conflicts. The 601st Special Forces traces 
its lineage to 1952, when it was a Czechoslovakian airborne brigade in Presov, which 
moved to Prostějov in 1960.229 In 1969, the brigade reorganized into a regimental 
structure with one airborne battalion and two airborne recon companies. In 1976, the unit 
adopted a “diversion” mission of sabotage and harassment attacks in enemy rear 
echelons. As the Cold War ended, the unit took on the additional missions of long-range 
reconnaissance and deep penetration.  
In 1995, the unit reorganized as the 6th Special Brigade and adopted NATO 
standards in preparation for entrance into the Alliance.230 In 1998, the Czech Army 
created an independent Special Forces Company within the brigade. The company 
experimented with new training methods, specialized equipment, standards, and 
personnel policies. The Special Forces Company selected unit members based on their 
performance and ability to assist in NATO special operations interoperability initiatives, 
such as English language training and specialized courses. In 2002, then Lieutenant 
Colonel Ondrej Palenik assumed command of the newly expanded 601st Special Forces 
Group (601st SFG) and initiated a series of reorganization initiatives that expanded the 
unit’s capabilities.231 The former Special Forces Company dispersed throughout the  
 
 
                                                 
229 Czech Army 601st SFG, “Official Pages of 601st Special Forces Group,” 2011, 
http://www.601skss.cz/english/history.html. 
230 Ibid. 
231 Former 601st SFG commander Ondrej Palenik has held the position as the head of Czech Military 
Intelligence since 2007 at the current rank of Lieutenant General. 
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601st SFG to ensure a distribution of experience and best practices in 2003.232 The same 
year, the unit completed the transition to NATO special operations interoperability 
standards.  
Under the innovative leadership of Ondrej Palenik, the 601st SFG initiated a 
systematic development plan that directly contributed to the unit’s rapid transition into a 
prominent NATO special operations partner. As the unit grew, it retained significant 
autonomy to develop unit structures, tactics, and selection procedures.233 This autonomy 
empowered senior leadership to hand select trusted subordinate leaders who enforced 
high unit performance standards. Once selected, early 601st SFG senior leaders 
empowered lower echelon leaders and soldiers to experiment with “bottom up” 
development within the Special Forces Coys (companies) that expanded identified best 
practices across the unit. Upon returning from a successful company deployment to 
Operation Enduring Freedom VI in 2006, the 601st SFG dispersed returning combat-
proven junior leaders across the 601st SFG to ensure distribution of exceptional talent 
and experience.234 Similar to other NATO special operations units, the 601st SFG 
selected subsequent unit members following rigorous tests of physical aptitude and 
psychological testing. An exceptionally innovative and gifted non-commissioned officer, 
who developed a screening profile for soldiers who “would be fit to go for any mission,” 
led the selection team.235 Unit selection events frequently selected fewer than 5% of the 
recruits that tried out for the unit, while adhering to the truth that “SOF cannot be mass 
produced.”236 
Unit cohesion and partnership development took a central role in the 601st SFG’s 
development, and created structures and policies that contributed to effective unit 
                                                 
232 Czech Army 601st SFG, “Official Pages of 601st Special Forces Group.” 
233 Information derived from author’s interviews with members of the Czech 601st SFG, February-
April 2011. 
234 Account is derived from interviews with Czech 601st SFG unit members between February and 
May 2011. 
235 Author’s interviews with members of the Czech 601st SFG, February–May 2011. 
236 Reference to one of the “SOF truths” common in special operations units across NATO. Selection 
percentages in the 601st SFG provided to the author by current unit members during conversations between 
February and May 2011. 
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performance through years of evolution. Unlike former Communist era policies favoring 
party insiders, the unit evolved as a meritocracy that selected leaders with high levels of 
demonstrated work ethic and merit. The 601st SFG embraced airborne and 
reconnaissance unit lineage while creating new Special Forces specific traditions to form 
enhanced camaraderie within the unit. To expand tactical skills and unit readiness levels, 
the 601st SFG conducted partnership training with U.S. Army Special Forces and United 
Kingdom SAS during its unit development.237 In addition to its NATO allies, the 601st 
SFG benefited from unit training with the Czech National Police’s domestic counter-
terror unit established in 1981, the Útvar rychlého nasazení (URN).238 Beyond unit 
partnerships, the 601st deployed soldiers to international training courses, such as the 
U.S. Army Ranger School, Special Forces qualification and medical courses, and the 
International SOF Training Center (ISTC) in Pfullendorf, Germany. In addition to 
military training, the unit encourages advanced civil schooling as well. More than 27% of 
the soldiers in the unit hold university degrees.239 These investments in training and 
education assisted the unit in increasing unit capacity and preparing for increased 
participation in NATO contingency operations.  
Between 2002 and 2009, the Czech Military Police developed another special 
operations unit in Prague; the Special Operations Group (SOG) focused on domestic 
counter-terrorism and overseas close protection details. The unit consisted of former 
police members, and some Army soldiers. During the units’ existence, it deployed to 
Iraq, Kuwait, Afghanistan, and the Balkans and participated in one Joint Combined 
Executed Training (JCET) with U.S. special operations. U.S. efforts to assist the 
development of the new unit diverted monetary assistance, partnership training, and some 
SOF-specific equipment from the 601st SFG until the Czech Army disbanded the SOG in 
                                                 
237 The 601st SFG conducted eight Joint Combined Executed Training (JCET) events with U.S. Army 
Special Forces detachments between 1998 and 2011. 
238 “Policie České republiky - Útvar rychlého nasazení - Policie České republiky,” 2011, 
http://www.policie.cz/clanek/utvar-rychleho-nasazeni-policie-ceske-republiky-utvar-rychleho-
nasazeni.aspx. 
239 Czech Army 601st SFG, “601st Special Forces Group Official Website,” 2011, 
http://www.601skss.cz/english/training.html. 
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2009.240 Following the SOG’s disbanding, officials distributed the unit’s equipment to 
several Czech military units. Some of the equipment went to the 601st SFG to fill 
outstanding requirements. The unit overcame other limitations through the unit 
commander’s persistence, prudent equipment acquisitions, and steady growth using 
systematic processes.  
The Czech 601st Special Forces Group’s evolution enabled the unit transition 
from a former Eastern Bloc organization and tactics to a vital special operations partner 
in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan.241 The unit serves as an example of a special 
operations unit structured to assimilate into NATO structure, develop unit cohesion, and 
partner with allies to combat common threats. The 601st SFG’s solid combat 
performance in Iraq and Afghanistan validated the systematic methods employed during 
the unit’s development, which indicates that the unit will continue to evolve to meet 
asymmetric threats.  
B. GERMAN SOF DEVELOPMENT: BENEFITS OF PROXIMITY  
Forward presence of American SOF in Germany directly facilitated the 
development of German special operations capability. Elements of the U.S. Army 10th 
Special Forces Group (10th SFG) occupied Flint Kaserne in the Alpine village of Bad 
Tolz in 1953. Its Cold war mission was to conduct guerilla warfare behind enemy 
lines.242 In 1968, the unit redeployed the 10th Group headquarters and much of the unit 
to Fort Devens, Massachusetts. The 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (1-10thy 
SFG) remained forward deployed in Bad Tolz. Following the end of the Cold War, 1-
10th SFG’s primary mission shifted to out of area contingency operations. In 1991, the 
U.S. Army moved the 1-10th SFG to a WWII era German tank post, Panzer Kaserne, in 
the Stuttgart suburb of Boeblingen. The move placed the unit within proximity of 
                                                 
240 Information is derived from the author’s conversations with former members of the Czech SOG 
between 2007 and 2008 and current members of the 601st SFG between February and May 2011. 
241 Elements of the 601st SFG deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 and to Operation 
Enduring Freedom in 2004, 2006, and 2008–2009 for three 6-month deployments. During OEF 
deployments, the unit fielded independent 100–120 man task forces including approximately 50 special 
operation operators and 50–70 support and staff personnel. 
242 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, “10th SFG(A) History,” 2011, 
http://www.soc.mil/USASFC/10thSFGA/10thSFG%20History.html. 
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Stuttgart Army Airfield, an asset required for rapid deployment not available in Bad Tolz. 
In addition to 1-10th SFG, the U.S. Naval Special Warfare Unit-2 established a small 
compound to house rotating SEAL units on Panzer Kaserne  
In 1994, the German government requested assistance from Belgian para- 
commandos to evacuate 12 German citizens from Rwanda. Germany lacked a force 
capable of conducting rapid operations outside of German borders.243 This event 
triggered the German government to consider development of an out of area deployable 
special operations capability to augment the Federal Police’s GSG-9 unit near Bonn.244 
On September 20, 1996, the newly formed Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK) replaced the 
25 Luftlande “Swarzwald” Brigade-25 at Graf-Zeppelin-Kaserne in the village of Calw. 
The political decision to locate the unit 25 kilometers away from Panzer Kaserne created 
positive conditions for unit partnership with U.S. SOF. From its establishment in Calw, 
the KSK formed close bonds with the three Special Forces companies in Boeblingen, and 
shared some resources and conducted combined training.  
Regularly scheduled partnership training has enabled the KSK and U.S. SOF to 
share valuable experience gained in global contingency operations over the past 
decade.245 Training typically occurs at the Panzer Kaserne urban combat training center 
or the KSK’s Ausbildungs-und Versuchszentrum (AVZ) training center.246 Partnership 
with U.S. SOF and priority funding and manning allowed the unit to establish itself as one 
of the foremost special operations units in the world. In 15 years, the unit has grown to 
nearly 1,300 soldiers with a full range of SOF capabilities. Partnership extended beyond 
training as both units invited delegations to military balls, changes of command, and 
encouraged off hours socializing. Many U.S. special operations soldiers’ families live in  
 
                                                 
243 German Federal Ministry of Defence-Heer (Army), “History of the KSK, German Heer,” 2011, 
http://www.deutschesheer.de. 
244 Ibid. 
245 The KSK and 1st-10th SFG additionally supported peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions 
in Bosnia and Kosovo, and frequently supported efforts to find and capture persons indicted for war crimes 
(PIFWIC). 
246 German Federal Ministry of Defence-Heer (Army), “History of the KSK, German Heer.” 
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the same communities as their KSK comrades and some have married German spouses, 
and thus, gained valuable cultural awareness, language skills, and social networks in the 
Stuttgart community.  
The relationship between U.S. SOF and the KSK demonstrate the benefits of U.S. 
SOF persistent forward presence. Beyond the German KSK, 1-10th SFG sponsorship and 
training contributed to initial SOF development in Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, 
Hungary, and assisted other emerging special operations forces. Forward presence in 
Europe assists U.S. SOF as well. Forward deployed American SOF soldiers are typically 
better prepared to immerse themselves in a foreign culture and have a greater 
understanding of NATO policy and doctrine than their continental U.S. counterparts. 
These soldiers are more likely to hold personal relationships with NATO SOF soldiers 
through previous combined training, schooling, or friendships established during off-duty 
socializing and travel. These relationships serve as valuable social capital when 
conducting partnership operations or liaison duty. These relationships continue to 
improve partner unit capacity and interoperability, as witnessed by the KSK’s emergence 
as one of the best special operations units in the world  
C. THE “NORWAY MODEL” AN EMERGING SOF BLUEPRINT 
Norwegian SOF has earned a reputation for exceptional volunteerism and 
professionalism in global conflicts. Norway is unique as a charter member of NATO, 
although twice voting to reject membership in the European Union.247 This unique 
relationship encouraged Norway to pursue its active role in the alliance as a mechanism 
for achieving national security and defense goals. The proud history of Norwegian 
special operations soldiers dating back to World War II demonstrated the economy of 
force benefits of SOF in combined operations, and especially in austere environments.248 
This lineage set the example for the active participation and steady employment of 
                                                 
247 Norway’s Mission to the European Union, “Norway and the European Union,” 2011, 
http://www.eu-norway.org/eu/. Note: The Norwegian population voted to reject European Union 
membership in 1972 and 1994, which resulted in 52% against EU membership and 48% in favor during the 
last vote in 1994. 
248 Norwegian Armed Forces, “Historie,” 2011, http://forsvaret.no/om-forsvaret/fakta-om-
forsvaret/historie/Sider/historie.aspx. 
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Norwegian SOF in NATO operations. This elevated level of participation beyond many 
other NATO allies has earned NORSOF influence, and increased representation within 
NATO SOF and forward deployed commands, such as ISAF SOF.249 Special operations 
leaders typically refer to a “Norway model” in recognition of ambitious NORSOF 
participation in combined operations and command structures.250 This model serves as an 
example that emerging SOF units can pursue to secure influence and respectability within 
the SOF community through consistent performance and reliable partnership.  
In addition to participation in contingency operations, Norway has pursued 
special operations training and education efforts aggressively. Norway has taken a 
leading role in assisting its NATO allies prepare for potential cold weather contingency 
operations through a series of annual training exercises near the Arctic Circle. Operation 
Cold Response 2010 drew more than 8,500 soldiers from 14 nations.251 Beyond 
exercises, NORSOF soldiers and officers routinely attend partner military training 
courses and advanced schooling. These efforts have built an educated corps of SOF 
leaders while generating an impressive collection of SOF specific literature and thesis 
work.252 NORSOF operators’ advanced technical skills, academic background, and 
fluency in the English language have made the unit a strong partner in combined 
operations. NORSOF took an active role in operations in the Balkans, was among the 
first NATO allies to deploy to Afghanistan in 2001, and played a central role in security 
operations in Kabul province under ISAF SOF in recent years.253  
                                                 
249 Authors observation of NATO SOF and ISAF SOF command infrastructure from 2007 to 2011, as 
well as interviews with Norwegian officers within both structures in 2011. 
250 NORSOF development as a model for emerging SOF was cited routinely by senior leaders and 
soldiers across NATO SOF units during the author’s interviews conducted between February and May 
2011. 
251 United States Navy, “Navy Special Forces Support Cold Response 2010,” March 2010, 
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=52108.  
252 Previous NORSOF thesis work at the Naval Postgraduate School has been widely circulated within 
NATO SOF. Examples include Mellingen, “Strategic Utilization of Norwegian Special Operations Forces”; 
Petter Hellese, “Counterinsurgency and its Implications for The Norwegian Special Operations Forces” 
(Master’s thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2008), 
http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2008/Jun/08Jun_Hellesen.pdf. 
253 Bensahel, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and The European 
Union. 
 84
Several emerging NATO SOF units have attempted to emulate the “Norway 
Model” through increased participation in coalition operations. Lithuania has attempted 
to emulate Norway and establish itself as a SOF leader in the Baltic region. Similar to 
Norway, Lithuania has a proud history of special operations dating to the “Forrest 
Brothers” partisan forces of WWII and the Cold War.254 The Lithuanian military created 
its first Special Forces unit in 1995 to give the nation additional capacity against 
asymmetric threats.255 In 2002, Lithuania joined NATO along with Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Estonia, Romania, and Slovakia.256 The same year, Lithuania created a unified special 
operations command designated the Special Operations Unit (SOU) and deployed its first 
elements to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.257 As the unit developed its 
capabilities, LITHSOF participated in a number of combined training exercises including 
Shamrock Key, Cold Response, and co-hosted the Jackal Stone exercise with Poland in 
2010.258 In addition to partnership exercises and capability development, LITHSOF 
combat operations in Kandahar Province since 2007 have earned the unit a solid 
reputation among its NATO allies.259  
The ambitious LITHSOF pursuit of influence within NATO SOF has not come 
without challenges. The relatively small size of LITHSOF has resulted in high 
operational tempo to fulfill force allocation goals comparable to other partners with high 
deployment rates. The cumulative effect of nine years of deployments has resulted in 
reduced family time, limited opportunities for individual schooling, and fatigue in some 
                                                 
254 Juozas Daumantas, Forest Brothers: The Account of an Anti-Soviet Lithuanian Freedom Fighter, 
1944–1948 (New York: Central European University Press, 2009). 
255 “Lithuanian Armed Forces: Structure-Special Forces,” 2011, 
http://kariuomene.kam.lt/en/structure_1469/special_forces.html. 
256 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Lithuania,” 2011, 
http://www.nato.int/invitees2004/lithuania.htm. 
257 “Lithuanian Armed Forces: Structure, Special Forces.” 
258 United States European Command, “Ceremony Kicks off Jackal Stone 2010 Special Operations 
Forces Exercise in Poland,” September 24, 2010, 
http://www.eucom.mil/english/FullStory.asp?article=Ceremony-kicks-Jackal-Stone-2010-Special-Forces. 




LITHSOF and other NATO SOF units.260 Despite these limitations, the “Norway Model” 
serves as a valid mechanism for emerging nations seeking to gain increased influence, 
trust, and respect within the NATO SOF community. 
D. TASK FORCE-10: TACTICAL LEVEL SOF PARTNERSHIP  
By the spring of 2007, “B” Company, 1st Battalion 10th SFG (1-10th SFG), was 
one of the few U.S. Special Forces companies that had not deployed as an Area 
Operational Base (AOB) to tactical operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. The unit’s 
dedication to SOCEUR regional contingency plans previously prevented deployment 
with the remainder of 10th SFG to operations in Iraq. Although the company 
headquarters had not deployed, many of its soldiers and subordinate leaders had previous 
combat experience with other units. Several combined training exercises honed the unit’s 
tactical skills and NATO SOF interoperability.261 The unit was well trained and eager to 
contribute to ongoing combat operations. At a conference in Mons, Belgium in June 
2007, the former SOCEUR Commander and NSCC Director Rear Admiral McRaven, 
outlined his plan to deploy the company to Afghanistan under the ISAF SOF mission. 
Initially, the unit would fill a six-month gap in NORSOF deployments in Regional 
Command-Central. This allocation served as a significant demonstration of trust in 
coalition SOF capabilities by placing U.S. special operations forces under ISAF SOF 
leadership for the first time in the conflict. The effort attempted to improve NATO SOF 
interoperability by infusing the Stuttgart-based U.S. Special Forces into the 
organization’s tactical operations as Special Operations Task Force-10 in honor of the 
10th SFG.262  
Under the ISAF SOF structure, the Task Force-10 contingent would report to 
British and Australian officers and fill vacant staff positions, while all other U.S. SOF 
                                                 
260 Comment based on author’s interviews with NATO SOF soldiers from February to May 2011. 
261 “B” Company, 1_10th SFG conducted a series of pre-mission training events with NATO SOF 
partners including combined training at the Joint Multinational Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany and 
a series of combined training exercises with Eastern European SOF partners. 
262 Special Operations Task Groups (SOTG) under ISAF SOF typically are assigned numeric 
designations. An initial assessment team in the summer of 2007 chose the name in honor of the 
simultaneous deployments of 10th SFG forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, North Africa, and Europe, as well as 
emphasizing the small elements daunting task to sustain itself independent of CJSOTF logistic channels. 
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remained under the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom.263 The men of 1-10th 
SFG were ideal candidates for this mission. The unit had developed long-running unit 
partnerships across Europe from the early 1950s. Many of the unit’s initial members were 
native-born Eastern European partisan fighters from WWII, who were allowed entry into 
the U.S. Army by the Lodge Act of 1950. These early foreign-born Green Berets were 
among the first soldiers to carry unit challenge coins to serve as a “bona fides” of their 
status as 10th Group soldiers, despite their heavily accented speech.264 Following the end 
of the Cold War, the unit’s forward deployed mission shifted to developing Eastern 
European special operations capacity. In this role, the battalion assisted in SOF capability 
development in Romania and Hungary over the past decade. These partnerships became a 
key element of subsequent combined deployments. The lineage of foreign-born soldiers 
in the battalion continues through present day with a higher percentage of East European 
emigrants in the unit than other Special Forces units. These cultural ties, military 
partnerships, and geographic proximity directly contributed to the development of 
significant trust and influence with NATO SOF units. 
While the men and leadership of 1-10th SFG eagerly welcomed the potential 
deployment, the plan to place U.S. special operations forces under the ISAF SOF 
structure was not popular with some American senior leaders. These leaders feared the 
deployment would set a precedent of U.S. special operations units transitioning under the 
ISAF command structure, and thus, challenge the autonomy of the Operation Enduring 
Freedom command structure. These concerns led several senior leaders to issue 
memorandums of non-concurrence to the SOCEUR proposal. These memorandums 
meant that U.S. Special Forces under Task Force-10 could not receive any logistical or 
operational support from their American special operations colleagues within the 
Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF). Task Force-10 would have to 
rely on SOCEUR or the unit’s internal support company to push supplies from Germany 
or request support from NATO allies. In the summer of 2007, the ISAF SOF staff in 
                                                 
263 Author’s observations of ISAF SOF Special Operations Coordination and Control Element (SOCCE) 
in Afghanistan from October 2007 to April 2008. 
264 United States Special Forces Association, “Special Forces Coin Rules and History,” 2010, 
http://www.sfalx.com/h_coin_rules_and_history.htm. 
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Kabul had many unfilled positions and could not provide any logistical support to Task 
Groups. One five-man assessment team sent to Afghanistan in the summer 2007 
concluded that under the initial constraints, the mission “ISAF SOF is a bring your own 
beer party, and we will be living in a dry county.”265 The consensus was that Task Force-
10 had to be self-sufficient upon initial arrival in Afghanistan, and bring essential 
supplies and equipment, and coordinate monthly resupply aircraft from Germany. 
Despite early support limitations, logistics officers and leadership at SOCEUR 
and 1-10th SFG worked tirelessly to secure vehicles and heavy weapons to equip the 
initial TF-10 deployment in September 2007. Task Force-10 established a temporary 
headquarters in the NORSOF compound at Camp Warehouse in Kabul, while three 
detachments deployed to American infantry posts in Kapisa, Logar, and Wardak 
provinces surrounding the capital. Two additional detachments supported Italian and 
Spanish efforts in Herat and Badghis provinces in northwestern Afghanistan.266 Without 
American logistic support, the western detachments relied on NATO allies for food, fuel, 
force protection, and tents for lodging and planning. In December 2007, the two Regional 
Command-West detachments redeployed to Kabul to target suicide bomber and 
improvised explosive device (IED) networks. Without access to CJSOTF resources, Task 
Force-10 formed its own information and support network, and partnered with Afghan 
intelligence, coalition interagency partners, American and British Infantry units, and 
other ISAF SOF units. The task force worked closely with ISAF SOF to create 
intelligence collaboration structures, such as the Kabul Effects Group and bi-weekly 
targeting meetings with NATO SOF allies. These efforts resulted in improved 
intelligence sharing and the detention of a number of high-level Joint Priority Effects List 
(JPEL) targets. 
In April 2008, “A” Company, 1-10th SFG assumed the second Task Force-10 
rotation. The company was accompanied by two Romanian SOF detachments that 
partnered with American detachments on all combat missions. Hungarian Special Forces 
                                                 
265 Quote cited in an analysis of logistic support in Afghanistan conducted by a TF-10 site survey 
team, June–July 2007. 
266 Task Force-10 initial foreword operating base deployments observed by author in Afghanistan 
from September–December 2007. 
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joined Task Force-10 for the third rotation. These partnerships demonstrated the deep ties 
that resulted from 1-10th SFG’s role in founding their units and subsequent partnership 
training. This partnership began a model of subsequent combined pre-mission training 
between Romanian, Hungarian, and U.S. detachments in preparation for Task Force-10 
rotations. These efforts increased interoperability and enhanced socialization prior to 
deployment, which resulted in strategic level success. Three years of combined combat at 
the tactical level created strong bonds within the multi-national task force. American, 
Hungarian, and Romanian soldiers live and fight together, and collectively mourn fallen 
comrades. Since 2007, one Romanian and two U.S. Special Forces soldiers died while 
fighting under Task Force-10 in Afghanistan.267 In memory of these soldiers, TF-10 
renamed the compound in Kabul Camp Vose, and the post in the Tagab Valley FOB 
Kutschbach. Romanian Major Marcel Petre posthumously received a Green Beret and 
Bronze Star medal.268 Task Force-10 has served as an example of how pre-existing social 
and professional bonds can overlap to develop trust and cooperation in multinational SOF 
organizations. 
E. DEBT AS A COMMON SECURITY CONCERN TO NATO  
1. Greece: Indicator for Future NATO Austerity  
The dramatic austerity measures in Greece serve as a warning of potential future 
financial constraints across NATO. In 2010, the European Union and the International 
Monetary Fund implemented a 110 billion-euro Greek financial bailout.269 In 2009, 
Greece was one of only five NATO nations including Albania, France, the United 
                                                 
267 Task Force-10 Special Forces soldiers killed in Afghanistan include U.S. Staff Sergeant Patrick 
Kutschbach in November 2007, Romanian Special Forces MAJ Marcel Petre in April 2009, and U.S. Chief 
Warrant Officer Doug Vose in July 2009. 
268 Combined Joint Task Force 82 Web Portal, “FOB Kutschbach Dedicated in Tag Ab Valley,” 2008, 
http://www.cjtf82.com/ar/component/content/article/299-fob-kutschbach-dedicated-in-tag-ab-valley.html.; 
United States European Command News Portal News Portal, “Romanian SOF Officer Honored 
Posthumously with U.S. Bronze Star Medal,” 2010, 
http://www.eucom.mil/english/FullStory.asp?article=Romanian-SOF-officer-honored-posthumously-U.S.-
Star.; United States European Command, “CW2 Doug Vose,”2009, 
https://useucom.wordpress.com/tag/cw2-doug-vose/. 
269 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Greek Military Spending under the Spotlight after Economic 
Crisis,” May 29, 2010, http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?shortcut=2138. 
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Kingdom, and the United States to meet the 2% of gross domestic spending (GDP) 
spending goal.270 Greece dedicated much of this spending to countering fellow NATO 
member Turkey’s military strength. Turkey consistently maintained defense expenditures 
over 2% of GDP until 2007 when it dropped to 1.8%.271 The bailout agreement called for 
Greece to reduce military spending and implement sweeping austerity measures to 
improve its national financial situation.272 The defense austerity measures quickly 
affected Greek military personnel as compensation, housing allowances, and pensions 
decreased, which sparked several protests marches.273 Greece representation at NATO 
Headquarters in Mons dropped from more than 150 personnel prior to 2008 to less than 
90 personnel by 2011 that reduced the nation’s influence in the Alliance.274  
The global recession was not the single cause the Greek crisis. A number of 
factors contributed to the continental financial destabilization. Years of expanding Greek 
federal spending coupled with persistent inflation led the exchange rate of one U.S. dollar 
to 100 Greek drachma to decrease from $3.33 in 1973 to $0.27 in 2000 prior to the 
introduction of the euro currency.275 Years of perceived improvements to the Greek 
economy under the euro merely distracted attention from the growing Greek debt. This 
debt became unsustainable as global markets fluctuated in 2008 and brought Greece 
perilously close to defaulting on its foreign debts. In 2009, Greece held the second worst 
government deficit as a percentage of GDP within the EU27 at 13.6%, which falls 
between Ireland’s 14.3% and the United Kingdom’s 11.5%.276 These large federal 
deficits were not isolated to these nations. In 2009, all EU27 nations ran federal budget 
                                                 
270 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, “Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence.” 
271 Ibid. 
272 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Greek Military Spending under the Spotlight after Economic 
Crisis.” 
273 Euronews, “Greek Military Marches against Cuts,” May 4, 2010, 
http://www.euronews.net/2010/05/04/greek-military-marches-against-cuts/. 
274 Author’s interview with Greek military officers, Mons, Belgium, February 2011. 
275 Time Magazine, “Why Greece’s Economic Debt Crisis Threatens the Euro,” February 22, 2010, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1963732,00.html. 
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 90
deficits, which, thus, portrayed the vast scope of the crisis.277 Comparable U.S. federal 
deficits would have tied Spain for the fourth worst in the EU at approximately 11.2% of 
GDP, which is the highest percentage since the end of WWII. The Greek example is 
merely the first instance of a looming trend in required military austerity measures in the 
near future across all NATO nations. 
2. United States Debt and SOF As an Economy of Force 
The financial cost of large-scale military interventions over the past decade and 
the global economic crisis will limit the U.S.’s ability to sustain current commitments in 
the long term. U.S. President George W. Bush addressed the need to run a budget deficit 
to fund global counter-terror efforts in his 2002 State of the Union speech. President 
Bush stated “to achieve these great national objectives—to win the war, protect the 
homeland and revitalize our economy, our budget will run a deficit that will be small and 
short.”278 The budget deficit has been neither small nor short, as the U.S. has spent nearly 
$1.28 trillion dollars on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and enhanced security measures 
related to the 9-11 attacks.279 The financial costs of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts are 
rising. The annual cost per soldier deployed to Iraq will increase from $433,000 in 2009 
to nearly $802,000 in 2011, and increase in Afghanistan from $507,000 per soldier 
deployed in 2009 to nearly $694,000 in 2011.280 These figures do not include the 
significant cost of training and equipment for Afghan and Iraqi soldiers, or the large 
numbers of government contractors supporting both conflicts. 
The U.S. national debt not only threatens American security, it also endangers the 
viability of the NATO Alliance. In February 2010, Gerald Seib highlighted the potential 
danger of the growing national debt in the Wall Street Journal, by stating that the deficit 
“has become so large and persistent that it is time to start thinking of it as something else 
                                                 
277 Eurostat, Provision of Deficit and Debt Data for 2009-First Notification. 
278 George W. Bush, “State of the Union Speech,” January 29, 2002, 
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entirely: a national-security threat.”281 By November 2010, the U.S. Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen stated the federal deficit was the primary 
national security threat to the United States.282 In response to these troubling statistics, 
Secretary Gates lobbied Congress to limit 2011 military pay, reduce future payroll 
expenses and retirement costs to the Armed Services while freezing civilian federal pay 
for two years.283 U.S. Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Swartz is to reduce 
spending by limiting personnel and family support programs.284  
The current global economic crisis increased the U.S. and NATO allies’ reliance 
on foreign lenders, which further complicates collective security obligations. China and 
other foreign lenders are likely to exert economic pressure to achieve policy goals and 
influence nations seeking additional funding. These financial constraints will force 
NATO allies to seek more efficient foreign policy mechanisms. Prudent employment of 
special operations forces can implement foreign policy through foreign internal defense 
training and combat advisory roles in countries at risk by radical extremist groups. The 
small signature light logistics trail of these forces, and ability to penetrate deep into 
restricted terrain make special operations forces ideal for military assistance and counter-
terror missions. All NATO nations will continue to face asymmetric threats and limited 
financial resources in the near future; prudent investment in special operations units 
represents the best defense against both common threats.  
F. DUTCH SOF: POST AFGHANISTAN ENGAGEMENT  
The departure of Dutch special operations forces from Afghanistan spurred 
discussion over post-ISAF commitments as other NATO SOF allies plan their departure 
from the conflict. While the ISAF SOF mission enhanced interoperability among 
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coalition partners, these units’ post-Afghanistan commitments will determine the course 
of future special operations integration. In February 2010, debate over whether to extend 
the Dutch mission to Afghanistan contributed to the collapse of former Prime Minister 
Jan Peter Balkenende’s ruling coalition.285 In August 2010, the Dutch military began to 
withdrawal approximately 2,000 soldiers from the Uruzgan Province where they had 
partnered with Australian forces since 2006.286 Within this force, Dutch SOF contributed 
approximately 75 operators working in unison with nearly 300 Australian Special Air 
Service troops operating under ISAF SOF.287 Throughout the mission, Dutch and 
Australian special operations soldiers established close working relationships with U.S. 
SOF operating in Uruzgan under the CJSOTF-Afghanistan. Beyond formal liaison nodes, 
much of the partnership and battle de-confliction occurred through informal relationships 
between tactical level leaders and operators.288 New Zealand deployed 70 Special Air 
Service soldiers to fill the void left by the departure of Dutch SOF from Uruzgan.289 The 
Dutch departure from Afghanistan represented the first NATO ally to withdrawal troops 
from the ISAF mission, which serves as a preview for the scheduled departure of 
Canadian forces from Kandahar in July 2011.290 These forces will be difficult to replace; 
Dutch and Canadian forces have fought with bravery in traditional Taliban strongholds of 
southern Afghanistan with few national caveats. Governments will seek to balance post-
Afghanistan operations to take advantage of the unprecedented combat experience gained 
in the conflict while protecting soldiers’ health and family cohesion.291 
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While the withdrawal of Dutch SOF from Afghanistan weakened ISAF SOF 
combat capacity, the departure facilitated greater participation in other global missions. 
CANSOF units are also expected to take a leading role in combined operations and 
training missions following the end of their Afghanistan mission. Dutch and Canadian 
SOF units maintain an array of tactical capabilities for future contingency missions, 
counter-terrorism efforts, and combined counter-piracy operations. In April 2010, Dutch 
special operations forces stormed a German ship held captive by Somali pirates, which 
ensured the freedom of the crew and jailed the hostage takers.292 In a subsequent 
operation in January 2011, Dutch SOF freed the crew of the New York Star in a combined 
operation with Australian aircraft and Russian naval forces.293 The current level of 
participation in these combined counter-piracy operations would likely have not been 
possible without the relief of ISAF force commitments.  
In addition to counter-terrorism efforts, Dutch and Canadian SOF actively 
contribute to combined military assistance efforts around the world. While almost every 
NATO SOF unit has advanced skills in direct action and counter-terrorism operations, 
capability gaps exists in military assistance capabilities. These units’ affinity for military 
assistance provides a greater force multiplier advantage than other forces with limited 
experience in training roles. Both nations employed their military assistance skills during 
participation in the U.S. Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF) sponsored 2011 
Flintlock exercise.294 During the exercise, Dutch SOF and CANSOF elements partnered 
with French, German, and Spanish forces to train six northern and western African 
nations’ militaries in basic counter-terrorism tactics.295 
Dutch and Canadian post-Afghanistan military obligations will set a precedent for 
other allies’ global engagement strategies following ISAF participation. While some 
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NATO SOF units will return primarily to domestic counter-terrorism roles, those nations 
that have the capacity to assist in the full spectrum of special operations roles around the 
globe will best support the NSHQ’s long-term goals.296 Active participation in combined 
military assistance operations will assist overstretched U.S. SOF units and create 
conditions for further NATO SOF capacity development. Afghanistan operations have 
given NATO SOF units the greatest collective combat experience since WWII. NATO 
SOF units can capitalize on the combined wisdom and established social networks forged 
in combat by embracing training and advisory roles in global partnerships to advance 
global SOF interoperability and collective security against asymmetric threats. 
G.  NATO SOF PARTNERS: EXTENDED INTEROPERABILITY  
The support of the Australian and New Zealand Special Air Services has been 
instrumental in NATO successes in Afghanistan over the nine-year conflict, beginning 
with participation in early operations to overthrow the Taliban in 2001. Over the past four 
years, both nations have served as vital partners in combined special operations.297 The 
selection of Brigadier General Rick Burr to serve as the first ISAF SOF commanding 
general from 2007–2008 demonstrated the prominent role of Australian SOF in the 
combined command. Over the past four years, Australia has contributed rotations of 
nearly 300 men to their SOTG in Uruzgan, which was complimented by 70 man New 
Zealand rotations.298 While both nations’ prolonged rotations have generated some 
domestic political debate, the support and cumulative experience of the Australian and 
New Zealand SAS has been vital to successful combined special operations in southern 
Afghanistan.299 
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The common lineage and organizational structure with British SAS forces and 
habitual partnerships and common doctrine with other NATO SOF units created 
favorable conditions for operational interoperability. Nearly a decade of combined 
combat in Afghanistan has further enhanced SOF integration and social bonds between 
NATO SOF and its dedicated Australian and New Zealand SAS partners. These 
partnerships have allowed best practices observed in Afghanistan to permeate to other 
common SOF partners in the Pacific region during combined training or contingency 
operations. The close affiliation with U.S. SOF, specifically with the Army’s 1st Special 
Forces Group and Navy’s West Coast SEAL teams, creates a hub linking a number of 
special operations forces participating in common counter-terror efforts in Asia. These 
linkages may one day lay the foundation for a SOF regional partnership in the Pacific 
region using the NSHQ model. The Pacific Area Special Operations Conference hosted 
annually in Hawaii by the U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific is one tool 
facilitating the construction of networks in Asia to enhance partnerships and global SOF 
interoperability.300 
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VII. RESULTS AND DATA  
A. SURVEY RESULTS  
The NATO SOF survey population conducted in support of this research 
consisted of NSHQ staff, special operations students at the Naval Postgraduate School 
and the NATO SOF Training and Education Program, and forward deployed U.S. special 
operations soldiers in Europe. The author administered surveys over five months in early 
2011. The author collected 225 complete surveys, including 126 U.S. special operations 
solders and support personnel and 100 international soldiers and support personnel from 
17 of the 26 nations contributing forces to NATO SOF. This report analyzed data from 
American and European responses separately to prevent skewing data toward any nation 
in the total survey sample. The survey included a wide distribution of ranks mirroring the 
distribution of NATO SOF units with most officer responses coming from OF-1 through 
OF-4 and most enlisted soldiers coming from ranks of OR-5 through OR-7. The survey’s 
largest concentration holds the rank of OR-6. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Basic Demographics and Exposure to Global Trends 
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The ages of respondents ranged from 21 to 53, with most respondents in their late 
20s or early 30s with an average age of 32.5. The average number of years in active 
military service in the sample population was 12.2 years, which indicates a typically 
more senior special operations force than conventional units. Military specialties were 
almost equally split between 51% of respondents currently serving as tactical operators 
and the remaining 49% performing functions or staff officer positions. Exposure to global 
trends indicated U.S. soldiers had access to technology at an earlier age. Although this 
technology gap largely disappeared in younger soldiers, the data suggests that senior U.S. 
soldiers may have a slight advantage over their European peers in embracing emerging 
networking initiatives. American soldiers first accessed the Internet almost four and a 
half years earlier, and first use cellular phones two years earlier than their European 
counterparts during their formative years in the 1990s. The sample showed that English 
language training is reaching younger students across Europe. Most current NATO SOF 
soldiers receive language training during their middle school years or earlier. Within the 
American sample, 9.8% of the soldiers surveyed spoke English as a second language, 
which indicates the long history of U.S. Special Forces recruiting foreign-born men. 
English language training programs appear to have made significant progress in the past 
decade with 72% of European respondents indicating that more than half of their tactical 
units speak English at an intermediate level or greater. Other languages frequently spoken 
among respondents included 16.7% of respondents speaking French and 21.8% with 
German language skills. 
 
 Exposure Trend  
 United States Sample 
European 
Sample 
 Age of first exposure to Internet 15.3 20.1 
 Age of first use of cellular phone 17.1 20.3 
 Age learning basic English NA 15.5 
(source NATO SOF survey 2011, M. Gates) 
Table 1.   Exposure to Global Trends 
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1. Languages, Combined Training, and Deployments 
Professional experience demographic questions indicated the survey population 
had participated in extensive combined training and held considerable deployment 
experience. Respondents indicated distributed attendance at NATO SOF Training and 
Education Program courses, international training courses, and combined training. 
Responses to this question indicated that most NATO SOF units have made combined 
education opportunities a priority within their forces, even through increasing financial 
constraints. In addition to individual training, combined pre-mission training and 
partnership events remains a priority. The U.S. sample indicated 36.5% of respondents 
have trained with German special operations, 26.8% with Hungarian, and 34.1% with 
Romanian units. Both survey samples demonstrated significant deployment experience. 
Nearly 72.1% of the total survey population has served in Afghanistan under either the 
Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) or ISAF Special Operations 
Forces; 6.5% have served under both commands, which facilitate the spread of best 
practices. Beyond this wealth of combat experience, respondents indicated that other 
members in their units had more experience in contingency operations than the survey 
population. Three-quarters of soldiers polled indicated that more than 85% of the 
personnel in their units have deployed outside of their nation.  
 
Deployments 
 United States Sample European Sample 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 19.6% 31.9% 
Kosovo 13.4% 34.0% 
ISAF SOF—Afghanistan 79.5% 59.5% 
Iraq 64.3% 47.8% 
CJSOTF—Afghanistan 14.60% 17.10% 
(source NATO SOF survey 2011, M. Gates) 
Table 2.   Survey Sample Overseas Deployments  
Following the basic demographic and training and education background, the 
remainder of the NATO SOF survey asked respondents to evaluate several themes in 
special operations interoperability, cohesion, and future employment. Survey respondents 
offered their perspective by evaluating questions using a scale of one through seven. 
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Under this rating scale, questions with an average rating less than four indicates 
disagreement with the statement and scores greater than four indicate approval with the 
statement. The following graphic displays the spectrum of potential responses to 
questions in this section. 
 
 
Figure 10.   Rating Scale Used in Survey 
2. Mission Readiness 
The majority of soldiers polled across NATO special operations indicated their 
units maintain proficiency to confront modern asymmetric threats. When asked to assess 
whether their units maintained capabilities in various special operations missions, 
patterns emerged between the U.S. and European samples along historic unit strengths. 
Both survey samples demonstrated significant confidence in their units’ capabilities, but 
responses indicated different training priorities among national forces. The U.S. sample 
indicated that special operations forces held a higher confidence in their unit’s 
capabilities across a wider mission set. The remaining respondents held greater 
confidence in traditional European special operations strengths of special reconnaissance, 







My unit is highly trained and capable to conduct 





 Irregular Warfare 6.11 4.96 
 Unconventional Warfare 6.13 4.99 
 Counter-Terrorism 6.03 4.92 
 Special Reconnaissance 5.91 6.05 
 Foreign Internal Defense (FID) 6.17 5.28 
 Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) 5.63 5.09 
 Direct Action (DA) 6.20 6.22 
 Counter-Insurgency (COIN) 6.19 5.52 
 Civil Affairs 5.29 4.04 
 PSYOP / MISO 5.09 3.99 
 Senior leader / VIP close protection duty 5.72 5.76 
(source NATO SOF survey 2011, M. Gates) 
Table 3.   Views on Mission Readiness 
3. Views on U.S. Special Operations Influence 
Survey respondents indicated strong support for U.S. forward presence and 
participation in combined deployments, training, and educational opportunities to 
advance NATO special operations interoperability. While members of the U.S. sample 
believed performance in overseas contingency operations and forward presence were 
their greatest contributions, European sample respondents emphasized school 
sponsorship and joint training events. Both samples indicated that Task Force-10 
presence in ISAF SOF facilitated the success of future operations, although the U.S. 
sample indicated a slightly higher correlation than the European sample. Eastern 
European soldiers who have participated with Task Force-10 on tactical level operations 
recorded significantly higher support for U.S. partnership, sponsored exercises, school 
sponsorship, and combined training than the remainder of the European sample. These 
results reflect that those nations with the closest relationship with U.S. special operations 





Participation by U.S. SOF in the following actions has 
greatly enhanced potential future success of combined 
operations 






 Establishment of forward staged SOF units in 
Germany 6.22 5.52 5.93 
 Participation in the ISAF SOF mission (TF-10) 6.17 5.93 6.65 
 Other U.S. SOF forces participation in other 
overseas deployments 6.09 5.53 5.57 
 Sponsored large-scale scenario exercises (Jackal 
Stone etc.) 5.76 5.73 6.58 
 Leadership and staff roles within NSHQ and 
associated schools 5.62 5.65 5.36 
 Sponsorship of foreign students at U.S. military 
schools 5.69 5.90 6.93 
 Joint Combined Executed Training (JCETS) 6.11 5.74 6.79 
(source NATO SOF survey 2011, M. Gates) 
Table 4.   Views on United States SOF Participation 
4. Views on Required Support 
An analysis of the U.S. and European survey samples reveals different concerns 
regarding combat support and combined operations execution. Americans strongly voiced 
their concern for a lack of rotary wing aircraft, which is an indicator of frustrations over 
limited Task Force-160 aviation support to U.S. theater level special operations units. 
Frequently, U.S. Special Forces operating in Afghanistan must compete with 
conventional units for limited aviation support provided by regular U.S. Army aviation 
brigades. American soldiers additionally desired increased training resources and 
facilities, intelligence collection, ground mobility, and close air support, despite present 
support structures and capabilities far exceeding their European colleagues. Anticipated 
reductions to defense spending indicate that further enhancements of these assets will not 
likely improve in the near term. The European sample requested additional intelligence 
collection and sharing capacity, increased rotary-wing support, and enhanced 





Evaluate whether your SOF unit could be more effective with increases in 





 Intelligence sharing between my unit and other SOF units and 
interagency partners 5.28 6.11 
 Share of national military funding 5.23 5.62 
 Flexibility with national caveats 5.12 5.65 
 Combined training between my unit and other NATO SOF units 5.39 5.94 
 Assistance from the NSHQ to develop new capabilities 5.09 5.69 
 Training resources and improved facilities 5.67 5.85 
 Rotary wing airlift 5.88 5.89 
 Fire Support (Artillery, Mortars, ADA) 5.18 5.27 
 Intelligence collection and exploitation means (including UAVs) 5.61 6.28 
 Information and communication technology 5.48 5.92 
 Logistics support 5.65 5.59 
 Ground mobility assets / vehicles 5.67 5.51 
 Close air support (CAS) 5.66 5.76 
(source NATO SOF survey 2011, M. Gates) 
Table 5.   Views on Desired Combat Support and Combat Service Support 
5. Views on Combined Training and Combat 
American and European special operations recognize the role of combined 
combat in forging relationships and trust among soldiers while recognizing that capability 
gaps remain among some emerging units. Follow up interviews with a portion of the 
survey population indicated that capability gaps resulted from inequities in some 
emerging units’ equipment and capacity, rather than individual soldier skills. Most 
NATO special operations soldiers maintain advanced individual technical and tactical 
skills, such as marksmanship, close quarter battle, or various infiltration methods, but 
maintain varying levels of military funding and equipment fielding. Adherence to NATO 
Allied Command Operations (ACO) standards improves unit capabilities and capacity 
among emerging special operations units and will likely improve levels of trust among 
future coalitions. The survey samples portray moderate levels confidence among soldiers 
of both samples who indicated they would prefer to partner with a NATO SOF unit from 
another country with equivalent capabilities rather than a conventional unit with lesser 
capability. This finding indicates that special operations soldiers place greater value on 
competence and performance in combat than common nationality and common cultural 
traits. Both the American and European survey populations cited a strong correlation 
between relationships forged in combat and special operations interoperability 
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development. These responses are consistent with other survey responses emphasizing 
the close bonds formed over the past decade among veterans of the Balkans, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan conflicts.  
 
Evaluate the following statements regarding combined 





 Combined training events have led to the creation of a 
substantial number of personal friendships or 
subsequent social events. 5.50 5.92 
 In combat, I would prefer to partner with another 
NATO SOF unit with capabilities equal to my unit 
rather than a conventional unit from my home nation 
with lesser capabilities. 5.13 5.66 
 I can count on other NATO SOF forces to perform well 
under fire during combined combat operations. 4.86 5.32 
 I am as equally proud to be a member of NATO SOF as 
I am a member of my own national SOF unit. 4.61 5.50 
 There is not much variation in capabilities across the 
spectrum of NATO SOF units. 3.45 4.04 
 My unit is better prepared to accomplish its given 
mission now than it was in 2007. 5.09 5.93 
 Relationships developed during combat improve future 
interoperability between SOF units. 5.61 5.99 
(source NATO SOF survey 2011, M. Gates) 
Table 6.   Views on Combined Training and Combat 
6. Perceptions of Emerging Threats 
Special operations soldiers across NATO shared similar security concerns when 
questioned regarding emerging threats to their nations and the alliance over the next five 
years. The U.S. sample showed a greater concern for a sizable terrorist attack within the 
nation by foreign terror groups than their European colleagues.301 Analyzing special 
operations soldiers from the three leading economies in Europe revealed a higher average 
score of 5.45, which indicates the regular threats from foreign groups and previous 
attacks have influenced security concerns.302 Similarly, respondents from the leading 
                                                 
301 No data collected from Spanish respondents, who were the target of the Madrid train bombings. 
Spanish respondents would likely have responded with greater concern for foreign terrorism within their 
borders than the overall European sample, and would have slightly skewed the total sample lower than 
would be expected with a total European distribution. 
302 Respondents from the United Kingdom, Germany, and France.  
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economies within NATO responded with greater certainty that their nations would play a 
prominent role in world affairs in the next five years than the entire European sample. 
These responses indicate a correlation between increased national political and economic 
power and potential targeting by foreign terrorist networks.  
U.S. respondents expressed a statistically significant greater concern for domestic 
terrorism than the European sample. This response indicates the diversity a potential 
radical groups, large geographic area of the nation, and concerns over increasing division 
within American political and social groups over the past decade potentially influenced 
U.S. soldiers concerns. Both survey populations responded with greater confidence that a 
sizable terrorist attack was likely to happen in another European nation, and showed 
slightly greater concern for international terrorism than domestic threats. The U.S. and 
European samples responded with equal certainty that NATO was not under threat of 
conventional attack. No consistent patterns of increased concern for conventional attack 
were seen among survey respondents from Baltic nations and Eastern Europe, although 
some Baltic soldiers indicated a resurgent Russia still influences security concerns within 
their nations.303 U.S. and European special operations soldiers collectively responded that 
their units would deploy with greater frequency than conventional forces from their 
nations in the next five years. This series of questions indicates that NATO SOF soldiers 
identify asymmetric networks as the primary security concern for the alliance in the near 







                                                 
303 Views voiced during six personal interviews with soldiers from Baltic nations between January and 
May 2011. 
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Evaluate the possibility that the following events will 
occur within the next 5 years United States Sample European Sample 
Total EUR: 4.26  A sizable terrorist attack within your borders by 
foreign terror groups  5.00 UK, GER, FRA: 5.45 
 A sizable terrorist attack within your borders by 
domestic groups  4.73 3.31 
 A sizable terrorist attack in another European 
country by foreign terror groups  5.53 5.61 
 A large terrorist attack in another European 
country by domestic groups  5.03 4.68 
 A conventional military incursion into your 
nation / treaty partners territory requiring military 
response 2.84 2.79 
 My unit will deploy to combat (outside of 
scheduled Afghanistan deployments) 5.32 5.38 
 My nation’s conventional military forces will 
deploy to combat (outside of scheduled 
Afghanistan deployments) 4.98 4.07 
Total EUR: 4.31  My nation will play a prominent role in world 
affairs 6.19 UK, GER, FRA: 5.05 
(source NATO SOF survey 2011, M. Gates) 
Table 7.   Expectations of Future Threats 
7. BICES Network Training and Access 
While the BICES network has enhanced collaboration and communication among 
NATO special operations forces, the majority of the operational forces surveyed lacks 
access and adequate training to use this platform’s various functions. The limited number 
of respondents with access to the BICES network (48.6%) required a combined survey 
sample analysis. Less than a quarter of respondents had a BICES terminal within their 
office, and more than half of the respondents indicated that they must walk to another 
building to gain access on a multi-use terminal. The data indicates that tactical level 
operators lack immediate access to BICES terminals. Tactical level units require access 
to technical networking structures, such as the BICES network to facilitate operational 







Do You have access to the NATO BICES Network Combined Sample Response Percent 
 BICES Network available 48.6% 
 BICES Network not available 51.4% 
What is the location / availability of your closest BICES Terminal? Combined Sample Response Percent 
 At your personal workstation 14.7% 
 Communal workstation within your Office 7.8% 
 Communal workstation in your building 18.6% 
 Communal workstation in adjacent building 17.6% 
 Communal workstation within walking distance 26.5% 
 Communal workstation within 10 minute drive 1.0% 
 Communal workstation requiring longer drive to reach. 1.0% 
 Limited time use terminal nearby available with 
coordination to secure access. 12.7% 
(source NATO SOF survey 2011, M. Gates) 
Table 8.   BICES Network Access 
Of those with access to the network, slightly more than half received training in 
the systems’ functions and capabilities. Soldiers who participated in training generally 
received only a basic overview of BICES basic functions or how to obtain and account 
and login to the network. Respondents that reported access to the BICES network 
primarily use the system for e-mail (70.6%), and intelligence analysis (57.4%). Less than 
a third of respondents routinely use the full suite of advanced functions available to 
BICES users, which limits the system’s capacity to improve special operations 
interoperability and integration. Only 5.6% of the 225 survey respondents reported both 
access and detailed BICES network training. The limited training and distribution 
contributed to a majority of soldiers indicating neutral views when asked to assess 
whether the BICES network in its current form was an effective tool to assist with 
military duties. Soldiers across the alliance routinely voiced concerns with limited 
training opportunities and access to BICES terminals during personal interviews. These 
soldiers were eager to use the advanced functions provided by the network, but frustrated 
with the current distribution of terminals to higher-level headquarters.304  
 
 
                                                 
304 Summary of interviews with special operations soldiers from nine nations with access to the NATO 
BICES network between February and May 2011.  
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Please indicate the amount of training you have received on the 




 No training 49.5% 
 Only demonstration of how to sign up and login 10.5% 
 Basic familiarization of main functions 27.6% 
 Detailed overview of main functions 5.7% 
 Detailed overview, plus separate classes on key functions 1.0% 
 I am proficient with BICES and have given instruction to 
others 5.7% 
What activities do you perform on the BICES Network? (Please 
check all that apply) 
Combined Sample 
Response Percent 
 Intelligence gathering / analysis 57.4% 
 Video Teleconferences 20.6% 
 E-mail 70.6% 
 Exercises 22.1% 
 Doctrine review 25.0% 
 Training coordination, prep, or scheduling Pre-deployment 
preparation 30.9% 
 Online training courses 14.7% 
Current BICES Network Effectiveness Combined Sample Rating Average 
 The BICES network in the current form is an effective tool 
to assist me with my military duties. 4.39 
(source NATO SOF survey 2011, M. Gates) 
Table 9.   BICES Network Training and Use 
8. Methods of Establishing Relationships 
U.S. and European special operations soldiers indicated that serving together in 
combat was the most effective method of building relationships between units, yet agreed 
that several other traditional methods of establishing unit cohesion benefit collaboration 
as well. Only one respondent indicated disagreement with the statement that serving 
together in combat missions was very effective at building relationships. Combined 
service in peacekeeping missions evoked strong, but less robust agreement than direct 
combat from survey members. Both survey populations indicated strong agreement that 
combined pre-mission training, social outings, endurance events, and combined airborne 
operations assisted relationship building among special operations forces. Full 




respondents than their U.S. colleagues, which indicates potential frustration over security 
clearance restrictions during combined combat over the past decades among European 
partners. 
 






 Social outings organized between units 6.04 5.88 
 Sporting contests between units 5.57 5.55 
 Combined airborne jumps / wings exchanges 6.01 5.77 
 Combined pre-mission training at a central training center  5.99 6.10 
 Serving together in peacekeeping missions 5.77 6.13 
 Serving together in combat missions. 6.28 6.52 
 Participating together in physically demanding /endurance events 5.80 5.96 
 Allowing full collaboration with available intelligence 5.13 6.29 
(source NATO SOF survey 2011, M. Gates) 
Table 10.   Evaluation of Relationship Building Activities 
9. Perceptions of International Colleagues 
NATO SOF survey responses indicate that combined combat experience, training, 
and education over the past decade have contributed to favorable characterization 
assessments of international NATO SOF comrades. Both survey samples showed strong 
correlations with the positive personality traits of honesty, bravery, and trustworthiness. 
The survey sample showed a greater variance when asked to evaluate performance 
indicators of effectiveness, reliability, and competency. European soldiers replied with 
stronger agreement in support of these variables. While U.S. respondents were typically 
more reserved in praise for international partners, they were very complimentary of their 
tactical level comrades. Handwritten comments and personal follow up interviews among 
U.S. special operations soldiers indicated significant levels of trusts and confidence in 
their Romanian and Hungarian SOF tactical level partners in Afghanistan.305  
While variance among respondents exists, the data in this series of questions is 
encouraging. The responses indicate that special operations soldiers across NATO show 
                                                 
305 Personal interviews with 20 U.S. special operations soldiers from February to May 2011, and data 
from 123 U.S. surveys.  
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significant respect and confidence for their international colleagues. The data also shows 
that special operations soldiers can distinguish between personality traits and military 
capability. Military capability can develop through training resources and support, 
whereas personality traits are typically more difficult to influence. Combined special 
operations training and deployments built upon a framework of mutual admiration for 
positive personality traits are more likely to succeed and assist capability development. 
Ongoing efforts to increase social interaction among NATO special operations soldiers 
beyond combined combat operations will likely continue to increase trust network 
development that should lead to increased intelligence sharing, enhanced partnerships 
and increased operational performance.  
 
Characterization of Comrades United States Sample European Sample 
 Honest 5.12 5.60 
 Effective 4.68 5.30 
 Reliable 4.69 5.38 
 Brave 5.17 5.65 
 Competent 4.77 5.49 
 Trustworthy 5.10 5.57 
(source NATO SOF survey 2011, M. Gates) 
Table 11.   Characterization of Comrades 
10 Regression Analysis 
The author conducted a more detailed data analysis using regression modeling to 
identify the interaction between the theoretical model variables.306 This method identifies 
qualities that enhance trusted special operations relationships and enhance unit 
performance. Multiple iterations of regression analysis identified the prominence of 
combined training and combat, complimentary doctrine and resources, and common 
language in coalescing combined special operations organizations. While both survey 
samples recognized the importance of overcoming barriers to communication, this 
variable and the establishment of trust had a higher causal effect in the European sample. 
Persistent frustrations regarding barriers to intelligence sharing likely contributed to the 
                                                 
306 Regression statistics derived from NATO SOF Survey data may be found in Appendix D. 
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prominence of this variable. The data produced in the multiple regressions indicates that 
NATO SOF interoperability and integration initiatives over the past four years have 
contributed to increased levels of trust and cooperation among special operations soldiers. 
This enhanced trust and cooperation continues to improve combined special operations 
performance in training and combat in support of common goals. 
B. CROSS SECTIONAL AND LONGITUDINAL COMPARISON 
1. Growth, Development, and Funding 
NATO special operations forces have increased in size, composition, and capacity 
over the past decade. Currently, 26 of 28 nations in the alliance contribute special 
operations forces and staff to NATO SOF initiatives, schools, and headquarters. A 
comparison of special operations units in NATO between 2005 and 2011 reveals rapidly 
emerging capabilities in the Balkans, and Eastern Europe.307 Following their entrance 
into NATO, many of these nations pursued ambitious special operations capability 
development programs with assistance from other alliance partner forces. Other nations 
with well-established special operations forces have developed additional units to 
enhance their range of capabilities in unconventional warfare, irregular warfare, and 
military assistance. These developments included the creation of the Canadian Special 
Operations Regiment and the Polish 1st Special Forces Regiment, which augmented 
Canada’s Combined Joint Task Force-2 and the Polish GROM. The development of both 
units marked recognition that NATO allies should maintain proficiency in a wide 
spectrum of special operations missions beyond direct action or counter-terrorism. 
Canada, Poland, and Norway established separate special operations commands to ensure 
their subordinate units received adequate funding, training, and proper employment in 
future conflicts. Maintaining these trends in special operations capacity building will be 
essential as the alliance continues to confront non-state actors employing unconventional 
tactics in out of area contingency operations, as well as conducting combined training in 
Africa and Asia to build partner nation capacity.  
                                                 
307 Please see Table 12, Special Operations Capabilities and Longitudinal Growth, for data and 
references mentioned in this comparative analysis. 
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While NATO special operations capabilities have increased over the past six 
years, U.S. Special Operations Command units have increased as well with funded 
personnel strength of 55,007 in 2011. The United States developed the Marine Special 
Operations Command, which then gave all four branches of service a robust special 
operations capability. U.S. Army Special Forces received three additional battalions, as 
well as two additional battalions in formation. European special operations capabilities 
expansion has matched the parallel expansion of U.S. special operations growth over the 
past decade that has, resulted in similar combined personnel strength but disproportionate 
funding. While most European allies have decreased military spending in the past decade, 
U.S. defense budgets increased to support the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and military 
capability growth. In 2009, the United States spent $697.8 billion in total defense 
expenditures, while the 25 other NATO SOF contributors spent a combined $269.6 
billion, or less than 40 percent of U.S. spending.  
A review of defense spending in NATO by nation reveals a prolonged trend of 
most nations not meeting the stated alliance goal of 2% of gross domestic product per 
nation.308 In 2008, a former SACEUR General, James Jones, cited the failure to meet 
spending goals under his command as one of the greatest practical problems facing the 
alliance. Jones stated, “this means that we can expect a ‘train wreck’ in the future unless 
the Allies can generate the political will to commit more resources to NATO.”309 To 
avoid the prediction outlined by Jones, NATO members will need either to increase 
funding or become more efficient with limited resources. Despite reduced military 
spending, many nations have invested limited resources prudently in special operations 
development. While Hungary defense spending (1.1%) in 2009 fell well below the 
alliance goal, the nation fields a well-trained and capable Special Forces battalion that has 
been a crucial partner to U.S. Special Forces serving in Afghanistan and operates a 
special operations training center and qualification course. Similarly, Spain’s military 
contributions fell far short of stated goals (1.2%), yet Spanish special operations forces 
                                                 
308 Data provided in Table 12, cited accordingly from multiple sources.  
309 David Yost, An Interview with General James L. Jones, USMC, Retired Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR) 2003–2006 (NATO Defense College, Rome, January 2008), 
http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/rp_34.pdf. 
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maintain high capability levels and interoperable equipment. These nations identified the 
economy of force aspect of special operations and allocated funding to units best 
prepared to meet emerging threats.  
The aftermath of the global economic crisis and spending deficits in all alliance 
nations indicates that a spending goal designed to fund a large and inefficient alliance 
focused on conventional threats is not feasible in the near term. If NATO defense budgets 
hypothetically represent petroleum reserves, the NATO structure of the Cold War could 
represent a gas guzzling truck, a comfortable luxury feasible when resources and 
conditions allow. Under this analogy, a NATO Alliance facing modern asymmetric 
threats must be an efficient and mobile hybrid capable of achieving high performance 
with a minimal expenditure of resources. A refocused alliance designed under this model 
would place the NATO SOF Headquarters as the priority of effort and funding to meet 
modern security challenges in times of uncertainty and austerity. 
2. Afghanistan Service Common Across NATO SOF Units 
Combined special operations in Afghanistan serve as a common framework of 
knowledge and experience. Since October 2001, special operations soldiers from all 26 
nations participating in the NATO SOF Headquarters have served in some capacity in 
Afghanistan. While many nations served in the Balkans and some served together in Iraq, 
the Afghan mission is the only conflict that has drawn universal participation. While 
variations in deployment packages and mandates exist, the combined effort in 
Afghanistan will continue to serve as common educational tool long after troops 
withdraw from the conflict. The political and military goals in Afghanistan have been 
difficult to achieve and the conflict has resulted in the expenditure of significant blood 
and treasure. These losses have been significant, particularly to the United States with at 
least 174 special operations soldiers killed in combat in Afghanistan from October 2001 
to March 2011.310 However, the conflict has served as a tool to enhance special 
                                                 
310 iCasualties.org, “Operation Enduring Freedom Casualties,” as of March 13, 2011, 
http://icasualties.org/OEF/index.aspx, 174 casualties cited includes all U.S. soldiers supported by the 
55,000 man U.S. Special Operations Command. U.S. Army Rangers supporting special operations in 
Afghanistan are included in this figure. 
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operations capacity and interoperability in the alliance and beyond. While only a limited 
number of U.S. soldiers under the Special Operations Command-Europe have served 
under the ISAF SOF mission, many other American soldiers have gained a greater 
understanding for NATO SOF capabilities during Afghanistan service. Only a limited 
number of U.S. special operations troops forward stationed in Europe have participated in 
NATO combined training, education, or command structures. These troops represent 
approximately less than 1,000 soldiers, or 1% of the total U.S. Special Operations 
Command strength. Without common service in Afghanistan, few of these soldiers would 
appreciate the dramatic capability gains NATO SOF units have made in the past decade. 
The Afghan conflict will be the common narrative that will shape the way NATO SOF 
units organize, equip, and prepare for future conflict in the next decade, as well as a 




Figure 11.   Spanish and United States SOF in Afghanistan 
Photo Credit: 
M. Gates 2007 
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/ %GDP 2005 Military Balance Description 2011 Military Balance Description Combined deployments
Albania Reparti i Neutralizimit të Elementit të Armatosur $ 249m 2 1 commando regiment+ police CT 1 commando regiment + police CT Iraq, Afghanistan, Balkans
Belgium
Immediate reaction Cell (sine 2003)  $3.97bn 1.2
1 para-commando brigade (2 paratroop/parachute, 1 
commando, 2 mechanized) 1 SF group
Afghanistan, Bosnia, 
Kosovo
Bulgaria 68th Special Forces BDE $1.04bn 1.9 1 SF comd. (brigade) 1 SF brigade Iraq ,Afghanistan
Canada 
JTF-2,  Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CANSOR) $18.5 bn 1.5 1 commando unit
1,500 persons,  1 combined command, 1 counter terror 
bn, 1 CANSOR , 1 AVN 1 CJIRU bn
Afganistan, Bosnia, 
Kosovo
Croatia Bojna za Specijalna Delovanja (BSB) $972m 1.6 1 SF battalion 1 SF batallion Iraq, Afghanistan 
Czech Republic
601st Special Forces Group $2.96bn 1.6 1 SF group 1 SF group
Iraq ,Afghanistan, Bosnia, 
Kosovo
Denmark*
Jaegerkorpset (land) / Fromandskorpset (sea) $4.11bn 1.4 1 SF unit 1 SF unit
Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, 
Kosovo
Estonia ESTFOR / K-Komando $396m 1.9 1 recce batallion 1 scout batallion Afghanistan
France
Brigade des Forces Spéciales Terre (BFST) $46bn 2.1
2,700 persons (aprox): 1  special operations command,1 
paratroop/parachute regiment I AVN unit
2,200 persons, 1 HQ Comd, 2 Para Regiments, 1 AVN 




Division Spezielle Operationen, Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK) $43.5bn 1.4
1 SOF division with 2 airborne (1 crisis response force), 




Hellenic Special Operations Command $10.9bn 3.1
commando squadron), 1commando brigade (3 commando, 
1 paratroop/parachute squadron)
1 command with 1  commando amphibiius brigade, 1 
ccommando airborne  bn Afghanistan, Balkans
Hungary
34. Bercsény László Különleges Műveleti Zászlóalj $1.63bn 1.1 not mentioned 1 SF batallion Afghanistan
Italy
Comando Forze Speciali Interarma $21.5bn 1.4
naval special forces command with 4 groups: 1 diving 
operation, 1 navy SF operation, 1 school, 1 research
1 SF command, (4 Alpini Reg, 1 Naval SF op, 1 diving 
op))
Iraq, Afghanista, Bosnia, 
Kosovo
Latvia Speciālo Uzdevumu Vienība (SUV) $341m 1.2 1 SF team 1 ranger batallion, 1 CBT diver unit, 1 anti-terror unit  Afghanistan
Lithuania Lituanian Special Operations Force / Special Purpose Service $484m 1.1 1 SF team 1 SF group (1 CT unit, 1 Jaeger Bn, 1 CBT diver unit) Afghanistan
Neatherlands 
Korps  Commandotroepen $12.1 bn 1.5 1 SF battalion 5 SF coys (4 land, 1 maritime), some SF marines
Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, 
Kosovo
Norway
FSK(CT), HJK(SF), MJK (Navy) $5.36bn 1.6 1 Ranger battalion 1 army SF command (1 Regiment), 1 Naval SF SQN
Afghanistan, Kosovo, 
Bosnia
Poland GROM, 1st Special Commado Regiment (Para Commando) $7.36bn 1.7 1 special operations regiment 1,650, 3 SF units (GROM, FORMOZA, and CDO) Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo
Portugal Centro de Tropas de Operações Especiais, Comandos, 
Destacamento de Acções Especiais $2.54bn 1.6 1 special operations unit; 1 commando battalion 1 special operations unit, 1 commando bn
Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Kosovo, Bosnia
Romania Regimentul 1 Operaţii Speciale, Regimentul 1 Operaţii 
Speciale,Detaşamentul Special de Protecţie şi Intervenţie $2.29bn 1.4 describes 1  Counter-terror unit under development *Special operations regiment not identified Afghanistan
Slovak Republic 5th Special Forces Regiment $1.53bn 1.5 1 recce BN 1 special regiment (Recce) Afghanistan
Slovenia Slovenska Specialna Enota /  ESD $766 m 1.6 1 recce bn reserves 1 SF unit, 1 recce bn Afghanistan
Spain Unidad de Operaciones Especiales, Mando de Operaciones 
Especiales,Scuadrón de Zapadores Paracaidistas $10.9bn 1.2
special operations command with 3 special operations 
battalions
1 comd with (1HQ bn, 3 Spec Ops bn, 1 sig coy), 1 
naval specops unit
Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, 
Kosovo
Turkey Bordo Bereliler (Maroon berets) ,Özel Jandarma Komando 
Bölüğü $9.95bn 1.8 SF command headquarters; 5 commando brigades
1 command headquarters with 4 commando brigades, 
some marine commadnos
Internal COIN /CT, 
northern Iraq, Afghanistan
UK 
SAS, SBS, SRR $60.5 bn 2.7
1 Special Air Services regiment, 1 marine commando 
brigade, SAS Reserve forces, 1 SBS Regiment
1 (SAS) Regiment, 1 (Special Recce Reiment), 1 SF SPT 
Group (basedon para BN), 2 SAS Reserve regiments, 1 
SBS Reiment
Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, 
Kosovo , 
USA US Army Special Forces, Navy SEALS, Marine Special 
Operations, Air Force SOC $697.8 bn 4.00
31,496 active duty,  11,247 reserve  within US Special 
Operations Command
* US Special Operations Command requested funding 
for  55,007 soldiers  in FY 2011 US Budget
Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, 
Kosovo  
Table 12.   Special Operations Capabilities and Longitudinal Growth311
                                                 
311 Table created by author using data available from: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 2011); The Military Balance 2005 (London: Oxford University Press, 2005) and cross referenced with North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, “Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence,” June 2010, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_64221.htm?mode=pressrelease. Deployment data was gathered using open source Internet data. 
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C. INTERVIEW SESSION THEMES 
Over the course of research, the author conducted personal interviews and 
roundtable discussions with 60 special operations professionals from 18 NATO SOF 
nations and two partner nations.312 Participants in these discussions included unit 
leadership, tactical level operators, support personnel, and staff officers. Several round 
table discussions included six-eight tactical level soldiers from a variety of NATO special 
operations units offering their experience in special operations development, recent 
combat experience, and evaluations of NATO SOF sponsored training and education 
programs. The author typically conducted personal interviews with unit leadership and 
primary staff officers to gain insight in specific areas of special operations development 
and employment. Although some themes addressed in these conversations represented 
regional or unit specific concerns, several central themes of discussion emerged. Persons 
interviewed typically offered very positive comments concerning the progress made by 
NATO SOF development initiatives over the past four years. Many people expressed 
admiration for the rapid progress made in these initiatives and offered complimentary 
assessments for the vision outlined in the Allied and Partner Collaborative Network to 
promote personal relationship and coordination among special operations forces within 
the alliance and its partners.313  
Respondents offered similar praise for NATO SOF Training and Education 
Program initiatives, quality of instruction, and rapid expansion of the Chièvres campus 
and course offerings. During round table discussions, current students voiced near 
unilateral agreement that course offerings included an appropriate balance between 
emphasis on near-term training to prepare for current contingency operations, as well as 
enduring professional skills. Many of the discussion participants have attended multiple 
courses, while colleagues with less polished English language skills lacked the fluency to 
attend some offerings. Most respondents stated that English language training programs 
within their units have achieved significant progress. Enduring commitments to these 
                                                 
312 The author conducted round table discussions and interviews from January to May 2011 in Mons 
and Chièvres Air Base Belgium, Boeblingen, Germany and Monterey, California. 
313 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters, “Allied and Partner 
Collaborative Network (APCN),” 2011, http://www.nshq.nato.int/nshq/page/APCN/. 
 117
programs would ensure increased levels of fluency and subsequent access to greater 
educational opportunities. A number of respondents mentioned they had brought their 
families to Belgium to sightsee during their training courses, and thus, potentially offered 
STEP an opportunity for outreach and socialization among spouses during duty hours. 
Many round table and interview participants expressed concern over impending 
financial austerity measures across NATO. Several participants previously suffered pay 
cuts and reduced military budgets in their national units. Many people expressed fears 
that reduced military spending may undermine some of the progress made in special 
operations development, or limit future opportunities for combined training and 
education. Additional concerns focused on potential reductions in military pensions and 
long-term health care for recent combat veterans. Several participants paired admiration 
for NSHQ development with concerns that future expansion goals may not be sustainable 
through future austerity measures. Others respondents indicated they viewed growing 
national debts among NATO nations as a greater security threat than terrorism or other 
emerging asymmetric threats.  
While economic concerns typically dominated discussions regarding security 
concerns, most soldiers expressed common concerns for the increased threat of 
international and domestic terrorism in Europe. Other security concerns mentioned 
frequently included cyber-terrorism, human trafficking, narcotics proliferation, and 
piracy in European shipping lanes. Several European participants mentioned the benefits 
of moving away from conscription toward professional militaries, but countered with 
concerns over demographic change resulting in population decline and more culturally 
diverse societies. These demographic changes are likely to complicate recruiting efforts 
in second and third generation immigrant communities. Encouraging promising 
applicants within these communities will become increasingly important to European 
special operations forces and intelligence services as European society becomes more 
culturally diverse. Young members of these communities also potentially offer increased 
cultural awareness and language capabilities in support of overseas contingency 
operations.  
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Round table discussion participants expressed pride in their Afghanistan service. 
Many thought the conflict gave their units the opportunity to prove capabilities to their 
national leadership, as well as their allies. Many believed their units’ participation in the 
conflict allowed them to achieve significant progress in developing special operations 
capabilities while highlighting limited areas for improvement. Many respondents 
expressed concerns that any outcome in Afghanistan short of victory may be viewed as a 
loss for all ISAF partners, including many NATO special operations units that have 
participated in operations over the past decade. Ongoing complications, strategy 
disagreements over NATO operations in Libya and a potential stalemate, and increasing 
European troop withdrawals in Afghanistan potentially test the alliance’s resolve and 
question its future mandate. Most individuals favored a smaller and more agile future 
NATO focused on combating asymmetric threats with a special operations focus. Several 
interviewees mentioned the construction of a new $15 million NATO SOF Headquarters 
building near the decades-old SHAPE Headquarters building as an analogy emphasizing 
new security concerns for the alliance. The older building represents NATO’s Cold War 
mission to deter conventional attacks, while the new NSHQ Headquarters under 
construction represents the emergency of asymmetric threats as the primary security 
challenge facing the alliance and a corresponding increased role for special operations. 
 
 
Figure 12.   Future NATO SOF Headquarters Building 
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D. FEEDBACK OF SCHOLARS AND SENIOR LEADERS 
To gain additional insight from authors referenced in the literature review section 
of this report, the author contacted several of the scholars referenced with follow up 
questions via electronic mail and phone conversations. These conversations asked the 
scholars how specific areas of their research might apply to several general topics relating 
to general topics concerning unit cohesion, emerging security threats, social networking, 
and military education development. The feedback provided by these scholars offered 
significant insight into a wide array of academic disciplines and ongoing research that 
may assist future special operations capacity development. Each of the prominent 
scholars contacted provided unique insight into their academic disciplines and research, 
which imparted a multifaceted approach-to-approach coalition development.  
Stanford senior fellow and political scientist Francis Fukuyama has written widely 
on the development of trust and social capital within societies, post-Cold War 
democratization, European security, and political institution development. In a phone 
conversation with the author, Dr. Fukuyama emphasized the benefits of regimental 
systems rather than centralized personnel management structures in fostering social 
capital and trust within military units.314 In these structures, trust forms through shared 
experiences and repeated interactions among individuals. Dr. Fukuyama emphasized 
potential limitations in establishing continuity within multinational organizations, in 
which each unit would have separate personnel systems and would not be reliant upon a 
coalition commander for promotions, evaluations, or career incentives. When questioned 
on what he sees as the greatest threat to Europe today, Dr. Fukuyama responded that 
overreaction to increased immigration and the potential threat of terrorism may galvanize 
popular support for extreme right-wing groups organized across the continent.315 NATO 
special operations forces must pursue prudent security measures and interdiction efforts 
without alienating immigrant populations or supporting extreme right-wing narratives.  
                                                 
314 Francis Fukuyama, phone interview with author, April 18, 2011. 
315 Ibid. 
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Harvard social scientist and physician Nicholas Christakis leads a research group 
exploring trends in social networking, is the co-author of Connected and several TED 
lectures, and made Foreign Policy’s list of “Top 100 Global Thinkers.”316 In a phone 
interview with the author, Dr. Christakis offered extensive insight into how social 
network mapping methods might highlight the distribution of social capital within tight-
knit organizations, such as military units.317 Christakis emphasized that much 
sociocentric research indicates that optimal communication structures consists of 
approximately 100 man networks composed of 10 man sub-units. This proposed optimal 
communication structure is similar to the current organizational structure of many NATO 
special operations tactical units and other military units dating back to the Roman 
Legions. Christakis agreed with the author’s statement that the SOF Net special 
operations social networking platform could be a useful tool to capture previously 
established social networks, enhance social capital development, and encourage further 
collaboration on classified networks. He emphasized the importance of creating webpage 
layouts and tools that mirror classified sites to allow users to become familiar with the 
advanced capabilities available prior to use. Christakis proposed that research analyzing 
the impact of frequent personnel moves and unit casualties within special operations units 
might identify breakdowns in social capital development within networks.318 
Stanford sociologist Mark Granovetter is a leading researcher emphasizing the 
strength of weak ties in communication in social networks. In communication with the 
author, Dr. Granovetter described the role of weak ties in facilitating “increased 
cooperation and understanding,” and developing ties that might be beneficial in future 
operations.319 Granovetter additionally emphasized that solidarity gained in previous 
deployments should facilitate future planning by improving coordination and “reduce 
                                                 
316 Nicholas Christakis, Connected: The Surprising Power of our Social Networks and How They 
Shape our Lives, 1st ed. (New York: Little Brown and Co., 2009); and TED.com, “Nicholas Christakis 
Profile,” 2011, http://www.ted.com/speakers/nicholas_christakis.html. 
317 Nicholas Christakis, phone interview with author, April 22, 2011. 
318 Christakis, phone interview with author. 
319 Mark Granovetter, e-mail correspondence-response to questions from author, April 19, 2011. 
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start up cost” in initial coalition development.320 Ongoing NSHQ efforts seek to build on 
established camaraderie through combined training, education, and technical networking 
to ensure that special operations coalitions can rapidly form and achieve optimal 
performance. Weak ties linking special operations coalitions with interagency and host-
nation partners facilitate communication and cooperation among partners pursuing 
common goals. 
Social scientist and former diplomat Joseph Nye is a leading international 
relations scholar best known for his work with Robert Keohane in developing the theory 
of complex interdependence. The highly interconnected North American and European 
economy creates incentives for NATO special operations units to collaborate in counter-
terror operations across the alliance and encourages cooperation in military assistance 
efforts training emerging security partners. In response to an e-mail inquiry from the 
author, Dr. Nye stated, “in addition to fighting, military power has important roles in 
deterrence, protection, and assistance.”321 He further emphasized that “in the future, it 
will be importance to train for all of these roles.”322 Nye discusses these new military 
roles in his recent book, The Future of Power, with specific emphasis on nesting counter-
insurgency doctrine with political goals and foreign policy.323 
Military psychologist James Griffith is a leading researcher in the fields of unit 
cohesion and soldier performance on behalf of the U.S. Army. Dr. Griffith emphasized 
that he has come to view social identity as a critical component of cohesion.324 Elements 
of social identity provide “the individual a social context to access additional coping 
strategies and social support to reduce the negative effects.”325 For further study, Griffith 
recommended reviewing previous research work regarding cohesion in U.S. Army 
                                                 
320 Granovetter, e-mail correspondence-response to questions from author. 
321 Joseph S. Nye, e-mail correspondence-response to question from author, April 18, 2011. 
322 Ibid. 
323 Joseph Nye, The Future of Power, 1st ed. (New York: Public Affairs, 2011). 
324 James Griffith, e-mail correspondence- response to questions from author, April 12, 2011. 
325 James Griffith, “Reserve Identities: What Are They? And Do They Matter? An Empirical 
Examination,” Armed Forces & Society (February 28, 2011), 
http://afs.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/02/27/0095327X10382213.abstract. 
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Special Forces units in the late 1980s. This research found that organizational structures 
rather than personality traits in special operations units facilitate unit camaraderie and 
offer some inoculation from mental stress incurred in training and combat.326  
Military strategist Major General (Ret.) Bob Scales served as a Commandant of 
the U.S. Army War College. In discussions with the author, MG (Ret.) Scales 
emphasized the importance of common goals, or “having skin in the game,” in 
facilitating interoperability.327 Scales has proposed using many of the best practices in 
training special operations soldiers during conventional basic training, employing sports 
psychologists, small team “coaches,” and cultural training. He emphasizes the role of 
social networking in maximizing small unit combat performance; envisioning soldiers 
interconnected among comrades, senior leader and “dashboard operators” providing 
access to interpreters, cultural advisers, or intelligence analysts. If MG (Ret.) Scales 
vision of future combat training becomes a reality, NATO special operations forces one 
day may rapidly communicate using BICES network functions available in mobile 
helmet or I-phone sized platforms. 
Australian Major General Rick Burr, the current commander of the Australian 1st 
Division, served as the former commander of the Australian Special Air Service, as well 
as the first ISAF SOF commanding general in Afghanistan from 2008–2009.328 From his 
previous unique experience, the author sought his opinion on whether a network structure 
similar to the NATO SOF Headquarters might develop in the Pacific region or Asia.329 
Major General Burr emphasized that currently neither an existing parent structure nor 
framework, such as NATO, exists in the region and that most militaries in the areas lack a 
common operational focus. Burr further described that across Southeast Asia and the 
Pacific, “strategically, countries within this region generally tend to favor bilateral 
                                                 
326 Frederick Manning and Terrence Fullerton, “Health and Well-Being in Highly Cohesive Units in 
the U.S. Army,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 18, no. 6 (1988): 503–519. 
327 Bob Scales, phone conversation with author, April 22, 2011. 
328 Rick Burr, e-mail correspondence-response to question from author, May 15, 2011. 
329 Ibid. 
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approaches rather than multilateral engagements and alliances.”330 A senior U.S. special 
operations officer described similar difficulties in building similar frameworks in South 
America beyond the bilateral partnership with Colombia.331 The limitations cited by 
these leaders indicates that regional special operations interoperability efforts outside of 
NATO may take the form of loose partnerships pursuing combined training and 
education similar to the NATO SOF Training and Education Program rather than a fully 
functioning combined headquarters similar to the NATO SOF Headquarters.  
As described in Chapter IV of this report, many NATO nations have described 
future security threats using language of uncertainty, which requires the development of 
flexible and adaptive network structures, such as the NATO SOF Headquarters, to 
combat emerging threats. As a testing ground for potential global SOF interoperability, 
the NSHQ serves as a laboratory for innovation and creative solutions for complicated 
challenges. The organization has prudently sought the advice of international scholars 
and leaders from a variety of disciplines to approach these challenges from different 
perspectives. The valuable feedback provided by the esteemed panel of scholars and 
leaders in this report contributes to this tradition.  
                                                 
330 Burr, e-mail correspondence-response to question from author. 
331 Author’s conversation with a U.S. flag officer with former operational experience in the U.S., 
European and Southern commands, April 2011. 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This report proposed a basic framework for improving special operations 
interoperability and performance in combined operations. Chapter I examined relevant 
literature relating to special operations interoperability and cohesion, contemporary 
threats, and social and technical networking to capture best practices and thoughts from a 
variety of academic disciplines. Chapter II proposed a theoretical framework to evaluate 
recent NATO SOF initiatives, make recommendations to the command for future 
development, and describe the methods of research. The theoretical framework attempted 
to expand elements of the NSHQ’s Allied and Partner Collaborative Network narrative 
inspired by the work of defense analysts John Arquilla and David Rondfelt.332 The 
overarching hypothesis of this report proposed that special operations coalitions with 
high levels of camaraderie, social and technical networking, and the presence of common 
threats enable enhanced special operations interoperability and effectiveness in combined 
operations. These dynamics coalesce to produce the accelerants of trust, responsibility, 
and access that contribute to elevate coalitions from marginal levels of integration to 
become special operations networks with increased operational performance. 
Chapter III examined WWII combined special operations units to determine why 
social networks and interoperability did not persist following the end of the conflict and 
examine the common history forming the lineage of NATO SOF. This historical research 
found that special operations forces pursuing common goals against common threats 
coalesced to achieve unprecedented interoperability and integration. Following the end of 
the conflict, network structures were not in place to capture the high levels of trust and 
camaraderie that had developed through combined combat. Colleagues who maintained 
regular contact with each other through regular reunions, letter writing, and telephone 
correspondence forged closer bonds that persisted for many decades following the 
                                                 
332 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters, “Allied and Partner 
Collaborative Network (APCN); John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of 
Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Cooperation, 2001), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382/index.html.” 
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conflict. Relationships not nurtured shortly following the war soon diminished. The 
conclusion of the chapter described the golden opportunity of collaboration and 
camaraderie gained by combined special operations service in Afghanistan. The author 
offered a recommendation that social and technical networking mechanisms and 
combined schooling and training could capture and enhance established camaraderie to 
improve performance in future contingency operations.  
Chapter IV analyzed modern threats common to all members of the NATO 
Alliance. This analysis attempted to identify common themes that would encourage 
further special operations collaboration and interoperability. The author surveyed the 
defense white papers and national defense strategies for many NATO nations, as well as 
other emerging world powers to capture trends in security planning. This analysis 
identified themes of uncertainty and asymmetric threats, such as terrorism, weapons of 
mass destruction, piracy, and cyber-terror as the primary concerns for most word powers, 
rather than conventional threats. The author further explored these themes with regional 
analysis to identify whether the security concerns mentioned in the defense reviews posed 
legitimate threats to alliance nations. The author found substantial support for concerns 
outlined in the defense reviews and white papers and concluded that special operations 
forces are suited best to meet unconventional security challenges threatening NATO. 
These emerging threats serve as a common narrative to encourage increased special 
operations cooperation, intelligence sharing, and efforts to enhance unit interoperability.  
Chapter V explored the antecedent conditions present during the formative years 
of current NATO special operations soldiers and their units’ development to ascertain 
whether the community was likely to embrace interoperability development methods 
recommended in Chapter III. Discussion documented various NSHQ sponsored 
initiatives, such as NATO Special Operations Training and Education Program course 
offerings, the BICES computer network, English language instruction programs, and the 
development of social networking tools connecting soldiers. The chapter concluded that 
NATO SOF has made significant progress toward establishing mechanisms likely to 
improve social and technical networking efforts among returning veterans from  
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Afghanistan. The author presented recommendations for continued development of 
combined training and education programs to maintain persistent contact among NATO 
special operations soldiers between contingency operations. 
Chapter VI presented a series of case studies outlining trends in NATO special 
operations development. The ambitious volunteerism of Norwegian special operations 
represents a model for emerging special operations forces to gain greater influence and 
recognition in NATO. The benefits of geographic proximity between German and U.S. 
special operations forces described the benefits of forward presence and persistent 
engagement between units. The establishment of the Czech 601st Special Forces Group 
presented a model for restructuring former Cold War era units into successful and 
effective special operations forces. The post-financial crisis austerity measures in Greece 
and U.S. national debt described potential eras of reduced military spending for the 
alliance and recommended utilizing special operations as an economy of force to achieve 
significant results with limited resources. The Dutch withdrawal from Afghanistan 
framed a discussion on future NATO special operations units’ missions. The author 
proposed that units relived of Afghanistan commitments could now offer substantial 
support in military assistance efforts in Africa and counter-piracy efforts in the Indian 
Ocean. The significant contributions of Australia and New Zealand in Afghanistan 
proposed the development of regional special operations networks around the world with 
the NSHQ as a potential model. The author concluded that these regional network 
structures would be helpful to counter asymmetric threats while outlining some 
challenges that would likely delay the initiation of these structures. 
Chapter VII presented survey research, statistical analysis, and feedback from 
scholars and summaries of personal interviews to capture the views and trends present in 
NATO special operations in support of the theoretical framework presented in Chapter II. 
The collected survey data supported the three primary hypotheses proposed in the 
framework, with correlations shown between increased camaraderie and common 
language, consensus with common goals and common threats, and social and technical 
networking to facilitate interoperability and coalition performance. Data identified 
significant areas for improvement regarding the deployment and training on the BICES 
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network. Personal interviews and round table discussions emphasized support and 
encouragement for NATO SOF development initiatives while voicing concerns regarding 
likely reduced financial resources, uncertainty regarding post-Afghanistan employment, 
and changing European demographics and emphasizing little concern for conventional 
threats but universal concern for non-state actors and asymmetric warfare. Feedback from 
prominent scholars gave additional insight to propose recommendations for improving 
unit cohesion, network communication, structure military education, and analyze 
emerging threats. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Throughout the course of preparing this report, the collective research, survey 
data, personal interviews, and feedback from prominent scholars, all support NATO SOF 
Headquarters development initiatives direction and momentum. These initiatives have 
achieved significant success in a rapid manner. The following recommendations should 
assist the NATO special operations community achieve the vision of the Allied and 
Partner Collaborative Network and optimize the employment of special operations forces 
in future contingency missions.  
1. Address BICES Network Training Shortcomings 
Less than a quarter of special operations soldiers surveyed or interviewed in this 
research have access and any form of BICES network training. Additional mobile 
training teams deployed to conduct training at tactical units would ensure soldiers receive 
instruction on the benefits of the network and can access the network’s full suite of 
capabilities. Some terminals deployed to higher headquarters receive little use; 
identifying methods to push these available terminals to tactical level units may alleviate 
some of the accessibility issues noted by respondents. If no mechanism is available to 
soldiers returning from Afghanistan, or combined pre-mission training to capture 
established social networks, these bonds will rapidly fade. 
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2. Encourage SOF NET Social Networking Collaboration 
The NSHQ sponsored unclassified social networking portal serves as a 
mechanism to fill gaps in BICES network training and deployment until greater 
distribution becomes feasible. SOF NET should mirror the layout and functions of 
BICES to serve as a training tool and encourage users to move online collaboration and 
to the classified network. 
3. Embrace Common Afghanistan Service and Sacrifice 
Combine service in the Afghanistan war serves as a common bond linking a 
majority of NATO special operations soldiers. Domestic political discourse and protests 
over the conduct of the war could negatively affect soldiers’ perceptions of the worth of 
their own participation in the conflict. Capturing the social networks established through 
combined service and harnessing the valuable experience gained in the conflict will 
facilitate collaboration and maintain trusted relationships. The SOF Net online portal can 
direct traffic to online memorials and Afghanistan veterans group pages to maintain and 
enhance camaraderie forged in combat. In the long term, the headquarters should expand 
the online forums and create a memorial in Mons or Chièvres to honor NATO special 
operations warriors that fall in the line of duty in various conflicts and training and invite 
family members to attend the memorial’s unveiling. 
4. Create Well Defined Common Employment Criteria 
Consensus on employment criteria within a well defined asymmetric warfare 
mission targeting non-state actors threatening vital infrastructure, populations, or 
economic interest will limit political rows among allies prior to the deployment of NATO 
special operations forces. Disputes among troop employment in Iraq and more recently in 
Libya demonstrate the importance of well-defined missions that maximize the full 
capabilities of special operations, while not creating cleavages among allies. 
5. Maintain Emphasis English Language Training Opportunities 
Providing additional training to increase proficiency in a common language is the 
least resource intensive method to facilitate special operations interoperability. NATO 
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special operations has made significant progress in this field over the past decade; 
however, many soldiers in emerging special operations units still lack language skills 
required to attend combined training courses or clearly communicate in combat. 
6. Encourage Combined Training Outside of NSHQ Events 
Encouraging continued cooperation and training outside of NSHQ exercises and 
NSTEP training through the Federation of Training Centers and Opportunities offers the 
headquarters a low cost solution to maintain established interoperability with minimal 
investment. As financial austerity measures permeate across NATO, many special 
operations units are likely to see training budget cuts and access to training venues 
outside of Europe constraining. In preparation for impending budget reduction, the 
headquarters may sponsor an exchange where tactical units can swap access to national 
training venues in Europe in a co-op fashion to ensure operators gain exposure to a 
variety of training scenarios and environments. 
7. Promote Forward-Deployed American SOF in Europe 
Forward deployed tactical units and the U.S. Special Operations Command-
Europe presence forward deployed in Europe have contributed to the development, 
mentorship, and growth of many NATO special operations units. Budget cuts over the 
next decade may contribute to renewed efforts to relocate these units to the continental 
United States. Redeployments of forward staged troops would severely weaken 
interoperability development and partnership efforts. The NATO SOF Headquarters 
should continue to advocate the benefits of U.S. SOF persistent forward presence. 
Additional efforts to encourage partnership with U.S. based American special operations 
forces will ensure best practices in coalition warfare spread beyond the approximately 1% 
of American SOF forward deployed in Europe. 
8. Maintain Relationships with Postgraduate Institutions 
The NATO SOF Headquarters and Training and Education Program are pursuing 
cross-cultural initiatives to challenge emerging global threats. The unique programs offer 
significant incentives for collaboration with higher education institutions around the 
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world. Through the preparation of this report, esteemed scholars at the U.S. Naval 
Postgraduate School, Stanford University and Harvard expressed significant interest in 
the innovative programs currently pursued by NATO SOF. Seeking partnerships for guest 
lectures, sponsored research, or fellowships at various institutions would benefit students 
and staff while advancing information operations goals. 
C.  THE CHALLENGE 
Achieving interoperability alone will not achieve increased performance; senior 
leaders should employ special operations capabilities prudently to ensure these units 
achieve their full potential in appropriate missions. Continued coordination, integration, 
and persistent engagement among NATO partners will ensure relationships forged in 
recent combat experience are not lost. When properly resourced, combined special 
operations units can overcome barriers to communication and varying capabilities to 
coalesce against common threats. The alliance must innovate more rapidly than the 
irregular threats and rogue states that threaten societies with terrorism, weapons of mass 
destruction development, cyber-war, and radical ideologies. Special operations are the 
right tool to combat modern threats, but they must act with common purpose, goals, and 
unity of effort to maximize combined performance. 
The uncertainty of European security threats mandates that NATO evolve to 
remain a viable security apparatus prepared to deter asymmetric threats. The emergence 
of non-state actors and empowered terrorist groups have led critics to question the utility 
of an alliance designed to deter conventional attacks by nation states; however, an array 
of interoperable and flexible NATO special operations capabilities are the best defense 
against modern threats. NATO should continue to develop highly resourced, efficient and 
rapidly deployable forces that can effectively conduct counter-terror operations in 
coordination with intelligence agencies and law enforcement. Although the creation of 
the NATO Response Force was a step in the right direction, this organization lacks the 




diminish the threat to Europe from non-state actors and diffused terrorist franchises. The 
NATO SOF Headquarters’ creation ensures that the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe 
has a complement of rapid response options to emerging threats.  
D. THE OUTLOOK  
The future of NATO SOF integration looks bright. The former NATO SOF 
Coordination Center (NSCC) made astounding progress in the integration of NATO 
special operations capabilities between 2006 and 2010 by advancing the staff functions, 
communications, and individual skills.333 This work formalized expanding relationships 
created in modern contingencies to ensure integration endured beyond current 
contingency operations. The NATO SOF Headquarters assumed and expanded efforts of 
these previous initiatives to enhance special operations capabilities and capacity across 
the alliance. The NATO SOF Headquarters now serves as a mechanism to capture the 
best practices in force integration and global special operations interoperability. Shared 
bonds formed over the past nine years of combat have established interpersonal 
collaborative networks linking international diplomatic, law enforcement and inter-
agency partners. These networks will improve global special operations integration to 
meet common social, economic, and security threats from non-state actors and rogue 
states. Through this endeavor, the NSHQ can achieve the long-term integration the 
special operations pioneers of the WWII era envisioned. Pre-existing NATO initiatives, 
command structure, and relationships have given the NSHQ significantly more resources 
and mechanisms to pursue special operations integration than other regional partnerships. 
Despite these limitations, application of the basic framework proposed can enhance 
interoperability in less robust collaborative structures and bilateral relationships among 
special operations units.  
The unique historic convergence of camaraderie, common threats, and available 
network access have created conditions that offer a golden opportunity to make 
substantial progress in advancing special operations interoperability and unit 
                                                 




effectiveness. The NATO Special Operations Headquarters prudently invested 
considerable resources and efforts to harness momentum achieved through recent 
European history and Afghanistan camaraderie. These initiatives indicate the command 
will continue to grow into a viable and effective trusted network, which will pursue 
increased global special operations interoperability and be prepared to confront future 
threats to ensure the NATO Alliance remains relevant in the 21st century. 
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APPENDIX A. PERCEIVED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS  




 “We must maintain our military’s conventional superiority, while enhancing its 
capacity to defeat asymmetric threats. (p. 8) 
 “Terrorism is one of many threats that are more consequential in a global age. The 
gravest danger to the American people and global security continues to come from 




 “we do not currently face, as we have so often in our past, a conventional threat of 
attack on our territory by a hostile power. (p. 3) 
  “Today, Britain faces a different and more complex range of threats from a myriad 
of sources. Terrorism, cyber attack, unconventional attacks using chemical, nuclear 
or biological weapons, as well as large scale accidents or natural hazards anyone 
could do grave damage to our country.” (p. 3) 
 “This Strategy is about gearing Britain up for this new age of uncertainty weighing 
up the threats we face, and preparing to deal with them.” (p. 3) 
France 337 
2008 
 “Complexity and uncertainty are unquestionably major features of this new 
environment. No single analytical framework can suffice to grasp in all their 
dimensions the economic, strategic political and cultural dynamics shaping 
globalization, or flowing from it.” (p. 13) 
 The prime mission of the (NATO) Alliance is collective defence, in a context 
implying the need to adjust to new risks, e.g. the spread of ballistic technologies and 
other vehicles capable of delivering conventional or non-conventional military 
payloads, mass terrorism, cyber attacks, as well as all means of bypassing the Allied 
countries’ military assets. (p. 100) 
Canada 338 
2008 
 “Canadians live in a world characterized by volatility and unpredictability. (p.6 ) 
  “Globalization means that developments abroad can have a profound impact on the 
safety and interests of Canadians at home.” (p. 6) 
 “Canada needs a modern, well-trained and well-equipped military with the core 
capabilities and flexibility required to successfully address both conventional and 
asymmetric threats, including terrorism, insurgencies and cyber attacks.” (p. 7) 
Turkey 339 
2000 
 “Turkey also believes that at present the fight against international terrorism in the 
world, the illegal arms trade, drugs smuggling and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction occupy an important place in providing regional and world peace.” 
(p. 5) 
  “At present (2000), it is not possible to say that the international community shows 
the needed reaction to terrorism.” (p. 5) 
                                                 
334 Note: English language translations of national defence reviews and white papers analyzed may be 
found at http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers.html. 
335 President of the United States, “2010 NSS.” 
336 UK Ministry of Defence, “Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) Securing Britain in an 
Age of Uncertainty,” 2010.  
337 French Government, The French White Paper on Defence and National Security, 2008. 
338 Canadian Ministry of National Defence, “Canada First Defence Strategy,” 2008.  
339 Turkey Ministry of National Defense, “Defense White Paper,” 2000. 
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 “Extremism, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their 
means of delivery including ballistic missiles rank among the gravest threats that 
can directly or indirectly impact security interests of the Czech Republic and her 
allies.” (p. 3) 
Croatia 341 
2005 
 “The world increasingly faces new forms of threats. International terrorism, 
smuggling of narcotics, weapons and human beings and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction create enormous challenges for most states, thus 
becoming global concerns.” (p. 5) 
Poland 342 
2007 
 In the context of the ongoing war on terrorism, Special Forces have gained more 
significance because they are best prepared to carry out operations against 
asymmetrical threats and to cooperate with other specialized institutions and 
authorities operating in the state security system.(p. 24) 
Spain 343 
2005 
 “new risks and threats have emerged, such as transnational terrorism with its 
global reach and its immense capacity to inflict damage in an indiscriminate 
manner... in the face of these new risks and threats, traditional military superiority 
does not represent an effective deterrent.” (p. 4) 
 “ the possibility of terrorist groups acquiring these weapons (of mass destruction) 
today poses the most serious threat to global security” (p. 4) 
Germany 344 
2006 
 “The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington, and the 
subsequent series of terror acts stretching from Bali to Madrid and London, have 
illustrated the vulnerability of modern states and societies worldwide. They 
underline that the most immediate danger to our security currently emanates from 
international terrorism perpetrated methodically in transnational networks.” (p.18) 
 “The proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery potentially represents the 
greatest threat to global security and, consequently, one of the largest political 
challenges to the international community of states.” (p. 18) 
Denmark 345 
2009 
 “in the light of the absence of a conventional threat to Danish territory, the Danish 
Armed Forces are currently undergoing an extensive transformation from a 
traditional mobilization defence to a modern deployable defence force.” (p. 1) 
 “Danish Armed Forces, in connection with international missions, must 
increasingly be prepared to encounter both asymmetric instruments of warfare and 
more conventional instruments of warfare. (p. 3) 
                                                 
340 The Czech Republic, “The Military Strategy of the Czech Republic,” 2008.  
341 Republic of Croatia Ministry of Defence, “Strategic Defense Review,” 2005.   
342 Republic of Poland, “National security Strategy of the Republic of Poland,” 2007.  
343 Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, “National Defence Directive 1/2004,” 2004. 
344 German Federal Ministry of Defence, “White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the 
Future of the Bundeswehr.” 
345 Danish government, “Danish Defence Agreement,” 2009.  
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Nation Summary of national security concerns noted in defense reviews or white papers334 
Lithuania346 
2006 
 “There is increasing attention to the development of special operations forces and 
light- and medium-sized military units. Modern command, control, 
communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems are necessary to 
guarantee effective interaction between multinational forces.” (p. 15) 
“The main source of threat is no longer the armies of other states but non-state 
groups and terrorist networks, often supported by authoritarian regimes and 
employing unconventional fighting methods.”(p. 11)  
The EU 347 
2003 
“The post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the 
internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked.” (p.1) 
 “Others have perceived globalisation as a cause of frustration and injustice. These 
developments have also increased the scope for non-state groups to play a part in 
international affairs. And they have increased European dependence—and so 
vulnerability—on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information 
and other fields.” (p. 1) 
Australia 348 
2009 
 “Australia cannot be secure in an insecure world. We have a strategic interest in 
preserving an international order that restrains aggression by states against each 
other, and can effectively manage other risks and threats, such as the proliferation 
of WMD, terrorism, state fragility and failure, intra-state conflict, and the security 
impacts of climate change and resource scarcity.”(p. 12) 
 “Australia's engagement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 
the European Union (EU) centre on three main themes: seeking ways to respond 
effectively to threats posed by international terrorism; contributing to international 
counter-proliferation efforts; and sharing the challenge of dealing with the 
destabilizing effects of failing and failed states.” (p. 100) 
China349 
2008 
 “China is still confronted with long-term, complicated, and diverse security threats 
and challenges. Issues of existence security and development security, traditional 
security threats and non-traditional security threats, and domestic security and 
international security are interwoven and interactive.” (p. 6) 
 “Issues such as terrorism, environmental disasters, climate change, serious 




 An external threat to Russia includes “the desire to endow the force potential of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with global functions carried out in 
violation of the norms of international law”(p. 26) 
 Russian will “combat piracy and ensure the safety of shipping” (p. 32) and 
“participate in the international struggle against terrorism”(p. 8) 
 
Table 13.   Summary of National Security Concerns Noted in Defense Reviews  
                                                 
346 Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense, “White Paper- Lithuanian Defence Policy,” 2006.  
347 European Council, “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy,” 2003.  
348 Australian Government, “Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030,” 2009. 
349 Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s National Defense in 
2008,” 2009. 
350 Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” 2010.  
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Figure 13.   1990 NATO Nations’ Internet Distribution 
 
                                                 
351 The World Bank, “Internet Users Data,” 2010, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER/countries/1W?page=2&cid=GPD_58&display=default., 
Note: graphs and charts prepared by the author using data available in worldwide internet growth statistics 







































































































































































































































































































































































The Majors and below know 
nothing but coalition war, have been 
networked their entire adult lives, 
and are more likely to have a 
common world perspective.
  
Figure 21.   European SOF Antecedent Conditions 
Prepared by M. Gates, 2011 
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APPENDIX D. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Statistical analysis used ordinary least square (OLS) regression modeling to 
identify the influence of six independent variables on the dependent variable measuring 
special operations soldiers’ assessments of their allies.352 The combined dependent 
variable tested assessments of cohesion composed of the characterization traits of honest, 
effective, reliable, brave, competent, and trustworthy. The operational dependent variable 
isolated assessments that measured operational interoperability characterization traits of 
effective, reliable, and competent within the combined dependent variable. The 
personality dependent variable isolated assessments of honest, brave, and trustworthy 
within the combined dependent variable. Whereas summary averages discussed in 
Chapter VII used data from all 225 complete survey responses, this regression analysis 
focused on 67 of the total 225 survey responses that had exposure to all of the variables 
assessed in theoretical model. The largest limiting factor in selecting responses with 
exposure to all variables was the limited number of respondents with routine access to 
emerging communication capabilities such as the BICES Network.  
Total sample analysis significant observations: In the correlation matrix, a 
significant positive relationship was noted between training and doctrine and overcoming 
barriers to communication Additional positive relationship were noted between barriers 
to communication and the variables presence and language. Complimentary training and 
doctrine emerged as the variable strongly influencing assessments of operational 
characterization traits, while common language was most significant in influencing 
perceptions of personality cohesion traits. 
                                                 
352 An overview of how to interpret regression data may be found in Pawel Lewicki and Thomas Hill, 
“Statistics: Methods and Applications,” 2011, http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/. Values in the correlation 
matrix portray the level of change in one variable in proportion to a change in a corresponding variable, 
indicating dependence in variables. For example, if a correlation coefficient is 1 then the two variables are 
perfectly correlated. In testing dependent variables, coefficients indicate whether the tested independent 
variable has a positive or negative influence on the dependent variable. P values demonstrate statistical 
significance of independent variables on the dependent variable. P values below 0.05 generally indicate that 
the tested independent variable significantly influences the dependent variable.   
 150
European sample significant observations: Within the European sample, the 
analysis identified high causal effects in the independent variables of complimentary 
training and doctrine and overcoming barriers to communication. Language, presence, 
and complimentary training and resources all had high statistic significance in 
influencing perceptions on operational characterization traits. Language was statistically 
significant in influencing personality cohesion traits. The significant relationship of 
language influencing both operational and personality assessments reinforces NSTEP’s 
common language initiatives, which indicates that interoperability emerges both in the 
classroom and during afterhours socializing.  
U.S. sample significant observations: Within the U.S. sample, the analysis 
identified high causal effects in the independent variables of complimentary training and 
doctrine and overcoming barriers to communication, similar to the European sample. 
Communication capabilities emerged as the independent variable that most directly 
influenced assessments of both operational capabilities as well as personality trait 
assessments. This finding indicates that the U.S. sample more heavily relies on 
communications and technology to forge personal and professional relationships as well 
as measure an allies’ ability to participate in combined operations fully. The significant 
prominence of emerging technology in American special operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq likely has helped shape this view, as well as the several year head start in 
Americans’ exposure to emerging technology noted in Appendix B. Language also 
emerged as statistically significant in influencing assessments of personality cohesion 
traits. The U.S. sample demonstrated the high prominence American special operators 
place on being able to maintain effective communication in personal interaction and 
network communications.   
Overview: The initiatives pursued by the NSHQ over the last four years have 
made significant progress in reduced impediments to communication among NATO 
special operations forces. The dedication of European special operations forces to expand 
language training opportunities and communication infrastructure at a time of 
unprecedented operational tempo has improved interoperability and cohesion. The 
analysis also highlighted the prominent role of complimentary training and doctrine in 
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overcoming additional impediments to effective combined operations, another area of 
specific focus for the NSHQ over the past four years. Data collection in this field should 
expand to capture a larger portion of the NATO SOF community with exposure to 
emerging technology to evaluate the findings of this initial analysis further. If the results 
of this analysis hold up under subsequent testing, it would appear that NSHQ initiatives 
prudently have targeted the areas of focus that most directly influence combined special 




1.  Total survey population: (U.S. and European SOF)  








presence 1.0000      
language 0.552 1.000     
training and doctrine  0.568 0.538 1.000    
structure and resources 0.077 -0.213 -0.173 1.000   
overcoming barriers to 
communication 
0.538 0.546 0.783 -0.228 1.000  
communication 
capabilities/BICES    
-0.019 0.316 0.003 -0.053 0.227 1.000 
Table 14.   U.S. and EUR Sample Correlation Matrix 
 
Combined dependent variable tested includes an assessment of cohesion 
composed of the characterization traits of honest, effective, reliable, brave, 
competent, and trustworthy. 
Coef 
+ or - 
influence 
  t  
Less than 0.05 stat 
significant 
presence -0.184 0.425 
language 0.309 0.066 
training and doctrine 0.232 0.351 
structure and resources 0.143 0.161 
barriers to communication 0.189 0.379 
communication capabilities  0.178 0.041 
*constant (other variables influencing DV outside of tested IVs) 0.458 0.701 
Number of Observations: 67 R-Squared: .3319 





Operational dependent variable tested includes an assessment of operations 
interoperability characterization traits of effective, reliable, and competent 
Coef 




Less than 0.05 
stat significant
 
presence -0.329 0.189 
language 0.153 0.396 
training and doctrine 0.538 0.048 
structure and resources 0.179 0.107 
overcoming barriers to communication 0.139 0.548 
communication capabilities  access / BICES 0.194 0.040 
*constant (other variables influencing DV outside of tested IVs) 0.291 0.821 
Number of Observations: 67 R-Squared: .3063 
Table 16.   U.S. and EUR Sample, Operational DV Regression Analysis 
 
Personality dependent variable tested includes an assessment of personality 
cohesion traits of honest, brave, and trustworthy. 
Coef 
+ or - 
influence 
  t
   
Less than 0.05 
stat significant
 
presence -0.039 0.879 
language 0.466 0.015 
training and doctrine -0.075 0.786 
structure and resources 0.108 0.346 
overcoming barriers to communication 0.239 0.324 
communication capabilities  access / BICES 0.162 0.096 
*constant (other variables influencing DV outside of tested IVs) 0.624 0.641 
Number of Observations: 67 R-Squared: 0.3151 
Table 17.   U.S. and EUR Sample, Personality DV Regression Analysis 
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2.  Portion of total survey population: European SOF 
Cor^2= percentage of 
change between 
variables 








presence 1.000      
language 0.819 1.000     
training and doctrine  0.541 0.605 1.000    
structure and 
resources 
-0.2514 -0.218 -0.1039 1.000   
Overcoming barriers 
to communication 
0.5586 0.649 0.705 -0.097 1.000  
communication 
capabilities  
0.096 0.243 -0.081 -0.019 0.229 1.000 
Table 18.   EUR Sample Correlation Matrix 
 
Combined dependent variable tested includes an assessment of cohesion 
composed of the characterization traits of honest, effective, reliable, brave, 
competent, and trustworthy. 
Coef 
+ or - 
influence 
  t
       
Less than 0.05 stat 
significant
 
presence -0.604 0.082 
language 0.808 0.010 
training and doctrine 0.400 0.233 
structure and resources 0.425 0.034 
barriers to communication -0.097 0.776 
communication capabilities  0.169 0.109 
*constant (other variables influencing DV outside of tested IVs) -0.531 0.781 
Number of Observations: 31 R-Squared: 0.5459 
Table 19.   EUR Sample, Combined DV Regression Analysis 
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Operational dependent variable tested includes an assessment of operations 
interoperability characterization traits of effective, reliable, and competent 
Coef 




Less than 0.05 
stat significant
 
presence -0.883 0.028 
language 0.809 0.022 
training and doctrine 0.786 0.045 
structure and resources 0.502 0.028 
overcoming barriers to communication -0.462 0.238 
communication capabilities  0.206 0.087 
*constant (other variables influencing DV outside of tested IVs) 0.527 0.808 
Number of Observations: 31 R-Squared: .5085 
Table 20.   EUR Sample, Operational DV Regression Analysis 
 
Personality dependent variable tested includes an assessment of personality 
cohesion traits of honest, brave, and trustworthy. 
Coef 




Less than 0.05 
stat significant
 
presence -0.324 0.365 
language 0.807 0.015 
training and doctrine 0.014 0.969 
structure and resources 0.348 0.094 
overcoming barriers to communication 0.269 0.456 
communication capabilities   0.133 0.229 
*constant (other variables influencing DV outside of tested IVs) -1.590 0.433 
Number of Observations: 31 R-Squared: .5598 




3.  Portion of total survey population: U.S. SOF 
Cor^2= percentage 
of change between 
variables 








presence 1.000      
language 0.336 1.000     
training and doctrine  0.609 0.514 1.000    
structure and 
resources 
0.304 0.021 -0.173 1.000   
overcoming barriers 
to communication 
0.607 0.429 0.845 -0.072 1.000  
communication 
capabilities    
-0.152 0.246 0.019 0.199 0.105 1.000 
Table 22.   U.S. Sample Correlation Matrix 
 
Combined dependent variable tested includes an assessment of cohesion 
composed of the characterization traits of honest, effective, reliable, brave, 
competent, and trustworthy. 
Coef 
+ or - 
influence 
  t      
Less than 0.05 stat 
significant
 
presence 0.308 0.47 
language 0.260 0.263 
training and doctrine -0.271 0.503 
structure and resources -0.149 0.394 
barriers to communication 0.389 0.225 
communication capabilities  0.289 0.049 
*constant (other variables influencing DV outside of tested IVs) 0.791 0.653 
Number of Observations: 36 R-Squared: 0.3512 






Operational dependent variable tested includes an assessment of operations 
interoperability characterization traits of effective, reliable, and competent 
Coef       
+ or - 
influence 
  t    
Less than 0.05 
stat significant
 
presence 0.194 0.665 
language 0.055 0.819 
training and doctrine 0.103 0.808 
structure and resources -0.059 0.744 
overcoming barriers to communication 0.329 0.327 
communication capabilities  access / BICES 0.267 0.080 
*constant (other variables influencing DV outside of tested IVs) 0.148 0.936 
Number of Observations: 36 R-Squared: .3353 
Table 24.   U.S. Sample, Operational DV Regression Analysis 
 
Personality dependent variable tested includes an assessment of personality 
cohesion traits of honest, brave, and trustworthy. 
Coef       




Less than 0.05 
stat significant
 
presence 0.421 0.395 
language 0.465 0.089 
training and doctrine -0.645 0.174 
structure and resources -0.238 0.242 
overcoming barriers to communication 0.449 0.226 
communication capabilities  access / BICES 0.311 0.066 
*constant (other variables influencing DV outside of tested IVs) 1.434 0.483 
Number of Observations: 36 R-Squared: .3246 
Table 25.   U.S. Sample, Personality DV Regression Analysis 
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